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 A traditional problem concerning the meaning or logical content of statements 
of identity received its modern formulation in Gottlob Frege’s “On Sense and 
Reference.”  Identity is taken either as a relation between objects or a relation 
between terms.  If identity is interpreted as a relation between objects, then identity 
statements seem to be of little value since everything is clearly identical to itself.  
Assertions of identity are thought to convey significant information, but it is hard to 
see how they can on this interpretation.  If identity is instead interpreted as a relation 
between terms, then identity statements still seem to be of little value since apparently 
they only convey a linguistic pronouncement to use certain terms interchangeably.  
Assertions of identity do not appear to be about the use of language, but, on this 
understanding of identity, they evidently are. 
 I examine the nature of the problem (and what it would take to solve it) and 
the advantages and disadvantages of each one of the two approaches to interpreting 
the content of identity statements.  I then investigate two approaches for solving the 
problem from the perspective of identity as a relation between objects.  The first of 
these represents the account provided by Gottlob Frege, and the second represents the 
account provided by Saul Kripke.  I conclude that neither one of these accounts 
finally solves the problem of identity in its entirety.  I then examine Michael 
Lockwood’s approach to resolving the problem of identity based on the idea of 
identity as a relation between terms.  I discuss and critically evaluate Lockwood’s 
account together with a modified version of that account.  After arguing for the 
inadequacy of the views examined as ultimate solutions to the problem of identity, I 
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Chapter 1: Worries about Identity 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 Although it would be a brash overstatement to declare, as Bertrand Russell is 
reputed to have said, that all philosophy is logic or, as Ludwig Wittgenstein stated in 
the Tractatus, that all philosophy is a "critique of language," one of the lessons of 
analytic philosophy has been that logical matters are often at the heart of 
philosophical perplexities.1  Few philosophical problems are reducible to logical 
problems, but many philosophical problems cannot be adequately resolved until 
certain key logical problems are solved.2  If only because any proposed solution of a 
philosophical difficulty will in general not be recognized as truly resolving an issue 
unless the arguments offered in defense of the proposed resolution are acknowledged 
to be sound, the connection between philosophical and logical problems should come 
as no surprise.  Such is the situation, I believe, with the numerous philosophical 
perplexities surrounding the notion of identity.  The various stances that have been 
taken on what constitutes personal identity (i.e., the various accounts of when person 
a is identical to person b) and the identity of objects through time as well as the 
acceptance or rejection of either the hypothesis that mental events are just brain 
events or the hypothesis that the mental supervenes on the physical presuppose an 
adequate prior understanding of the logical nature of the identity predicate.  It is to 
                                                 
1.  The declaration attributed to Russell may an interpretation of a similar remark he made in 
Our Knowledge of the External World. 
2.  I maintain this in spite of some fairly recent criticism of this sort of thesis by Richard 
Mason in his book Before Logic. 
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provide that sort of understanding that the following discussion is aimed.  Even 
though I will not specifically discuss the traditional nonlogical or extralogical 
problems associated with identity (such as the problems just alluded to concerning the 
identity of persons and of objects over time and the relation of the mental to the 
physical), I hope to shed some light, at least indirectly, upon the character of these 
and similar problems by examining the logical problem of identity.  Furthermore, the 
manner in which identity statements are ultimately analyzed may reveal how we 
should correctly understand not only the logical notion of truth but also the nature of 
the entire metalanguage-object language distinction.  There are some interesting 
parallels between certain difficulties concerning the ascription of truth and other 
difficulties having to do with the assertion of an identity.  These difficulties may be 
interconnected in that an understanding of what it means to say that things are 
identical may require a prior understanding of what it means to say that something is 
true of an object.  If such is indeed the case, then it will mean that the relation 
between our talk about objects and our talk about talk about objects may need to be 
reconsidered at a fundamental level. 
 
1.1 Logical and nonlogical difficulties with identity 
 The logical problem of identity, or what I will subsequently refer to as simply 
"the problem of identity," has to do with the content of statements of identity.  More 
specifically, the central concern of the problem is with that part of the content of 
identity statements that remains invariant regardless of the theoretical context in 
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which an identity statement occurs and is responsible for the validity of the most 
fundamental sorts of inferences involving identity statements.  The contexts in which 
the substitutions of one term in an identity statement for the other are always judged 
to be plausible are typically considered to be just those contexts in which the basic 
inferences associated with identity statements are deemed plausible.  At its core, the 
problem of identity does not involve that content of identity statements, of a specific 
sort, that is provided by a theory of individuation for a particular kind of thing.  The 
familiar difficulties and consequences that attend the various proposed criteria for 
individuating such things as people, events, processes, psychological states, and 
physical objects undergoing change are not connected with the attempt to understand 
what justifies the substitution of co-referring terms.  On the contrary, the alleged 
troubles with the criteria are generated from an application of the criteria to certain 
special cases by taking for granted the validity of inferences that involve only the 
substitution of co-referring terms and deriving problematic conclusions from identity 
statements viewed as the consequences of certain special hypotheses and the 
particular theory of individuation constituted by the criteria. 
 In an important sense, the logical problem of identity stems from uncertainties 
surrounding what is expressed by any identity statement, whereas the problem of 
individuating objects of various kinds (what may be called the "nonlogical problem of 
identity") arises from difficulties connected with the attempt to specify the precise 
conditions under which what is expressed by an identity statement should be accepted 
as true.  The two problems (one concerning the logical content of identity statements 
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and the other concerning the nonlogical content of identity statements), though 
distinct, are, however, obviously interrelated in that one cannot solve the latter 
problem without presupposing a solution to the former problem.  In other words, one 
cannot adequately advance a hypothesis concerning the identity and individuation of 
things of a certain kind unless one already knows those conditions that are 
independent of the particular subject matter of an identity claim and are always a part 
of the conditions sufficient and necessary for the truth of any identity statement.  
Unfortunately, the distinctions between the separate issues each problem raises are 
often muddled in discussions about identity, particularly, so it seems, in discussions 
about the identity of the indiscernibles and the indiscernibility of identicals.3  In 
addition, more attention has apparently been devoted to the nonlogical problem of 
identity than to the logical problem of identity.  Nevertheless, knowledge of when a 
statement of identity is true requires knowledge of both the requisite nonlogical 
conditions and the requisite logical conditions.  Not knowing the logical conditions 
sufficient and necessary for the truth of an identity statement amounts to not knowing 
the first thing about identity and consequently not grasping the significance of the 
nonlogical conditions sufficient and necessary for the truth of identity statements of a 
particular sort. 
 The problem of identity (as opposed to the problem of individuation) received 
its modern formulation in Frege's "On Sense and Reference."4  In that essay, Frege 
                                                 
3.  See, for instance, Baruch A. Brody's, Identity and Essence and Peter Simons' entry 
“Identity of Indiscernibles” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 678-681. 
4.  This classical English rendition of Frege's essay, “Uber Sinn und Bedeutung,” occurs in 
Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege on pages 56-78. 
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asked whether identity is a relation and, if it is judged to be a relation, whether it is a 
relation between objects or a relation between names of objects.5  Frege then noted 
that each of these two possible interpretations gives rise to certain perplexities.  If 
identity is viewed as a relation between objects, then true statements of identity 
appear in an important sense necessary and trivial, given that anything is both 
necessarily and trivially identical to itself.  If identity is viewed as a relation between 
the names of objects, then true statements of identity appear to be insignificant 
statements that are not about the world but are only about the use of language.  Both 
interpretations are counterintuitive in that many identity statements are considered to 
be significant statements the truth of which, when recognized, contributes to our 
knowledge of the world.  Since the questions Frege raised amount to questions about 
the very idea of identity, Frege's puzzle about identity did not concern uncertainties 
about what principles of individuation to adopt but was a puzzle about the very 
meaningfulness of identity statements. 
 In essence, then, the logical problem of identity amounts to the problem of 
interpreting what the assertion of any identity statement, regardless of its context, is 
normally an assertion about.  Ultimately, it is the logical content of identity 
                                                 
5.  The understanding of identity as a relation between objects must be kept distinct from the 
understanding of identity as a relation between names.  Even though one could possibly hold that the 
appropriate relation holds between the names in a true identity statement only when a certain relation 
holds between the objects referred to (and vice versa), much confusion can result if it is not recognized 
that what identity statements are about is given different interpretations according to these two 
different understandings of the identity relation.  Butchvarov, for instance, in his Being Qua Being, 
enters into a rather pointless discussion of the “apparent distinctness of identicals” by failing to 
appreciate the difference in kind between the distinctness or sameness of names and the distinctness or 
sameness of the objects to which the names refer.  Contrary to Butchvarov, I do not see the apparent 
presumption of the distinctness of objects that he alleges is involved in the very use of distinct names.  
This may seem, and perhaps is, a minor point, but sometimes the elaboration and expansion on what is 
a small mistake ends up becoming a big mistake. 
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statements that is in question.  It is clear that the identity predicate functions as a 
logical particle in many inferences, and the meaning attributed to the identity 
predicate when used as a logical word must be clarified in any proposed resolution to 
the problem of identity.  The recognition of, among other things, whatever precisely 
we take statements of identity to be about, regardless of their specific theoretical 
underpinnings, should contribute to our understanding of the validity, and in some 
cases limitations, of the basic kinds of inferences customarily associated with identity 
statements.  An understanding of the validity of such inferences amounts to an 
understanding of why and under what conditions the substitution of one co-referring 
term for another is legitimate.  The legitimacy of such substitutions is not, in general, 
a consequence of the nonlogical content of particular identity statements.  Rather, it is 
due to that component of the content of identity statements that is peculiar to all such 
statements.  The problem of identity, as I shall more fully develop it in the next 
chapter, will therefore not be completely resolved until the interchangeability of co-
referring terms is accounted for, since an explanation of the latter will necessarily 
figure in the solution to the former.  Furthermore, because the intersubstitutivity of 
co-referring terms is due to the logical content of identity statements, an 
understanding of what identity statements are about sufficient to resolve the problem 
of identity will involve an understanding of the logical content of identity statements. 
 In very general terms, the logical content of a statement is that portion of the 
content of the statement that is considered to be responsible for the inferential 
connections between the statement and other statements.  The logical content of 
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statements thus fixes the validity of arguments and determines what are the logical 
truths.  The logical content of a sentence can be viewed as a consequence of the 
logical words it contains.  Admittedly, the distinction between the logical and the 
nonlogical components of language is not always clear, and there is controversy 
regarding where precisely to draw the line.6  Nevertheless, one should not conclude 
that, because the alleged distinction is not clear-cut and is in some sense arbitrary, 
there is in fact no distinction to be drawn.  Such a conclusion would be no more 
warranted than the conclusion that, because, for any vague concept, the exact 
boundary between a case falling under the concept and a case falling outside of the 
concept is unclear and any particular line drawn always seems arbitrary, there is no 
distinction between the two cases.  The distinction between the logical and the 
nonlogical is important.  The development of formal theories of validity was 
prompted in effect by at least an implicit recognition of the distinction between the 
logical and the nonlogical components present in the premises and the conclusions of 
arguments.  Moreover, the plausibility and the limitations of a formal theory of 
validity depend on the extent to which the logical behavior of all sentential particles 
that determine the truth conditions of, and therefore the inferential relations among, 
statements is taken into consideration.  One of the limitations of traditional syllogistic 
logic, for example, stems from its difficulty, if not failure, in accounting for the 
                                                 
6.  See, for instance, Steven T. Kuhn, “Logical Expressions, Constants, and Operator Logic”; 
McCarthy, “The Idea of a Logical Constant”; Christopher Peacocke, “What is a Logical Constant?”; 
and Roger Smook, “Logical and Extralogical Constants.” 
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behavior of logical particles within the subject and predicate terms of categorical 
statements. 
 The general features of the logical particles can, I believe, be specified, and 
the specification will make it obvious that the identity predicate does function as a 
logical particle.  I take it that it is reasonable to interpret a word or an expression as 
functioning as a logical word when it satisfies the following conditions. 
 
(1)  It does not belong to only the special lexicon in terms of which a theory is stated 
but is rather a part of the linguistic stock of the language in which the theory is 
expressed. 
(2)  It is an iterative device in the language that can be used to construct complex 
sentences out of all sorts of simpler sentential components. 
(3)  Its presence affects the truth conditions of complex sentences. 
(4)  Its occurrence in sentences determines, at least in part, the truth-value relations 
among different kinds of sentences. 
(5)  Its meaning is definable (and thus learnable) in terms of the truth-value relations 
that hold among sentences. 
(6)  Its meaning determines the validity of certain general types of inferences among 
sentences. 
 
 The nonlogical particles are, in contrast, those components of sentences the 
meanings of which do not determine the possible truth-values of sentences, and thus 
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the truth-value relations and inferential relations, among sentences.  Nevertheless, the 
nonlogical particles generally fix the subject matter of statements and play an obvious 
role in fixing the actual truth-value of statements. 
 Thus, the problem of identity I wish to address will not be resolved until the 
role of the identity predicate as a logical particle is made clear.  However, the clarity I 
seek does not involve settling the matter of so-called vague or indeterminate identity, 
a matter that seems to be of concern to some logicians nowadays.  Issues connected 
with vagueness and with the problems vague concepts give rise to are important in 
themselves and can be, and I believe in most cases should be, handled as a separate 
concern.  If there is vagueness to ascriptions of identity, that vagueness is not 
fundamentally different from the vagueness associated with the use of other terms and 
therefore can be dealt with as another extra matter concerning assertions of identity.7
 
1.2 The nature of the discussion to follow 
 Besides possessing merit in its own right, a resolution of the problem of 
identity is valuable in connection with other philosophical concerns, as I shall argue 
in the next chapter.  For instance, Quine held that such referentially opaque contexts 
as belief contexts and other intensional contexts are problematic, and, as result, it is 
                                                 
7.  Some have argued that identity statements cannot be indeterminate.  Timothy Williamson 
(Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. “Identity”) offers the following sort of argument.  (I have 
interpreted and supplemented his argument somewhat.)  Suppose that it is indeterminate whether a 
certain mass of rock and ice is Mt. Everest.  It is, nevertheless, a determinate fact that Mt. Everest is 
Mt. Everest.  If we assume for the sake of argument that it is true that the particular mass of rock and 
ice is indeed Mt. Everest, then (given the plausibility of substitution) it must be a determinant fact that 
the particular mass of rock and ice is Mt. Everest.  However, this contradicts the original supposition.  
Thus, if the identity statement supposed to be indeterminate is in fact true, it is not indeterminately true 
(since it must in fact be false); hence, it is not indeterminately true after all. 
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difficult to talk sensibly about such things as beliefs, desires, and thoughts.8  (Oddly 
enough, one should likewise conclude that talk about explanations is problematic 
since explanatory contexts are also referentially opaque.)  Because substitutions into 
intensional contexts do not always preserve truth and particular intensions, if they 
exist at all, cannot really be specified since they lack clear identity conditions, Quine 
urged that talk of intensions be dispensed with and the underlying logic of science be 
regarded as purely extensional.  Quine's rejection of intensions, and with that a 
rejection of intensional logic, is therefore founded on a notion of identity.  So, an 
adequate understanding of identity is actually indispensable for judging whether or 
not Quine had a solid basis for his rejection of intensions. 
 I will now briefly outline what course my discussion of the relevant issues 
will take in the pages to follow.  Subsequent to the present introductory chapter, I will 
give in the next chapter a more thorough presentation of both the problem of identity 
and what it will take to solve the problem.  After that, in the next two chapters to 
follow, I will examine and evaluate more traditional approaches to solving the 
problem of identity.  The primary goal of Chapter 3 will be an elaboration on and a 
critique of Frege's proposed solution, and the main intent of Chapter 4 will be to 
critically examine Kripke's solution to the problem.  Both Frege's and Kripke's 
accounts of identity are objectual accounts.  In Chapter 5, I will examine Lockwood’s 
metalinguistic account of identity, which represents an attempt to solve the problem 
within a more general account of speech acts.  Finally, in Chapter 6, I will summarize 
                                                 
8.  See, for instance, Quine's essays “On What There Is,” “Reference and Modality,” and 
“Propositional Objects” as well as Chapters Four, Five, and Six of Word and Object. 
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the troubles with the sorts of solutions that have been proposed to resolve the problem 
of identity and give a general overview of a strategy that may possibly lead to a 
workable solution. 
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Chapter 2: The Nature of the Problem 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 In the present chapter, I will discuss what I take to be the problem of identity.  
More specifically, I want to make clear in the next two sections what the problem of 
identity amounts to, what the significance of the problem is, and how two general 
approaches to understanding identity claims contribute to the problem.  In the course 
of detailing the perplexities surrounding identity, I will specify the sorts of questions 
that will need to be addressed by any totally adequate solution to the problem of 
identity, and, by examining the two strategies often pursued in order to solve the 
problem, I will come to an assessment of what is required of an account of identity if 
it is to answer these questions. 
 
2.1 The problem of identity 
 What I call "the problem of identity" concerns the manner in which we are to 
understand statements of identity.1  An adequate understanding of identity claims, 
                                                 
1.  Unless the context should indicate otherwise, whenever I employ such a phrase as 
“statement of identity,” “identity statement,” or “identity claim,” what I will have in mind is any 
statement (occurring alone or as part of a longer statement) of the form ⎡α is identical to β⎤, ⎡α is the 
same as β⎤, or ⎡α = β⎤, where α and β are any, not necessarily distinct, singular terms (i.e., proper 
names or possibly definite descriptions, depending upon the proposed analysis under consideration) or 
variables.  The identity predicate can, of course, occur as a component of more complex sentences 
such as statements of uniqueness or other kinds of generalizations, but, as will emerge from my 
subsequent investigation, such statements are not what I will be focusing on primarily in discussing 
identity statements.   However, the overall scope of the questions addressed and often the context of 
my discussions, particularly situations in which I do not want to beg any questions regarding an 
analysis, will force me to regard as an identity statement a statement that has an overall form such as 
⎡α is identical to β⎤ and thus has at least the surface grammar of what I properly regard as an identity 
statement. 
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regardless of the context in which these claims occur, can only be had when three 
general sorts of questions about identity are answered.  (1) What is the meaning, or 
import, of assertions of identity?  In other words, what precisely are we indicating 
when we claim that a is identical to b?  (2) If we regard identity, or sameness, as a 
relation, then must it be a relation that holds between objects, or a relation that holds 
between names or descriptions of objects?  (3) Are identity statements actually, as 
opposed to just seemingly, informative?  In asserting an identity statement are we, in 
the final analysis, merely indicating our decision to use a certain pair of terms 
interchangeably, or are we possibly informing our audience, in a practically useful 
manner, about the nature of objects in the world?  Question 1 is what I shall call the 
"question of meaning"; question 2, the "question of reference"; and question 3, the 
"question of informational value."  As I see it, each of these questions is a separate 
question, but the manner in which we answer any one of them will invariably make it 
more difficult to answer at least one of the others.  For example, if, in our response to 
question 2, we regard identity as a relation that necessarily holds between every 
object and itself, and if we regard decisions about word usage as being merely a 
matter of convention, then, regardless of how specifically the question of meaning is 
answered, it is difficult to see how we could give an affirmative answer to the 
question of informational value, that is, how it is that identity statements could be 
used to convey knowledge about the world.  These three questions are, surprisingly, 
not easy to answer, and for this reason reflection on such questions brings to light 
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certain conceptual problems associated with the notion of identity, a notion that, at 
least on the surface, seems so transparent. 
 Before discussing the attempts that have been made to answer the above 
questions, I need to clarify exactly what is at issue here.  It is easy to get sidetracked, 
for the topic of the meaning of identity statements often raises issues which are 
actually peripheral and ought not to divert attention away from the main concern.  As 
I indicated in the previous chapter, a specification of the content of any particular 
assertion of identity involves two separate, but related, concerns, and thus a careful 
distinction needs to be made between two different types of questions that are asked 
about the notion of identity.  Our main concern is with the sort of questions that are 
asked in regard to an identity statement's logical content, that content that warrants 
the substitution of one term in an identity statement for another in transparent 
contexts and thus validates certain patterns of inference that are associated with 
statements of identity.  As I noted in the previous chapter, the development of formal 
theories of deductive validity depends on the recognition that certain words (logical 
words) are put together with certain other words (nonlogical words) according to 
clearly definable patterns and the realization that the former words have a meaning 
that accounts for the inferential relations that obtain among sentences containing 
these words.  The logical content of an identity statement is the content that remains 
invariant regardless of the theoretical context in which the identity statement occurs 
so long as the validity of the inference rules of identity elimination and identity 
introduction (or the natural language analogs of these rules) is preserved.  Thus, 
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inquiries about the nature of, and the explanation for, the conditions in which it is 
permissible and the conditions in which it is not permissible to substitute for co-
referring terms are questions that concern the logical content of identity statements. 
 The other sort of questions, those questions that are for the purposes of the 
present discussion peripheral, are asked in regard to the conditions under which 
objects of a certain kind are individuated.  Depending upon the particular theory of 
the world in which identity statements occur (together with a particular understanding 
of identity statements), the specification of the conditions under which things are 
judged to be identical will vary.  Thus, inquiries about what constitutes an individual 
or what constitutes more than one distinct individual are questions that concern 
primarily the nonlogical content of identity statements.  The nonlogical content of 
identity statements is that component of the content of such statements that is 
provided by the contexts in which such statements occur and does not account for the 
inferential relations that are usually seen as holding among certain forms of identity 
statements and other statements regardless of context. 
 As I alluded to in the previous chapter, the questions that have been asked 
about what constitutes the identity of persons are questions that concern 
fundamentally the nonlogical meaning of the identity predicate as that predicate 
occurs in sentences that are used to make claims about persons.  The traditional 
problem of personal identity did not arise in a context where the logical content of 
saying that person a is identical to person b was unknown, but instead the problem 
was connected with the metaphysical (and perhaps epistemological) difficulties 
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involved in adequately specifying when it is correct, given certain intuitions we may 
have about what constitutes being a person, to say that person a is identical to person 
b.  The question of personal identity thus amounts to the question of the nonlogical 
content of the identity statement "Person a is identical to person b."  Any proposed 
solution to the problem of personal identity will describe those conditions, unique to 
the theory of personhood under consideration, that must be satisfied in order for an 
assertion that person a is identical to person b to be correct, and such a solution must 
therefore presuppose an understanding of the logical content of any identity 
statement.  Since an understanding of personal identity requires a prior understanding 
of the logical content of identity claims, the former is dependent on, even though 
distinct from, the latter. 
 Consistent with what was said in the previous chapter about the difference 
between the logical and the nonlogical words, the difference between the logical and 
the nonlogical content of identity statements is also reflected in a difference in the 
roles such statements play in making inferences.  An identity statement can occur in a 
context where only the logical features of the identity predicate are exploited in the 
drawing of an inference.  Any inference that depends on what gets expressed in a 
formal system as the rules of identity introduction (=I) and identity elimination (=E) 
constitutes an inference the plausibility of which reflects only the logical content of 
the identity predicate.  In contrast, an identity statement can occur in a context where 
the identity predicate is being treated as a nonlogical particle in that the inferences 
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drawn are plausible only given the particular extralogical content of the particular 
identity statement. 
 The different sorts of inferences the typical set theorist makes from the 
statement that sets are identical reflect the difference between the logical and the 
nonlogical content of the identity predicate.  The set theorist who, without appealing 
to an axiom governing the identity of sets, infers from some particular truth about a 
that there is a corresponding truth about b in virtue of the truth of the statement of 
identity "a = b" treats the identity predicate as a logical symbol, and thus the 
plausibility of the inference depends solely on the logical content of the identity 
statement.  The set theorist can, however, appeal to the axiom of extensionality to 
infer the truth of the statement "a = b" from the fact that the elements of a are just the 
elements of b.2  In this latter case, in contrast to the former, the plausibility of the 
inference depends crucially on the extralogical content of the identity statement as 
specified by the axiom since the conclusion is obtained as a deductive consequence of 
the axiom and not by an application of an inference rule governing identity.  In this 
particular inference, the identity predicate "=" occurring in the axiom is being treated 
as any other predicate designating a binary relation, and the logical features of the 
identity predicate (those that collectively comprise the logical meaning of the identity 
predicate) do not play a role in reaching the conclusion.  Even though the axiom of 
extensionality resembles a definition of the predicate "=", where the definiendum 
appears as the left side of the main biconditional and the definiens is the 
                                                 
2.  The axiom of extensionality states that, for any sets x and y, x = y if and only if, for all z, z 
∈ x if and only if z ∈ y. 
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generalization that appears as the right side of the main biconditional, the axiom is 
typically viewed as serving only the purpose of, in effect, defining the nonlogical 
content of the identity predicate.  Clearly, within any development of set theory in 
which inferences regarding the identity of sets depend for their legitimacy on more 
than the logical content of identity statements and cannot be justified without an 
appeal to the axiom of extensionality, the axiom does not determine the logical 
content of the identity predicate.3  Rather, in such circumstances, the axiom specifies 
the identity conditions for sets (by specifying the sufficient and necessary conditions 
under which, for sets, it will be said that set a is identical to set b); it does not unpack 
the logical content of identity statements, even if everything in the domain of the 
theory is regarded as a set.  This is, however, no defect in the axiom since set theorists 
never intended it as a definition and the axiom usually appears in first order 
formalizations of set theory in a context where the understanding of the identity 
predicate as a logical symbol is already assumed.  Without the treatment of the 
identity predicate as a logical particle in first order logic, the axiom of extensionality 
would not normally provide the criterion for the individuation of sets.  This is the case 
since sets will be adequately individuated only when the inference rules governing 
identity are valid for the statements of set theory, which occurs only when the 
                                                 
3.  For instance, any set theory in which “a = c” is not provable from “a = b” and “For all x, x 
is a member of b iff x is a member of c” by appealing only to logical laws and not also to the axiom of 
extensionality would be a set theory in which that axiom gave the nonlogical content of identity 
statements.  In a version of set theory in which none of the inferences normally associated with identity 
could be made without an appeal to the axioms, the identity predicate could reasonably be viewed as a 
nonlogical word the content of which is fixed by the axioms.  Such would be the case if the axioms of 
the set theory contained as the only primitive nonlogical particle a symbol for the membership relation 
and it followed that any set is a member of another set just in virtue of the membership of the former. 
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intersubstitutivity of co-referential terms is provided for, and this is not normally 
provided for whenever only the nonlogical features of identity statements are being 
exploited in drawing conclusions from identity statements, which occurs when the 
only meaning the identity predicate has is that provided by the axiom.  Hence, sets are 
individuated only when the validity of the formalized language versions of =I and =E 
is provided for in the context of the set theory, and this typically occurs within a 
context where the logical meaning of the identity predicate is understood. 
 Questions regarding the logical content of identity statements are chiefly 
logical and semantical, since they deal with issues that concern the logical meaning of 
the identity predicate.  Questions regarding the nonlogical content of identity 
statements tend right away to be metaphysical, for it is metaphysics, not logic, which 
provides the criteria for the identification and individuation of things that stand in the 
identity relation.  The distinction is crucial, for the question of what an assertion of 
identity amounts to (from a logical perspective) is distinct from the question of when 
objects are the same (or when different appearances are appearances of the same 
object).  It is only the former question that is of primary interest here and in the 
discussions to follow. 
 As I have indicated by the preceding remarks, in spite of the conceptual 
differences, an understanding of the logical and the nonlogical content of identity 
statements, and thus the separate bases for inferences from identity statements, are 
nonetheless interrelated.  Any attempt to come to a complete understanding of the 
content of identity statements will involve both of two separate undertakings.  One 
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must both come to an understanding of what is in general expressed by any identity 
statement (the logical content of an identity statement) and also come to an 
understanding of what commitments are signaled by identity statements in terms of 
the conditions, specific to the discipline in which the identity statements occur, under 
which the logical content, whatever is that content, of an identity statement is to be 
accepted.  Assertions of identity and uniqueness are essential components of many 
different theories, and a complete understanding of the identity statements occurring 
in a particular theory will require one to be familiar with both the logical features of 
the identity predicate (those features that account for the inferences warranted by the 
natural language analogs of =I and =E) and the extralogical principles that, by 
specifying the circumstances in which an identity obtains, serve to individuate the 
objects discussed by the theory.4  In order to understand the typical set theorist's use 
of the identity predicate, for instance, one must both understand the identity sign as a 
logical particle, as occurs when certain conclusions from the identity of sets do not 
depend on the axioms, and recognize how sets are individuated as specified by the 
axiom of extensionality.  Any definition that specifies the extralogical conditions 
under which an assertion of identity should be accepted (and thus represents a 
specification of the nonlogical content of the identity predicate) will consist of a 
generalization stating that a logical statement of identity is true when and only when 
                                                 
4.  Thus, the nonlogical content of an identity statement is that component of the statement's 
content that is provided by the theory, whereas the logical content of an identity statement is that 
component of the statement's content that is presupposed by the theory. 
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these conditions obtain.5  Thus, anyone who attempts to answer the metaphysical 
questions connected with the nonlogical content of the identity predicate must regard 
as unproblematic the logical content of the identity predicate since a specification of 
the nonlogical content of identity statements will invariably involve the at least 
implicit acknowledgement of the logical content of the identity predicate.  The 
problem of identity will, therefore, receive its more fundamental resolution when the 
problem is solved for the logical content of the identity predicate, and it is there that 
attention needs to be focused.  What is desired here is to have answers to the purely 
logical and semantical questions that surround the notion of identity, for these 
questions are more basic, as I have just argued. 
 Now, how does the distinction, that has been duly noted, between these two 
notions of content affect the manner in which the original three questions (the 
question of meaning, the question of reference, and the question of informational 
value) are to be answered?  The question of meaning needs to be addressed in terms 
of an explication of the meaning that attaches to the identity predicate when 
understood as a logical word.  That is, an account needs to be given of the logical 
meaning of the identity predicate that explains the inferential relations that obtain 
between statements of identity and other statements, those relations being responsible 
for the validity of the natural language analogs of identity introduction and identity 
elimination.  The question of reference will be answered when the reference of the 
                                                 
5.  The axiom of extensionality in effect tells the set theorist that he should accept the logical 
consequences of claiming that set a = set b when and only when all elements of set a are elements of 
set b and vice versa. 
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terms (or the role of what appear to be terms) in any statement of identity is made 
clear at least with regard to the logical features of the identity predicate.  The question 
of informational value will be settled when there is an elucidation of the general 
manner in which the truth-value of a statement containing the identity predicate 
understood as a logical symbol is invariably a reflection of certain extralogical 
considerations pertaining to matters of convention or to matters of empirical fact. 
 As I suggested in the previous chapter, there have emerged two principal 
strategies for resolving the questions about identity, Frege having mentioned each of 
these approaches as a distinct way of interpreting identity statements.  Both of these 
ways of interpreting identity statements can be characterized in terms of the particular 
response given to the question of reference.  The following discussion of these two 
approaches will help clarify the central issues involved in any attempt to answer the 
questions of meaning, reference, and informational value.  As will be made clear in 
the discussion to follow, any successful reply to these questions must show how it is 
possible for there to be contingent statements of identity, and this latter can only be 
accomplished by an account of identity that satisfies three important requirements.  
Any account of identity that fails to satisfy any one of these requirements can then be 
rejected since it will fail to answer successfully the three basic questions. 
 
2.2 The objectual and metalinguistic accounts of identity 
 Identity is often viewed either as a relation that holds between objects or as a 
relation that holds between names or descriptions of objects.  An interpretation of 
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identity as a relation that holds among objects is what constitutes an objectual account 
of identity, and an interpretation of identity as a relation that holds among singular 
terms (proper names and definite descriptions) constitutes a metalinguistic account of 
identity.6  Each one of these approaches seems to have its assets as well as its 
liabilities. 
 If identity is understood as a relation that holds between objects (or more 
precisely, between every object and itself), then, as Frege observed in "On Sense and 
Reference," every statement of identity appears to express a trivial truth since it is 
evidently a trivial matter that every object is identical to itself and to no other object.7  
The truth thus expressed by any true identity statement is what is often seen as a 
metaphysically necessary truth that is nonetheless trivial at least in the sense that it is 
trivially true that every thing is identical to itself.  Furthermore, provided that 
different statements that are customarily used to make the same assertion are 
synonymous and the assertion made by the utterance of a statement is independent of 
the particular words occurring as singular terms in the statement but dependent on the 
referents of those terms, a true statement of identity of the form ⎡α = β⎤ appears to 
                                                 
6.  Although Kripke may have originally coined the terms for these two interpretations of 
identity, I am borrowing the terms “the objectual account of identity” and “the metalinguistic account 
of identity” from Thomas V. Morris in his book Understanding Identity Statements.  Morris used the 
former expression to refer to the first sort of interpretation of identity that I discuss and the latter to 
refer to the second sort of interpretation of identity that I discuss.  Each of these two approaches is 
designed to give an analysis of the standard, or general, meaning of identity statements.  One could, in 
principle, follow either approach and still admit that some identity statements in special contexts must 
be understood according to the alternative interpretation.  By the way, Christopher Williams in his 
book What is Identity? rejected categorizing accounts of identity in such a fashion, but he did so, I 
believe, without adequate justification.  Identity, if it is to be judged a relation, is clearly a two-place 
relation, and the terms that occupy those two places must both refer either to objects or to names of 
objects if ordinary identity statements are to be intelligible. 
7.  Gottlob Frege, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, eds. Peter 
Geach and Max Black, 56-78. 
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have, regardless of what pair of co-referential singular terms flanks the identity sign, 
the same meaning as the corresponding identity statements of the forms  ⎡α = α⎤ and 
⎡β = β⎤.8  However, this seems to be an intolerable consequence since such true 
statements as "The morning star is the evening star", "Benjamin Franklin was the first 
postmaster general of the United States", and "2 = [8 - (4 + 41/2)]2 - 81/3" are not 
self-evident but are such as to require verification through observation, investigation, 
or calculation.  Also, each of these statements, with the possible exception of the last 
one, appears to express a claim about the world that seems not to be in any sense 
necessary, given an ordinary understanding of identity.  In contrast, the statements 
"The morning star is the morning star," "Benjamin Franklin was Benjamin Franklin," 
and "2 = 2" all appear to be self-evident statements of necessity.  How is it that each 
of the former seemingly contingent, nonobvious, statements has the same meaning as 
its corresponding self-evident necessary statement?  According to what is suggested 
by the typical objectual account of identity, all true statements of identity are 
evidently necessary truths that ultimately tell us nothing significant about the world.  
However, this result stands in stark contrast to the usual understanding of the import 
of identity claims, for such assertions are often thought to convey at times important 
factual knowledge gained about the world. 
                                                 
8.  This conclusion can be avoided by not granting these assumptions about meaning.  It is 
possible to do this and still maintain an objectual analysis of identity, since one who opts for the 
objectual account of identity is not thereby committed to an objectual account of meaning.  Frege, as I 
will argue later, abandoned the metalinguistic account of identity in favor of the objectual account, but 
he regarded the sense (meaning) of a sentence to be determined not by the reference of its terms but by 
the senses of its parts. 
 24
 An objectual analysis does have certain points in its favor.  It does allow for a 
rather straightforward specification of the truth conditions for an identity and in such 
a way that not all statements of identity are true.  The identity statement "a = b" can 
be taken to be true when and only when "a" and "b" are co-referential.  In addition, 
since identity claims are about objects in the world, such an analysis could in 
principle show how an assertion that a and b are identical conveys knowledge about 
the world if the problem of the apparent triviality of identity statements could be 
resolved.  This is in contrast to any analysis of identity that would take identity 
statements to be only about singular terms and not about the referents of those terms, 
for in such a case identity statements would only be used to make assertions about 
language.  Moreover, the typical sort of objectual account of identity does seem, at 
least initially, to lend plausibility to the inference rules governing identity.  Since 
every object is identical to itself, any sentence of the form ⎡α = α⎤ should be true. 
Furthermore, it seems sensible to reason that, if "a = b" is true, then a and b are the 
same object so that a claim about a is also a claim about b, which means that the truth 
of any sentence that expresses a claim about a will entail the truth of the sentence that 
expresses the corresponding claim about b (and vice versa). 
 On the other hand, if identity is understood as a relation that holds between 
singular terms (or concerns only, as Frege put it, the "mode of designation" of its 
subject matter9), then statements of identity express, in essence, only a linguistic 
                                                 
9.  “On Sense and Reference,” Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob 
Frege, 57. 
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pronouncement to use certain pairs of terms interchangeably.10  The agreement to use 
terms interchangeably may account for the validity of the inference rules governing 
identity (since one always uses a term interchangeably with itself and, presumably, 
the occurrence of one term in a sentence could be replaced by the occurrence of 
another if the two terms are being used interchangeably), but statements of identity 
only concern singular terms and not what those terms are about, what they designate, 
in spite of the fact that in any assertion of identity singular terms appear to be used 
instead of mentioned.11  An identity statement only declares, in effect, that certain 
terms are being used to designate the same object, whatever that object happens to 
be.12 According to a metalinguistic analysis of identity (that is, under an 
interpretation of identity as a relation that holds among singular terms), every true 
statement of identity thus represents what is in effect an acceptable stipulative 
definition, and every false statement of identity represents, presumably, a stipulation 
that cannot consistently be followed given the way the terms in the identity statement 
are used in other contexts.  Such stipulations, though, appear to be arbitrarily 
producible and thus do not reflect knowledge about the world but only present to us 
                                                 
10.  More precisely, they express in some way or another either a linguistic pronouncement to 
use terms in a certain way or a statement about how in fact speakers of a language are using terms. 
11.  In a formalized language, the form of a sentence reveals its logical content, but obviously 
this is not in general the case for natural language sentences.  Conclusions about logical form should 
therefore not be made solely on the basis of the form of natural language sentences. 
12.  However, I want to avoid saying that under a metalinguistic account of identity the 
statement “a = b” means that the referent of “a” is the same as the referent of “b.”  Even though this 
way of giving the meaning of the identity statement does make mention of the names “a” and “b,” the 
identity statement is not properly about those names but about the referents of those names if the 
content of “a = b” is specified in this manner.  Also, this way of presenting a metalinguistic notion of 
identity makes such a notion more clearly dependent on a prior notion of identity holding between the 
referents of the terms in an identity statement. 
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conventions concerning language use.13  Such is the case even if the stipulations of 
identity claims are, admittedly, established, or laid down, only after consulting the 
world, for as long as identity claims are not about the world but are only about 
language, they are not the vehicles by which knowledge about the world is, at least 
directly, communicated.14  Therefore, in a sense, identity statements are just as trivial 
according to a metalinguistic account of identity as they are according to an objectual 
account of identity. 
 However, since the identity statement "a = a" declares, in effect, that the term 
"a" is to be used interchangeably with itself and the identity statement "a = b" 
declares, in effect, that the term "a" is to be used interchangeably with the term "b," 
the former statement of identity does differ in meaning from the latter statement of 
identity if identity is viewed as a relation holding among singular terms.  After all, the 
former statement of identity expresses a claim only about the term "a," and the latter 
statement of identity expresses a claim about the two terms "a" and "b."  It is for this 
reason that a metalinguistic interpretation does have an advantage over the typical 
objectual interpretation.  In spite of this, the truth conditions of a statement of identity 
are not as obvious under a metalinguistic interpretation as they are under an objectual 
interpretation since, except for saying that the two terms are in fact being used 
                                                 
13.  Statements of identity, on this view, are used either to introduce linguistic conventions or 
to talk about how language is being used.  See footnote 10. 
14.  I say that statements of identity are established only after consulting the world in the 
sense that the terms occurring in identity statements also occur in a body of other statements that do 
make empirical claims and that must remain consistent upon the acceptance of an assertion of identity.  
Thus, we will accept the claim that the morning star is the evening star only if we are prepared to 
accept that all such empirically true statements about the morning star are also true statements about 
the evening star and vice versa.  If the complex of empirical claims should prove to be inconsistent 
upon the acceptance of the statement of identity, then we would reject that statement. 
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interchangeably, it is not clear how one should specify the conditions under which 
two terms are always used interchangeably.  Given a metalinguistic understanding of 
identity, the truth conditions for an identity statement will be about facts about 
linguistic usage, the most obvious of such facts being those the identity statement 
itself is in effect used to express.  Thus, one who subscribes to the metalinguistic 
view would presumably claim that the statement of identity "a = b" is true when and 
only when the terms "a" and "b" are being used interchangeably in all purely 
referential (transparent) contexts.  Clearly, though, the issue of circularity arises with 
such a specification since the statement of the truth conditions of a sentence is in this 
case virtually no different from what that sentence is actually used to assert.  The 
circularity involved in stating the truth conditions may pose a distinct problem since 
one who opts for this approach will need to provide a precise and noncircular 
specification of a purely referential context into which these kinds of substitutions are 
always legitimate.15
 The most perplexing aspect of the problem of identity, then, concerns the 
question how it is possible for there to be contingent, nontrivial statements of 
identity.16  This is essentially the problem Frege saw with identity in "On Sense and 
                                                 
15.  A metalinguistic identity theorist could not just say, for instance, that a purely referential 
context is one in which the substitution of “a” for “b” preserves the truth-value of a sentence as long as 
“a = b” is true.  Incidentally, an objectual identity theorist is not necessarily immune to the difficulties 
attending the specification of a purely referential context, as will become evident in the discussion to 
follow, particularly if his account of identity depends crucially on notions, such as sameness of 
reference or sameness of sense, that occur in the metalanguage. 
16.  Although not the same problem, the problem of identity is similar in certain respects to 
another puzzle that has been called “the paradox of analysis.”  In any analytical definition, if the 
definiendum (the analysandum) and the definiens (the analysans) are synonymous, then the definition 
appears trivial; if they are not synonymous, then the definition seems inadequate.  Given that the 
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Reference."  Any attempt to successfully answer the questions of meaning, reference, 
and informational value must solve this problem.  Any interpretation of identity 
statements that is successful at resolving this difficulty must at least show (1) how the 
identity statement "a = a" differs in content from the identity statement "a = b," (2) 
how it is that some identity statements are false (or how some identity statements are 
not necessarily true), and (3) how identity statements can be nontrivial in the sense 
that they can be used to convey information about the world.  I shall call requirement 
1 the "difference in content requirement," and I shall call requirements 2 and 3, 
respectively, the "nonnecessity requirement" and the "nontriviality requirement."  (I 
should hasten to add here that any account of identity that completely meets these 
requirements will do so in a noncircular fashion in that it will not presuppose or rest 
upon a prior unanalyzed notion of identity.)  According to an objectual account of 
identity, identity statements are about objects in the world but, when true, express 
what is often seen as a metaphysical necessity; according to a metalinguistic account 
of identity, identity statements are not necessary but express propositions that are 
about the use of terms instead of about the world.  On the former interpretation, 
identity statements acquire their connection to the world (and thus could in principle 
be significant) but, when true, appear to lose their contingency; on the latter 
interpretation, they acquire their contingency but appear to lose their direct 
connection to the world.  Thus, an objectual account partially meets the nonnecessity 
requirement (in that not all identity statements are true) and the nontriviality 
                                                                                                                                           
definiendum and the definiens must be either synonymous or not, it evidently follows that every 
analytical definition is either trivial or inadequate. 
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requirement (only in that identity statements are about things in the world), while a 
metalinguistic account seems at best to meet only the difference in content 
requirement and the nonnecessity requirement.  A metalinguistic account evidently 
fails to meet the nontriviality requirement in that the advocate of such an account 
interprets identity statements as statements that are only about the interchangeability 
of terms and not about what those terms designate. 
 What apparently is needed to solve the dilemma is some way to merge the 
best components of both views into a single interpretation that nonetheless avoids the 
worst components of both views.  Such an interpretation would take identity 
statements to be about (nonlinguistic) objects, so that identity statements could be 
important statements about the world, but would also take identity statements to be in 
some manner about language, or the terms used in language, so that identity 
statements could be contingent statements even when true.  In other words, it would 
be desirable to interpret true identity statements as statements about the world, as is 
suggested by the objectual view, without always acquiring a commitment to their 
necessity, and, at the same time, to interpret true identity statements as statements 
somehow connected with language use, as is suggested by the metalinguistic view, 
without severing the connection between identity statements and the world.  The 
interpretation of the manner in which identity statements are about the use of 
language would, of course, have to dispel the pertinent sense of arbitrariness that is 
bestowed upon them by the latter view. 
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 In the next chapter, I will begin my discussion of the proposed solutions to the 
problem of identity with a detailed examination of how Frege sought to resolve his 
puzzlement with identity.  Both Frege's and Kripke's views on identity (the latter 
discussed in Chapter 4) are important if for no other reason than their explication 
helps to clarify further the problem of identity and the difficulties one faces in 
advancing an objectual account of identity. 
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 In the present chapter, my focus will be on an examination and critique of 
Gottlob Frege's account of identity and a couple of more recent proposals that are 
within the spirit of Frege's analysis.  I will examine in the next section Frege's 
solution, which in many respects represents the standard, or received, view of 
identity.  I will then indicate in the subsequent section why I believe Frege ends up 
with an interpretation of identity statements that is not totally satisfactory.  I will then 
close the chapter with a very brief look at two proposals that attempt to solve the 
problem of identity by in effect reintroducing Frege's sense/reference distinction. 
 Since Frege's views on identity have influenced the manner in which most 
philosophers of language today commonly think of identity, it seems only fitting that 
a critique of the traditional accounts of identity should begin with an examination of 
Frege's analysis.  In what follows, I will contend that, notwithstanding certain 
indications to the contrary, Frege ends up adopting an objectual account of identity, 
an objectual understanding that nonetheless attempts to meet the difference in 
content, nonnecessity, and nontriviality requirements by, in effect, providing for a 
distinction between metaphysical necessity and semantical and logical necessity.  I 
believe that, in the final analysis, Frege settled on the view that the terms appearing in 
any statement of identity refer only to the objects that are their referents.  Identity 
statements may appear trivial because, when true, they always contain reference to 
the same object so that from the standpoint of their referents they are, when true, 
necessarily true (in that it is metaphysically necessary that every object is identical to 
itself).  Nonetheless, from the standpoint of their sense, identity statements are not 
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always necessarily true (and are thus not always trivial) in that a recognition of the 
sense of some identity statements does not always thereby constitute a recognition of 
the truth of such statements. 
 
3.1 Frege's account of identity 
 In the Begriffsschrift, Frege clearly advances a metalinguistic interpretation of 
identity statements, but, later, after having made the distinction between sense and 
reference, he evidently changed his earlier views.1  In section 8 of the Begriffsschrift, 
Frege characterizes identity as a relation that "applies to names and not to contents."2  
A is identical to B means that "the sign A and the sign B have the same conceptual 
content, so that we can everywhere put B for A and conversely."3  For Frege, a sign 
(singular term) had a content, and to every sign there was associated a manner of 
determining a content.4  Two different signs could both have the same content even 
though the two signs are associated with two different ways of determining a content.  
The fact that two different signs had the same content was not always obvious and 
might be a significant fact, so Frege felt compelled to introduce into his formal 
language the symbol for identity, which would be used to assert that the manner of 
determining a content associated with each of two signs determined the same content.  
Frege illustrated the need for an identity predicate with a geometrical example 
wherein two different ways of describing a point on the circumference of a circle 
                                                 
1.  All citations to the Begriffsschrift (except for the citations to the original German text) are 
to the reprint in Frege and Godel: Two Fundamental Texts in Mathematical Logic, 1-82.  (Italics are 
as they occur in that text.) 
2.  Ibid., 20. 
3.  Ibid., 21. 
4.  The association of a name with a determination of a content is what Frege evidently later 
saw as the expression by a name of its sense.  What Frege meant by the manner of determining a 
content is perhaps best explained with the use of a mathematical analogy.  Just as different 
mathematical descriptions of objects (numbers, points, angles, etc.) may reflect different mathematical 
procedures that can be used to pick out the referents of those descriptions, different names may reflect 
different ways the referents of those names can be determined or fixed. 
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were presented.  The points determined by each of these descriptions were given two 
distinct names, and, when both descriptions corresponding to each of the names 
determined the same point, the content had by one of the names was the same content 
as that had by the other name.  In such a case, we would correctly judge that the two 
ways of determining a content associated with the two names do in fact determine the 
same content.  Frege declared, "Hence the need for a sign for identity of content rests 
upon the following consideration: the same content can be completely determined in 
different ways; but that in a particular case two ways of determining it really yield the 
same result is the content of a judgment."5
 However, in the above-cited passage, the word "content" is apparently used in 
two different senses.  Each occurrence of the word "content" in the passage is a 
translation of the same German word, "Inhalt," Frege used in the original, but the 
expressions "identity of content" and "same content" had a different meaning for 
Frege than did the expression "content of judgment."6  In the geometrical example, 
the identity is (ultimately) between the point specified by the manner of determining 
a content associated with each name, and the two names have the same content when 
they both refer to the same point.  Evidently, Frege used the terms "content" and 
"conceptual content" here to talk about what he later would call "reference," and, 
when he mentioned here a way of determining a content corresponding to a name, 
Frege had in mind what he would later call the "sense" of a name.  However, in 
sections 2-4 of the Begriffsschrift, Frege presented a different notion of content when 
he described his notion of the content of a judgment.7  In every judgment, there is 
both the expression of a content, or an idea or a thought, and the assertion that the 
                                                 
5.  Ibid., 21. 
6.  See Gottlob Frege, Begriffsschrift und Andere Aufsatze, 1-88. 
7.  Begriffsschrift, in Frege and Godel: Two Fundamental Texts, 11-13. 
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content, or the idea or thought, is true.  (For Frege, when one wants to deny that 
something is the case, one expresses its negation and then affirms that the latter is 
true.)  Frege used, apparently interchangeably, in these sections some form of the 
German words "Inhalt," "Vorstellung," or "Gedanke" whenever he spoke of what 
could be expressed in a judgment.8  These German words are frequently translated as, 
respectively, "content," "idea," and "thought."  Not every content could be expressed 
in a judgment; Frege distinguished between contents that could become judgments 
from contents that could not become judgments.  Given the examples Frege used to 
illustrate the difference, evidently the former are those contents that are complete 
thoughts and the latter are those contents that are not complete thoughts (or are ideas 
or concepts that are only associated with words and phrases and not with whole 
sentences).  In section 3, Frege employed the expression "conceptual content" as a 
way of talking about the meaning synonymous sentences have in common.  More 
precisely, two judgments (or propositions) were said to have the same conceptual 
content if and only if it is the case that, whenever both judgments each occur together 
with the same combination of certain other judgments, whatever follows from the 
first also follows from the second and vice versa.  Frege used the same German 
words, "begrifflichen Inhalt," in section 3 as he used in section 8 to speak of what can 
be spoken of in English by the use of the words "conceptual content."9  Frege's notion 
of content as it is associated with the phrases "content of a judgment" and "conceptual 
content" (as used in section 3) seems to be the notion of a thought or an idea, while 
Frege's notion of content as it is associated with the phrases "same content," "identity 
of content," and "conceptual content" (as used in section 8) seems to be the notion of 
                                                 
8.  Begriffsschrift und Andere Aufsatze, 1-5. 
9.  Ibid., 2-4 and 13-15. 
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what Frege would later identify as an expression's reference.10  The word "content" 
thus seems to undergo a shift in meaning from one place in the Begriffsschrift to 
another.11  Perhaps the desire to avoid different uses of the same term played a part in 
forcing Frege later to make the distinction between sense and reference and to change 
his earlier analysis of identity.12
 Frege began his famous essay "On Sense and Reference" by noting that the 
idea of equality gives rise to challenging questions that are not easy to answer.13  
Frege's initial discussion in that essay was concerned with one of the same questions 
with which I began my discussion: If identity is a relation, then must it be a relation 
that holds between objects, or a relation that holds between names or descriptions of 
objects?  Frege attempted to solve the problem of identity by showing how the 
judgment represented by an identity statement of the form ⎡α = β⎤ could differ from 
the judgment represented by the corresponding identity statement of the form ⎡α = α⎤.  
An essential component of Frege's analysis that allowed him to claim a difference in 
judgments was the distinction he made between sense and reference.  The referent of 
                                                 
10.  Admittedly, Frege used the expression “conceptual content” only once in section 8, in his 
definition of identity, but in section 8 and in other parts of the Begriffsschrift the way in which he 
spoke about two terms having the same content indicates that this expression was used in section 8 as 
just another way of talking simply about content. 
11.  After having distinguished between sense and reference, Frege later admitted on page x 
of his introduction to The Basic Laws of Arithmetic that he had previously used the expression 
“possible content of judgment” to mean either “thought” or “truth-value,” the former being the sense 
of a declarative sentence and the latter being the reference of a declarative sentence. 
12.  Joan Weiner offers an interpretation of the situation that is somewhat different than mine.  
She maintains that Frege later abandoned his talk of “conceptual content” and recognized that included 
in the content of an expression is both its sense and its reference.  Accompanying this change was, she 
contends, a change in Frege's understanding of identity: instead of viewing identity as a relation 
holding between expressions having the same sense and reference, Frege came to view identity as a 
relation holding between objects.  According to Weiner, Frege continued the practice, introduced in 
his Begriffsschrift, of allowing sentential expressions to flank the identity predicate and was thus led to 
the view of a sentence as a name of its truth-value.  On Weiner's interpretation, Frege held a view of 
identity in the Begriffsschrift that was, as she notes, implausible since sameness of content (or 
synonymy) is too strong a requirement for identity.  See Chapters 5 and 6 in Frege, 72-116. 
13.  All references to “On Sense and Reference” in the following discussion are to the 
translation provided by Geach and Black appearing in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of 
Gottlob Frege, 56-78. 
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a singular term is the object the term refers to, the extension of the term, and the 
referent of a predicate is a concept or relation, which Frege understood technically to 
be a function that mapped one or more objects to a truth-value.  The sense of an 
expression, wherein is contained what Frege called its "mode of presentation," 
corresponds closely to the contemporary notion of the intension of an expression 
(except that Frege conceived of the sense of an expression in terms of a function 
having the referent of the expression as its value).  The sense of a singular term is 
grasped by anyone who is familiar with all of the true sentences in which the term 
appears, and the sense of a predicate is grasped by anyone who understands how the 
particular concept or relation referred to by the predicate is determined, or specified, 
by the predicate.  It is in virtue of an expression having a sense that it also has a 
referent, although not every sensible expression has a referent.  (The singular term 
"the largest prime number," for instance, has a sense but does not have a referent.)  
The relation between sense and reference is such that expressions with the same sense 
have the same reference but not all expressions with the same reference have the 
same sense.  Frege subscribed to what can be called the principle of 
intersubstitutivity: expressions with the same sense can be substituted one for the 
other in the context of a sentence without affecting the sense of the sentence, and 
expressions with the same reference can be substituted one for the other in the context 
of a sentence without affecting the reference of the sentence.  For example, if the 
word "bachelor" and the phrase "eligible unmarried man" are synonymous and the 
sense and referent of "Richard" is the same as, respectively, the sense and referent of 
"Dick," then the sentence "Richard is a bachelor" and the sentence "Dick is an 
eligible unmarried man" are synonymous and have the same referent (truth-value). 
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 According to Frege's theory of sense, the sense of a sentence is a function of 
the senses of its component parts and how those parts are arranged.  Since the sense 
of "a" can differ from the sense of "b" (after all, the senses or meanings of two 
singular terms don't have to coincide for them to be co-referential, but if they do 
coincide they are co-referential), the sense of "a = b" can differ from the sense of "a = 
a."  The sense of a sentence was nontrivial for Frege if our mere recognition of that 
sense, our understanding alone of the sentence, is generally insufficient for us to 
determine the referent of the sentence (i.e., its truth-value).14  Thus, the sense of "a = 
b" can be nontrivial, as occurs when the sense of "a" is entirely distinct from the 
sense of "b."  So, since the sense of "the morning star" (the sense of "the brightest star 
seen in the early morning sky"15) is distinct from the sense of "the evening star" (the 
sense of "the brightest star seen in the early evening sky"), the sense of the sentence 
"The morning star is the evening star" is distinct from the sense of the sentence "The 
morning star is the morning star."  Since a person's grasp of the sense of the latter 
sentence always suffices for him to recognize it to be true, while not everyone who 
grasps the sense of the former sentence thus recognizes it to be true, the sense of the 
latter is trivial, while the sense of the former is nontrivial.16  It was in this fashion that 
Frege sought to satisfy the difference in content requirement. 
                                                 
14.  In “On Sense and Reference,” this is suggested by Frege's remarks in paragraphs 27 and 
28 (pp. 57-58), paragraphs 32 and 33 (pp. 61-63), and paragraph 50 (p. 78). 
15.  A sense, like a set, is fairly easy to name but is very difficult to display.  Frege 
characterized a sense as a thought or a part of a thought and conceived of it as a special type of 
function having a referent as its value.  Since having the same sense is the basis for synonymy, in 
order to talk about the sense of an expression x (other than by using as a name the term ⎡the sense of 
x⎤) often the best that can be done is to find a synonymous expression y and to use, as a name of the 
sense of x, such terms as ⎡the thought that y ⎤, ⎡the sense of y⎤, or ⎡the proposition that y⎤. 
16.  For Frege, any statement of the form ⎡α = α⎤ is an a priori truth (provided that it is a truth 
at all), but not all statements of the form ⎡α = β⎤  are true (and not all of those that are true are a priori 
truths). 
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 For Frege, the reference of complex expressions is fixed in a manner 
analogous to the manner in which the sense is fixed.  According to Frege's theory of 
reference, the reference of a sentence, its truth-value, is a function of the references of 
its component parts.  A statement of identity is true whenever both of its component 
singular terms have the same referent and is false otherwise.  Thus, if the terms "a" 
and "b" refer at all, then "a = a" will always be true regardless of what "a" refers to 
and "a = b" will be true as long as the referent of "a" is the same as the referent of 
"b."  However, since the referent of "a" is the referent of "a," but the referent of "a" is 
not necessarily the referent of "b," the former statement is logically necessary, in that 
all such statements having a truth-value are true, while the latter statement is logically 
contingent, in that some such statements having a truth-value are false.17  
Furthermore, "a = a" is (when true) always semantically necessary, in that our 
recognition of the sense of any such sentence is always sufficient for our recognizing 
that the sentence is true (when "a" refers at all), while "a = b" is not always 
semantically necessary, let alone true.  Thus, Frege's analysis appears to meet the 
nonnecessity requirement. 
 Frege understood a judgment to be the movement from the sense of a sentence 
to its reference, its truth-value.18  Since a sentence of the form ⎡α = β⎤ can have a sense 
different from the sense of the corresponding sentence of the form ⎡α = α⎤ and 
sentences of the former kind can, in general, be either true or false but sentences of 
the latter kind cannot be false, different judgments are possible.  The nontriviality 
(that is, the presence of informative value) of some identity statements is due to the 
fact that they possess a nontrivial sense and do not have to be true, given Frege's 
                                                 
17.  The sentence “a = b” is logically contingent provided, of course, that it is not logically 
necessary that the terms “a” and “b” be co-referring. 
18.  Frege makes this claim at the end of “On Sense and Reference” (paragraph 50, p. 78). 
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theory of reference.  A difference in judgments thus explains why the assertion that a 
= b may be cognitively significant, whereas the assertion that a = a is without 
informative value, even if true.  The assertion of an identity statement with a 
nontrivial sense could inform us about the world because it could tell us something 
about its referents that we would not obtain by merely recognizing the sense of the 
sentence.  Notwithstanding the fact that true statements of identity express 
metaphysically necessary truths, true statements of identity are not always logically 
necessary and are not semantically necessary unless they possess a sense that always 
enables one to pass directly from that sense to a truth-value (the True).  If Frege's 
analysis does indeed satisfy the difference in content and nonnecessity requirements, 
then different judgments are possible and thus Frege's analysis also satisfies the 
nontriviality requirement. 
 In sum, then, Frege's theory of sense together with his theory of reference 
allowed Frege to give an account of identity statements that apparently satisfies the 
difference in content, nonnecessity, and nontriviality requirements by, in effect, 
providing for a distinction between different notions of necessity.  Although Frege 
did not explicitly identify these different forms of necessity, they can be recognized 
as metaphysical, logical, and semantical necessity.  Any instance of the form ⎡α = α⎤ 
is, if true, both logically necessary, since no instance of that form is false (i.e., the 
reference of no instance of that form is the False), and semantically necessary, since 
the terms flanking the identity sign have the same sense and thus our grasp of the 
sense of the sentence is all that we need in order to know that it is true.  Any instance 
of the form ⎡α = β⎤ is, if true, metaphysically necessary, since every object stands in 
the identity relationship with itself (i.e., the relation referred to by the identity 
predicate maps any object and itself to the truth-value the True), but some instances 
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of that form are not semantically necessary, since the sense of α may be distinct from 
the sense of β and thus our recognition of the sense of the sentence may not be 
sufficient for us to recognize its reference.  Also, an instance of  ⎡α = β⎤ may not be 
logically necessary because some statements having the same form as that instance 
are not true (i.e., the reference of some such statements is the False).  Hence, even 
though all true identity statements are metaphysically necessary, the statement "a = 
a" may have a different content than "a = b" since the former, if true, is logically and 
semantically necessary, and thus is trivial, and the latter, even if true, may not be 
logically or semantically necessary, and thus may not be trivial. 
 
3.2 The trouble with Frege's solution 
 Frege evidently thought that the clearest indication for the need to make the 
distinction between sense and reference was provided by the problem of identity.  It 
was in virtue of this distinction that the problem could supposedly be solved, and 
without such a distinction the problem would remain.  The only trouble with this 
proposed solution, as it is presented in "On Sense and Reference," is that it really 
does not completely answer the questions concerning identity Frege raised at the 
beginning of that essay.  Is identity a relation that holds between any object and itself 
or is it a relation that holds between names of objects?  What precisely are we 
indicating when we claim that a is identical to b?  It is not quite clear in "On Sense 
and Reference" how Frege answers the first question, particularly since an advocacy 
of both interpretations of identity is suggested by different parts of his initial 
discussion.  However, I do believe that, rather than adopting the view that statements 
of identity express a relationship between terms that holds whenever the senses of the 
terms determine the same reference, Frege took the simpler approach and supposed 
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that such terms refer to their customary referents so that the identity statement is true 
whenever the referents of the terms are the same.  If Frege had advocated the former 
view after having made the distinction between sense and reference, then, given his 
definition of identity in section 8 of the Begriffsschrift, he would have been claiming 
that "a = b" means that the terms "a" and "b" are so related that the referent of "a" 
determined by the sense of "a" is the same as the referent of "b" determined by the 
sense of "b."  Frege would then have understood identity as a relation, either simple 
or complex, between the terms in an identity statement and the referents of those 
terms. 
 The claim that Frege finally opted for the objectual, not the metalinguistic, 
interpretation of identity can be defended along two lines of thought.  First of all, 
since terms with the same sense have the same reference and the terms in an identity 
statement refer not to themselves but to their customary referents, an objectual 
account would allow the replacement of one term in an identity statement with 
another term having the same sense to preserve the sense of the original.  If an 
identity statement asserted a relation between singular terms, then the singular terms 
occurring in a statement of identity would presumably be referring to themselves.19  
However, if one such term in an identity statement were to be replaced by another 
term with the same sense, there would be no good reason to believe that the sense of 
the original statement would be preserved (unless, of course, one opts for the curious 
view that the names of two singular terms will always have the same sense provided 
that the two singular terms have the same sense).20  In addition, when Frege 
                                                 
19.  Frege acknowledges this in section 8 of the Begriffsschrift.  Notice that, in his statement 
of the meaning of the identity statement “A = B,” the signs “A” and “B” are being referred to even 
though the original identity statement uses the terms “A” and “B” themselves (presumably to refer to 
objects). 
20.  It would seem odd to say, for example, that the sense of the quoted expression “’the 
morning star’” is also the sense of the quoted expression “’the brightest star seen in the early morning 
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considered in "On Sense and Reference" the cases in which the principle of 
substitutivity appears to fail but doesn't because words do not have their customary 
reference, he never mentioned a case where a singular term refers both to itself and to 
its customary referent.21  Frege noted that the words in direct quotation refer to the 
quoted sentence and that the words in some subordinate clauses refer both to their 
customary sense and to their customary reference, and this is why in these cases 
substitutions of co-referring terms that fail to preserve truth-value do not violate the 
principle of substitutivity.  As one of Frege's examples of the latter phenomenon, the 
replacement of a term by a co-referring term in the sentence "Bebel mistakenly 
supposes that the return of Alsace-Lorraine would appease France's desire for 
revenge" may not result in a sentence with the same truth-value since the subordinate 
clause refers to both the sense and the truth-value of the embedded sentence.22  
Among the various other possible sentential constructions present in a language, a 
situation where features of these two cases are combined is never described in “On 
Sense and Reference.”  This would seem to be a significant omission, especially since 
identity was the subject with which he began the discussion in that article, if he still 
held to his earlier views on identity. 
 The second sort of reason why it can be argued that Frege later abandoned the 
metalinguistic account of identity concerns how he treats identity in the 
Grundgesetze, which was published after both the Begriffsschrift and "On Sense and 
Reference."  In the Grundgesetze, Frege regards identity as a relation that is 
expressed by a functional expression having two argument-places.23  Thus, Frege 
                                                                                                                                           
sky’” in spite of the fact that the sense of the expression “the morning star” is also the sense of the 
expression “the brightest star seen in the early morning sky.” 
21.  “On Sense and Reference,” paragraphs 36-49, pp. 65-78. 
22. Ibid., 76. 
23.  Sections of Volume I and Volume II of the Grundgesetze are reprinted in Translations 
from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 137-244.  See especially sections 1-5 of Volume I 
of the Grundgesetze, 152-157. 
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used "ξ = ζ" to refer to the function referred to in any identity statement, where what 
stands on the left side of the identity sign denotes the ξ−argument of the function and 
what stands on the right side of the identity sign denotes the ζ-argument of the 
function.24  A relation is a function that maps objects onto truth-values.25  Since 
concepts and relations are referred to by predicates, the "is" of identity must be a two-
place predicate, in spite of the fact that it is a logical particle.  Since an argument of a 
function is an object, identity is a relation that holds between objects, and whatever 
constructions occupy the two positions in the predicate must be proper names.26  This 
latter fact accords with the manner in which Frege actually uses the identity sign to 
form sentences in the Grundgesetze.  Frege thus used both "Δ" and "Γ" as names and 
specified the truth conditions for identity statements by stipulating that "Δ = Γ" is to 
stand for the True whenever Δ and Γ are the same.27  Hence, where "a" and "b" are 
proper names and "F" is a two-place predicate, "a = b" is analogous in logical form to 
"Fab."  Frege is therefore committed to the view that identity is a relation between 
objects, not a relation between names of objects. 
 Notwithstanding the difficulties involved in interpreting just how Frege 
would, in the end, answer the first question, Frege's solution clearly does not provide 
an answer to the second question: What precisely are we indicating when we claim 
that a = b?  If we were puzzled about the meaning of such a statement as "a = b," it 
would not really help us to be told that such a statement means that the referent of "a" 
is the same as the referent of "b" or that there is a unique x (i.e., any y satisfying the 
same condition being the same as x) such that "a" refers to x and "b" refers to x.  
Similarly, it would not help to say (more in line with Frege's analysis) that the 
                                                 
24.  Ibid., section 7, p. 158. 
25.  Ibid., section 3, p. 155. 
26.  Ibid., section 2, p. 154. 
27.  Ibid., section 7, p. 158. 
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statement "a = b" is true if and only if the referent of "a" is the same as the referent of 
"b."  After all, the predicate, "is the same as," occurring in these parsed versions of 
the identity statement "a = b" is just another expression for the identity predicate.  
Thus, such metalanguage statements expressing the content of assertions of identity 
and such statements of the truth conditions for identities are no less obscure than are 
the identity statements themselves.  Furthermore, we would, in most cases, never 
prefer the former over the latter since the former are decidedly more complex and still 
contain the problematic identity predicate.28
 The trouble with Frege's solution to the problem of identity is that almost all 
the difficulties that attend the problem, even if solved for statements in the object 
language, are reintroduced in the metalanguage.  In order to answer the question what 
it means for a to be identical to b, one must understand the truth conditions for the 
sentence "a is identical to b" and must therefore answer the question what it means 
for the referent of "a" to be the same as (identical to) the referent of "b." In order to 
answer the latter question, one must, in turn, rely upon a notion of identity occurring 
in the metalanguage wherein is contained the descriptions "the referent of 'a'" and 
"the referent of 'b'."  The problem is thus never solved but is rather merely 
forestalled.  This situation is objectionable since it means that we cannot rely on the 
metalanguage to employ a notion in terms of which identity can be usefully defined.  
Nonetheless, if we already have an adequate conception of the logical content of 
identity statements in the metalanguage, then that understanding can be usefully 
exploited in the development of an analysis of identity that will indeed satisfy the 
                                                 
28.  I suspect Morris (Understanding Identity Statements) was led to understand Frege as espousing a 
metalinguistic analysis of identity by mistakenly interpreting Frege's statement of the truth conditions 
for an identity statement as being synonymous to the identity statement and wrongly conceiving of the 
former as a statement about the relationship between terms instead of the referents of terms.  However, 
one should not take a statement to be about its terms just because the statement of its truth conditions 
makes mention of its terms (which was the overall mistake Morris made), otherwise every statement 
would be about its terms instead of the referents of its terms. 
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difference in content, the nonnecessity, and the nontriviality requirements and will 
answer the questions asked at the beginning of this chapter.  Since the specification of 
the truth conditions for identity statements accounted for the fact that "a = a" is 
(logically) necessary when true and "a = b" is not, Frege's analysis relied 
fundamentally on a conception of identity in the metalanguage, as well as the notion 
of reference, in order to satisfy the nonnecessity requirement.  Since differences in 
sense contributed to the fact that "a = a" is different in content than "a = b," Frege 
relied fundamentally on the theory of sense in order to satisfy the difference in 
content requirement.  (Furthermore, since the difference in content was attributed to a 
difference in the senses of "a" and "b," Frege relied on a notion of two terms having 
different senses, which would presumably be dependent on a notion of two terms 
having the same sense.)  Since differences in both sense and truth conditions 
accounted for the fact that "a = a" is trivial and "a = b" is not, Frege relied 
fundamentally on both the theory of sense and the theory of reference in order to 
satisfy the nontriviality requirement. 
 The fact that the identity predicate still occurs in the metalanguage statements 
and was never eliminated from the corresponding talk about senses and referents 
shows that the meaning of an identity claim has nothing essentially to do with the 
distinction between sense and reference.  We should expect that if identity were to be 
expressible as some sort of relation between sense and reference, then the identity 
predicate as such would drop out of our considerations in the metalanguage, but such 
is not the case.  Frege only succeeded in specifying the conditions under which an 
identity claim, which, when true, is to be understood as a claim about, in effect, a 
single object, could represent an important, nontrivial extension of our knowledge 
given a prior notion of identity in the metalanguage.  Frege did not fully explicate the 
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meaning of the identity predicate, but, in all fairness to Frege, it should be remarked 
that this probably was never really his goal.  Frege even argued that identity could not 
be defined.  "Since any definition is an identity," Frege declared, "identity itself 
cannot be defined."29
 Some may object that, since Frege did not make the metalanguage/object 
language distinction, it is unfair to criticize him in terms of machinery he was in no 
position to handle.  However, such an objection is quite irrelevant.30  The making of 
the metalanguage/object language distinction does not create the trouble with Frege’s 
analysis.  The problem would remain whether or not we explicitly recognized the 
difference between the language used and the language mentioned.  The trouble may 
actually be more intuitively clear if we ignore the difference.  Frege employed the 
very notion of identity in his presentation of the truth conditions for identity 
statements, and, if grasping the sense of the identity predicate is a necessary condition 
for understanding the truth conditions for an identity statement, then Frege 
presupposed a prior grasp of the sense of the identity predicate in his account of the 
truth conditions for an identity statement and thus relied on the very notion his 
analysis was ostensibly designed to explicate.  Frege used discourse to talk about 
discourse, and this is true regardless of how his analysis is described.  By making the 
metalanguage/object language distinction, we only clarify and elaborate upon what is 
already present in his analysis. 
 A more telling objection to my dismissal of Frege's analysis can nonetheless 
be made.  It may be claimed that identity must be viewed as a primitive notion and as 
such is ineliminable.  We should not expect to be able ultimately to define the logical 
                                                 
29.  See Frege's review of Husserl's Philosophie der Arithmetik, reprinted, in part, in 
Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 79-85. 
30.  Such an objection may also be quite mistaken as well.  Given his criticisms of the works 
of some of the mathematicians of his day, Frege seemed to recognize the distinction between discourse 
about objects and discourse about the signs used to designate objects. 
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notion of identity, and, consequently, the best that can be achieved is to employ 
whatever resources are available in the metalanguage in order to specify the truth 
conditions of identity statements and to establish certain rules of inference that 
govern the way statements of identity operate in deductions.  The identity predicate 
is, after all, a logical particle, and logical particles tend not to be completely 
eliminable.  No one would object to the use of the word "and" to form conjunctions in 
spite of the fact that the metalanguage statement of the truth conditions for 
conjunctions standardly employs the very notion of conjunction:  A sentence of the 
form ⎡A & B⎤ is true iff both the left and the right conjuncts are true.  We should not 
be surprised then that the truth conditions for an identity statement cannot be stated 
without employing the very notion of identity. 
 However, the situation with the identity predicate is different than it is with 
other logical particles.  First of all, the other logical particles are to some extent 
interdefinable, and this is not the case with identity.  A universal generalization can 
be defined as the negation of existential generalization, and any one of the truth 
functional connectives can be defined in terms of one or more other truth functional 
connectives.  The identity predicate, according to the standard account, is not 
definable in terms of any other logical particle.  Secondly, and more importantly, the 
truth conditions of other logical particles are understood in the context of a more 
general account of how such particles determine the truth-value of sentences in which 
they occur.  The truth conditions for universal and existential generalizations are 
stated in the context of the theory of quantification, and the truth conditions for 
negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, and conditionals are understood in terms of the 
theory of truth functions.  It is in virtue of the latter theory that deviant conjunctions, 
disjunctions, and conditionals can be recognized in spite of the fact that the 
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conjunctive, disjunctive, and conditional particles are all taken as primitive.  
However, as should be evident from my discussion, Frege's account of identity 
provides no theory in the context of which the specification of the truth conditions for 
identity statements can help us understand the logical meaning of the identity 
predicate.  The specification of the truth conditions for identity statements does occur 
in the context of Frege's theory of reference, but this theory is too general since it 
applies to both the logical and the nonlogical parts of the language and does not 
single out the strictly logical features of the identity predicate.  The manner in which 
a logical predicate and a nonlogical predicate determine truth-value is accounted for 
in the same fashion by the theory of reference. 
 There is, though, a much more profound reason for not merely taking identity 
as primitive and letting it go at that.  The distinction between an intensional and an 
extensional context, and thus the distinction between intensional and extensional 
logic, is made based upon a notion of identity.31  If we lack a clear understanding of 
the relation of identity, then our idea of the distinction between intension and 
extension must ultimately be confused.  The intensional idioms that introduce 
propositional attitude contexts such as "believes that," "desires that," "wishes that," 
"hopes that," "fears that," "says that," and "wonders whether" vary greatly in meaning 
and for this reason are difficult to categorize in terms of a common content, but they 
all share the feature of often being used to set up contexts within which substitutions 
of co-referring terms do not in general preserve truth-value.  In a typical sentence in 
which one of these idioms is present, a sentential expression occurs in the subordinate 
clause following the idiom, and this sentential expression may contain one or more 
singular terms.  The truth-value of the complex sentence will not always remain 
                                                 
31.  Also, as I noted in the previous chapter, Quine presupposed an adequate understanding of 
identity in his rejection of intensions. 
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unchanged when a singular term occurring in the subordinate clause is replaced by 
another co-referring term.  For example, even though Mark Twain is, or was, Samuel 
Clemens, the following sentences do not necessarily have the same truth-value. 
 
Joe believes that Mark Twain wrote The Adventures of Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry 
Finn. 
Joe believes that Samuel Clemens wrote The Adventures of Tom Sawyer and 
Huckleberry Finn. 
 
Joe, for instance, may have an extensive knowledge of American literature but not 
know who Samuel Clemens was. 
 As Frege discussed at length in “On Sense and Reference,” the principle of 
substitutivity appears to be violated by substitutions into these sorts of contexts.32  
Because the replacement in these contexts of one co-referring term for another may 
not preserve the truth-value of the sentence (the Fregean referent of the sentence) 
propositional attitude contexts are often said to be “referentially opaque.”33  In 
contrast, contexts in which co-referring terms can be freely substituted one for the 
other without altering truth-value are said to be “referentially transparent” or “purely 
referential.”  There are also those more problematic cases involving causal and 
evidential relations and explanatory contexts where transparent reference to objects 
                                                 
32.  In addition, there are also modal contexts and contexts involving direct quotation where 
the principle of substitutivity likewise apparently fails.   As I shall discuss in the next chapter, 
substitution into modal contexts can generate identity paradoxes. 
33.  This expression was coined by Quine in Word and Object.  As I have previously 
mentioned, for Frege there are no violations of the principle of substitutivity; all alleged violations of 
the principle are only apparent violations.  Instead of singular terms in subordinate clauses and in 
quoted sentences occupying referentially opaque positions, such terms, for Frege, involve “oblique 
reference” (i.e., they refer not to their customary referents, those referents the terms would normally 
have outside of these special contexts, but rather to their indirect referents, which are their customary 
senses). 
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seems to be made, and yet substitutions of co-referring terms are typically not 
permitted and, in the main, should not be permitted.  We may, for instance, explain 
why bees are attracted to a certain flower by claiming that the bees are attracted to the 
flower because the color of the flower is blue.  Notwithstanding the truth of the 
sentence "The color of the lamp signaling a blue light special is blue," we would not 
preserve the explanation in claiming that the bees are attracted to the flower because 
the color of the flower is the color of the lamp signaling a blue light special.  The 
situation is complicated further by the fact that there are, however, special cases 
where some substitutions into these same sorts of contexts do seem to be legitimate.  
Thus, from the sentences "Jim provided evidence which indicated that Tom is guilty" 
and "Tom is Laura's husband" it seems to follow that "Jim provided evidence which 
indicated that Laura's husband is guilty."  An understanding of the logical nature of 
propositional attitude and explanatory contexts will therefore require comprehending 
the extent of their opacity (or what I like to call the "degree of their opacity") and not 
merely the fact of their opacity.34
                                                 
34.  Frege's examination in “On Sense and Reference” of the cases in which the principle of 
substitutivity seemingly fails does not provide us with an adequate understanding of a purely 
referential context.  Frege was primarily concerned there with defending his account of sense and 
reference against possible criticism, and so what he did was to examine apparent counterexamples and 
show that, in each case, the principle can be maintained as long as we take terms and component 
sentences as sometimes having a sense or reference that is not their customary sense or reference.  
Frege's remarks, though, do not constitute an adequate theory of transparent and opaque contexts.  
(Actually, contexts were never opaque for Frege, since intersubstitutivity never really failed according 
to Frege, but terms could have an indirect or oblique reference, instead of their customary reference, in 
certain contexts.)  Frege never provided sufficient reason for claiming, for instance, that terms could 
have their customary sense as their indirect reference other than the fact that the principle of 
substitutivity is preserved if we sometimes take this to be the case.  Thus, Frege characterized contexts 
in terms of what expressions with the same customary sense or reference could be substituted for 
corresponding expressions without altering the truth-value of sentences.  Frege provided, therefore, no 
descriptions of contexts that were free of the notion of sameness (either sameness of customary sense 
or reference or sameness of indirect sense or reference).  In addition, although I will not argue for this 
here, Frege's contention that the reference of sentences in propositional attitude contexts is to their 
customary sense is probably not in general true.  A substitution of one term for another in such 
contexts should actually be legitimate provided that the substitution preserves the same saying, 
thought, belief, desire, etc. expressed by the original subordinate clause, rather than merely the same 
sense or proposition. 
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 The apparent failure of intersubstitutivity has been taken as one of the tests for 
an intensional context.  If a sentence contains a term t1 and is such that the 
substitution for t1 by a co-referring term t2 can alter the truth-value of the sentence, 
then the context in which t1 occurs is intensional, and, if this is not the case, then the 
context is extensional.  Furthermore, the terms t1 and t2 are co-referring when and 
only when the identity statement ⎡t1 = t2⎤ is true.  The notion of identity thus plays a 
crucial role in demarcating the boundary between extensional and intensional logic; 
the principle of substitutivity will always be understood to hold if the underlying 
logic of a theory is taken to be extensional, but this will not be the case if that logic is 
taken to be intensional.  Within formal systems of extensional logic, the validity of 
the inference rules of identity introduction and identity elimination is a direct 
consequence of the commitment to the principle of substitutivity.  If our 
understanding of identity is incomplete and does not allow us to see precisely why 
and in what circumstances intersubstitutivity holds and why and when it does not 
hold, then we have only a partial understanding of the distinction between intensional 
and extensional logic.  It should perhaps also be noted here in this regard that, if the 
manner in which we view identity should change, then we might well have to redraw 
(or indeed even eliminate) the boundary between intensional and extensional logic. 
 Some may contend that all logic is extensional and that all contexts should be 
interpreted as being referentially transparent instead of opaque.  For those who opt for 
this view, there is no distinction to be drawn between the two general sorts of logical 
inferences.  The advocates of such a position may then not be troubled by the lack of 
a definitive solution to the problem of identity and may not be averse to regarding the 
identity predicate as an irresolvable primitive.  However attractive this position may 
be from the standpoint of being able both to circumvent the problems posed by 
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propositional attitude contexts and to free oneself of the need to have a clear idea of 
identity, the denial that intensional idioms introduce contexts where there is some 
kind of problem with intersubstitutivity seems untenable.  It clearly will not do to 
interpret contexts of direct and indirect quotation as referentially transparent.  In the 
case of a statement involving direct quotation, the spoken or written words of another 
must be duplicated, in the same language or in the translator's language, nearly 
verbatim if the report on what was said or written is to be deemed true.  In the case of 
a statement involving indirect quotation, the characterization of the spoken or written 
words of another is allowed greater variance, but an interpretation often can 
mischaracterize what was said or written if certain key words in the original are 
omitted, even if they are replaced by co-referring terms.  If contexts of direct and 
indirect quotation should not in general be regarded as referentially transparent and 
such contexts are of the same nature as propositional attitude contexts, then the latter 
contexts should also not in general be regarded as referentially transparent.  Thus, it 
often happens, and seems completely reasonable, that we accept as true such a 
sentence as "The Germans knew that the beginning of the Allied invasion of France 
would occur in June" at the same time we accept the falsehood of "The Germans 
knew that the Normandy invasion would occur in June," in spite of the fact that the 
beginning of the Allied invasion of France was the Normandy invasion.  (The former, 
but not the latter, sentence accurately reports the Germans' state of knowledge.)  It 
may seem convenient, for theoretical purposes, to dismiss, because of our acceptance 
of the truth of the former sentence, our acceptance of the falsehood of the latter 
sentence; however, whoever indulges in such a theoretical face-saving exercise is 
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inexorably left with the conclusion that a great deal of our talk about the propositional 
attitudes (as well as our talk about causes and explanations35) is nonsensical. 
Although I have no desire to present here an argumentum ad populum, I find 
such a conclusion unwarranted.  Admittedly, it is not the purpose of logical analysis 
to show the good sense of all that we say in ordinary language, but it is one of the 
primary goals of the formal analysis of arguments to account for the overall pattern of 
the valid inferences made by speakers of the language.  The formal logician's analysis 
of the inference relations present in a language (or in a properly regimented version 
of the language) involves examining how the truth-value of one sentence is related to, 
or, in some cases, independent of, the truth-values of other sentences.  The formal 
logician's task is to devise a grammar and a system of analysis to represent the logical 
form of statements in such a way as to allow him to make perspicuous both the truth 
conditions of and the inferential connections among statements, as those statements 
are understood by speakers of the language.  Thus, holding to an analysis that is 
flagrantly at odds with common linguistic usage is both inconsistent with the spirit of 
logical analysis and counterproductive. 
Furthermore, due to the aim of logical analysis, it can be said that a successful 
treatment of these special contexts that accommodates both the understanding of them 
as intensional and the understanding of them as extensional is, in general, to be 
preferred over an account of these contexts that always forces them to be read 
extensionally.  The question whether the propositional attitudes should be understood 
                                                 
35.  Biologist David Suzuki once remarked on the Discovery Channel's The Nature of Things 
that he was forced to spend part of his childhood in the 1940's in an internment camp “because of his 
genes.”  When understood literally, such a claim is surely incorrect.  Even if it were possible to equate 
being of Japanese ancestry with the possession of certain genes (which is extremely doubtful at best), 
those who carried out the resettlement order did not send Americans of Japanese ancestry to such 
camps because of their genetic makeup, a variable which was certainly unknown to them.  Thus, the 
interpreting of Suzuki's remark as being referentially transparent (which is involved in interpreting it 
literally) is clearly mistaken. 
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either as in some sense a relation between a person (a believer, a knower, etc.) and a 
particular proposition representing the content of the attitude or as a relation between 
a person and other persons or things is not one that can be legitimately settled just by 
deciding beforehand whether or not to accept both intensional and extensional logic.  
This question is central to the current debate over internalism and externalism in the 
philosophy of mind and needs to be addressed from a neutral perspective that 
recognizes at least the initial plausibility of both opaque and transparent readings of 
propositional attitude contexts. 
 
3.3 Two other Fregean resolutions of the problem of identity 
 It is interesting to note that some contemporary philosophers, while evidently 
rejecting strictly Fregean senses, have nonetheless proposed in effect to resuscitate 
Frege's sense/reference distinction in order to solve the problem of identity.  
Unfortunately, these proposals have generally tended to reintroduce the 
sense/reference distinction (or something akin to it) without providing much, if any, 
elucidation of the concept of identity. 
 David Kaplan has suggested considering the meaning of any "fugitive" (as 
opposed to eternal or “timeless”) sentence type that is an identity statement 
containing a demonstrative to be a function that maps an utterance of the sentence 
type at a particular time in a possible world to a content.36  Kaplan construes the 
content of an utterance of a sentence type as a function that maps the utterance in a 
possible world to the truth-value the utterance would take on if it were made in that 
possible world.  Thus, the meaning of a sentence type fixes the content of any 
particular utterance of that sentence type in a particular situation, and the content of 
                                                 
36.  David Kaplan, "Dthat," in Syntax and Semantics, reprinted in A.P. Martinich, ed., The 
Philosophy of Language, 315-328. 
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an utterance of a particular sentence type in a particular situation fixes the truth-value 
of that utterance.  Furthermore, for Kaplan, a content is necessary if the utterance 
having that content is a true utterance in every possible world, and a content is 
impossible if the utterance having that content is a false utterance in every possible 
world.  The utterance of an identity statement containing a demonstrative has either a 
necessary content or an impossible content, and such identity statements are often 
contingent in the sense that their utterances have a necessary content in some contexts 
and an impossible content in other contexts.  When the utterance of an identity 
statement expresses a true statement, the statement expressed is a necessary truth; 
when a false statement, the statement expressed is a necessary falsehood.  However, 
knowing just the meaning of an identity statement is not sufficient in itself for 
knowing the content, and thus the truth-value, of any particular utterance of the 
identity statement.37  Kaplan thereby accounts for how an utterance of an identity 
statement can express a necessary truth even though its truth is not known and is 
consequently an informative utterance.  Thus, for Kaplan, an utterance of the sentence 
“That planet (the morning star) is identical to this planet (the evening star)” will 
express, when made under appropriate conditions and accompanied by appropriate 
behavior (a demonstration, such as pointing to or displaying something) to fix the 
reference of the singular terms containing the demonstratives, what is necessarily 
true, even though the sentence itself is not a necessary truth. 
                                                 
37.  Kaplan's distinction between the meaning of a sentence and the content of an utterance 
also appears to be Simon Blackburn's later distinction between the character of an utterance (of a 
sentence) and the particular information expressed by an utterance of a sentence (i.e., the particular 
truth or falsity a sentence is used to communicate).  As Blackburn illustrates with a case of a 
demonstrative utterance, the particular information conveyed by an utterance may depend upon the 
identification of the individual or individuals to which the speaker wishes to refer and under such 
circumstances is what Blackburn calls “identity-dependent” information.  See page 303 of Blackburn’s 
Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. 
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 What is the case for demonstrative expressions may, Kaplan suggests, also 
often be the case for other singular referring expressions.  The demonstrative 
expression serves only the purpose of enabling the speaker's utterance together with 
the demonstration to fix the speaker's intended reference.  An understanding of how 
the demonstrative expression and the demonstration determine what is being referred 
to (the manner in which these are connected perhaps being amenable to a Fregean 
analysis) is not in general required for an understanding of the meaning of the 
sentence uttered.  To understand what is being said specifically about particular 
things (i.e., to understand the content of a particular utterance), one needs to grasp the 
meaning of the sentence uttered and recognize the speaker's intended reference.  
Kaplan claims, although rather tentatively, that the distinction (and relationship) 
between the meaning of a sentence and the content of an utterance may well hold not 
only for sentences containing demonstratives but also for many sentences (or 
utterances of sentences) containing proper names or even definite descriptions.  If 
Kaplan is correct, then an adequate understanding of the use of demonstrative phrases 
may thus be basic to an understanding of the use of all singular terms. 
 Kaplan's analysis of the meaning/content of any particular token of a sentence 
is overall Fregean in its approach in spite of the fact that Kaplan downplays the role 
played by what Frege would regard as senses.  For Kaplan, as was the case for Frege, 
there is associated with any particular declarative sentence a composite function from 
that sentence, as uttered by a speaker in a particular context, to a truth-value, that 
function representing the meaning/content of the sentence.  Kaplan's proposal is thus 
vulnerable to the sorts of criticisms that can be leveled against Frege's analysis when 
it comes to the matter of identity statements.  As a result, Kaplan has not really 
elucidated the concept of the identity relation, particularly since he never specifies the 
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functions that represent the meaning of an identity statement and the content of an 
utterance of such a statement.  Kaplan has just indicated in a general way how it is 
possible for an identity statement to be considered contingent and informative even 
though any particular utterance of such a statement, if true, will necessarily be true. 
 Searle takes a somewhat different approach to the problem of how it is 
possible for identity statements to differ in content and significance.38  Searle's 
solution relies fundamentally on introducing a notion that corresponds to Frege's 
notion of sense.  According to Searle, a proper name is associated with a complex of 
descriptions a sufficient number of which must be satisfied by exactly one individual 
in order for the name to have a referent.  The descriptions with which proper names 
are associated will vary, and some proper names that have the same referent will 
nevertheless be associated with significantly different descriptions.  When the proper 
names in an identity statement are associated with the same descriptions and there is 
exactly one thing that is the referent of both names, the identity statement is a trivial 
analytic truth.  However, when the proper names in an identity statement are 
associated with different descriptions and yet there is exactly one thing that is the 
referent of both names, the identity statement is a synthetic truth. 
 For Searle, the sentence “Tully is Tully” and the sentence “Tully is Cicero” 
can both be used to express an analytic truth, and the ability of a speaker to use either 
one to express such a truth is a reflection or illustration of contingent linguistic rules 
governing the use of proper names generally and the use of “Tully” and “Cicero” to 
refer specifically.  Without linguistic rules ensuring that successive occurrences 
(tokens) of the same proper name (type) in a sentence will refer to the same 
individual and without linguistic rules regarding how “Tully” and “Cicero” are used 
                                                 
38.  John R. Searle, “Proper Names,” Mind 67 (1958), also reprinted in A.P. Martinich, ed., 
The Philosophy of Language, 270-274. 
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to refer, neither sentence could be used to make a claim that is analytically true.  
Searle, though, admits that the rules that allow the use of “Tully is Tully” to express 
an analytic truth are more universally conventional in the use of language than are the 
rules that allow the use of “Tully is Cicero” to accomplish the same feat.  The two 
identity statements therefore differ in significance at least in the sense that each is a 
reflection, or illustration, of different sets of linguistic rules.  This observation, while 
not ruling out the possibility that identity statements containing distinct proper names 
can express significant synthetic truths, nevertheless does not enable us to see how 
such statements are possible.  The issue of just that sort of possibility is, of course, at 
the heart of the problem of identity.  Searle acknowledges that those who argue, for 
instance, that Shakespeare was Bacon are not advancing a thesis about language but 
are intending by their use of the sentence “Shakespeare is Bacon” to express an 
important historical truth. 
 Two strategies have traditionally been pursued in order to explain the manner 
in which proper names are connected with the individuals to which speakers intend to 
refer, and thereby to account for the nature of the rules governing the use of proper 
names to refer.  These two approaches represent for Searle two extremes; Searle 
rejects both and instead offers a proposal that is a compromise between these 
extremes.  On the one hand, some have considered proper names to be devices used 
exclusively to refer and thus to be devoid of any descriptive content whatsoever.  On 
the other hand, others have viewed proper names as terms always having a 
descriptive content in virtue of which they have, or do not have, reference. 
 If proper names necessarily have reference but lack anything corresponding to 
sense (which would seem to be the case if proper names are completely devoid of 
descriptive content), then it is difficult to see how the rules for the correct use of 
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proper names to refer to particular individuals could be learned and it is difficult to 
assign an adequate meaning to any denial that a proper name has a referent.  In order 
to learn to how to use a particular name to refer, one must learn the connection 
between the use of the name and the object to which speakers intend to refer.  The 
connection between the name and the intended referent is ultimately established by 
describing the latter, even in cases where a speaker indicates the intended reference 
by an act of ostension.  Since the descriptions associated with the proper name fix the 
intended referent of the name and thereby determine in effect the rule for the correct 
use of the name, these descriptions can be construed as collectively constituting the 
sense of the proper name.  Hence, if one rejects the notion of proper names having a 
sense, then one would also have to reject the notion of there being learnable 
descriptive rules for the use of proper names. 
Perhaps even more importantly, if proper names have no descriptive content, 
then any denial that a name has a referent appears not to have the meaning and 
significance normally attributed to such a claim.  If, for example, someone were to 
utter the sentence, as evidently some people actually have, “Socrates never existed,” 
what the speaker would most likely be intending to say is that the features 
customarily ascribed to Socrates were never possessed by any one individual or were 
possessed collectively by different people living at different times or places.  The 
speaker should not be interpreted as saying merely that no one named "Socrates" ever 
existed (which is false), but should rather be interpreted as saying something like, 
"There was no influential ancient Greek philosopher who lived in Athens, was Plato's 
mentor, was tried and convicted of impiety and corrupting the youth, and was 
executed in 399 B.C."  Such an interpretation of the denial that a proper name has a 
referent is precluded, though, if the use of a proper name does not involve the at least 
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implicit attempt to describe or allude to some of the features thought to be possessed 
by the referent of the name. 
 However, if proper names necessarily have sense and only contingently, if at 
all, have reference, then there are a whole host of other difficulties of a different sort.  
If proper names have a meaning or sense in that there is associated with any name a 
description that must be satisfied by an object in order for the name to be used to 
refer to that object, then the particular meaning attached to a name may vary from one 
person to another and that meaning may have to change in order for the name to have 
the same referent, or any referent at all, if the object the name is used to refer to 
should change its attributes.  Furthermore, if proper names have descriptive content, 
then they function in effect as shorthand for their descriptions, which means that 
some statements that involve the name in simple predications are trivial analytic 
truths and others are self-contradictory.  Thus, for instance, if at least part of the 
meaning of the name “Aristotle” is given by the definite description “the famous 
philosopher from Stagira who tutored Alexander the Great,” then the sentence 
“Aristotle was once a tutor” can be used to express a truth that is both trivial and 
analytic.  However, this does not seem right; as Searle notes, it is only a contingent 
matter of fact that Aristotle ever went into pedagogy. 
What I suspect is of even more importance for Searle is the fact that, if proper 
names were to function in effect as descriptions, then the linguistic rules governing 
the use of proper names to refer to particular individuals would be so precise that a 
name could be used to refer to its intended referent only if the latter satisfied a certain 
definite complex of descriptions, which would mean that proper names are logically 
equivalent to that complex of descriptions and are therefore superfluous.  Under such 
circumstances, there would be no difference between referring and describing, since 
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one could only succeed in referring by describing.  That difference, though, is what 
marks, for Searle, the distinction between proper names and descriptions.  If the rules 
for the use of proper names are precise, then the descriptions that determine the 
referent of a proper name must specify what it is to be identical to the referent of the 
name (i.e., they must specify the identity conditions for the referent of the name).  
The descriptions that collectively give the sufficient and necessary conditions for 
applying a proper name will not specify merely that the referent of the name is a 
particular thing that happens to bear the name as its label, or, in other words, that may 
be or has been referred to in speakers' referring uses of the name.  (Thus, for example, 
the fact that there lived in the twentieth century a certain wealthy Greek tycoon is not 
a sufficient condition for saying that philosophers’ use of the name “Aristotle” 
succeeds in referring.)  However, Searle contends that the great pragmatic 
significance of proper names lies precisely in the fact that speakers who use proper 
names do not need to come to any prior public agreement on what exactly constitutes 
the identity conditions of the things to which they use proper names to refer.  In most 
cases, the issue of what constitutes the identity of the intended referent is never even 
raised by a speaker's referring use of a proper name.  In contrast, a definite 
description is always used to specify the condition that must be satisfied by the 
unique referent of the description.  So, if proper names function ultimately as definite 
descriptions, then the former are eliminable in terms of the latter and thus lack their 
important role in speech, a role that seems to distinguish them from descriptions. 
 What Searle proposes as a solution to these difficulties is in important respects 
an intermediate between the view of proper names as purely referential and the view 
of proper names as fundamentally descriptive.  According to Searle, proper names, 
with but few exceptions, are not strictly equivalent to descriptions, but proper names 
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nevertheless do possess a sense in that their referring uses always involve certain 
"descriptive presuppositions."39  For Searle, a speaker who uses a proper name to 
refer presupposes, but does not assert, that some of the descriptions of an unspecified 
complex of descriptions hold true of the individual to which the speaker intends to 
refer, this complex of descriptions detailing the attributes the speaker believes the 
intended referent to possess.  Since presumably what is known, or at least is believed 
to be true, about an individual will vary somewhat over time and among different 
people, the descriptions associated with a proper name will vary accordingly.  Certain 
of these descriptions a speaker will regard as more important in that their fulfillment 
is considered more crucial to a specification of what amounts to the identity 
conditions of the individual to which the speaker intends to refer, these descriptions 
collectively constituting the descriptive presuppositions involved in a speaker's 
referring use of the proper name of that individual.  Still, since what a speaker takes 
to be an essential fact about an individual and thus a component of the identity 
conditions of the individual is rather vague and will vary from speaker to speaker, the 
extent and nature of these descriptive presuppositions is nevertheless left rather 
indefinite in a typical referring use of a proper name.40  The absence of an explicit 
specification of these descriptive presuppositions marks, according to Searle, the 
distinction between referring and describing, and the consequent lack of precise 
criteria for applying proper names is what for Searle will in general serve to 
                                                 
39.  The exceptions involve proper names that assume the form of a description or that have 
acquired a strict descriptive use.  A proper name such as “The Bank of England” (Searle's example) or 
“The artist formerly known as 'Prince'” (my example) carries, in this case, what would customarily be 
its presuppositions as a very part of its meaning.  For an example of a proper name that is commonly 
used as a substitute for a description, consider that traditional Western theists have come to use the 
word “God” to mean “the omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, all-loving being who created the 
universe but is separate from it.” 
40.  This conclusion is reminiscent of the same sort of conclusion reached by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein in section 79 of his Philosophical Investigations.  See, for instance, Philosophical 
Investigations, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe, 3rd ed., pp. 36e-38e. 
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distinguish proper names from descriptions.  Therefore, proper names, Searle claims, 
function not as descriptions, but as “pegs upon which to hang descriptions.”  
Furthermore, the complex of descriptive presuppositions associated with a proper 
name functions like a Fregean sense in that a speaker who uses the name to refer can 
be considered as successfully referring in virtue of the fact that a sufficient number of 
the descriptions he presupposes as satisfied are indeed true of the intended referent.41  
Similar to what is the case with Fregean senses, the issue of what exactly are the 
presuppositions associated with a proper name and precisely how many of a speaker's 
presuppositions need be satisfied in order for referring uses of the name to be 
successful is, however, in general never raised (nor is a definitive answer 
presupposed) by a speaker's referring use of the name.  This approach, according to 
Searle, can yield an adequate account of what a speaker asserts in denying that a 
proper name has a referent.  In denying that a proper name has reference, a speaker in 
effect asserts that a sufficient but unspecified number of the descriptions 
conventionally associated with referring uses of the name (more specifically, all those 
descriptions that are conventionally presupposed and regarded as essential to fixing 
the alleged reference of the name) are true of no one individual. 
 Thus, Searle, if I am interpreting him correctly, considers the sense a speaker 
attaches to a proper name to be the indefinite complex of descriptive presuppositions 
with which the speaker associates the name, while the sense of a proper name in 
general is the indefinite complex of conventional presuppositions with which 
speakers have come to associate the name.  In addition, the linguistic rules for the use 
of a proper name must be based upon a specification of the identity conditions of the 
name's referent since for Searle it is these identity conditions that connect the name 
                                                 
41.  The idea of the referent of a proper name being fixed by descriptions has also been 
endorsed by Paul Ziff in his Semantic Analysis, 102-105. 
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with its referent.  Hence, the sense of a proper name, for Searle just as it was for 
Frege, determines the reference of the name, since, for Searle anyway, the sense of a 
proper name amounts to the complex of descriptive presuppositions that constitutes 
the identity conditions of the name's referent and figures in the linguistic rules for the 
use of the name.42
 Given this understanding of proper names, Searle then offers a solution to the 
problem of identity that parallels Frege's solution.  The terms used in an identity 
statement can have the same referent, in which case the identity statement is true.  
Searle's commitment to an objectual account of identity is clearly revealed by his 
observation that, in order for the proper name "Aristotle" to apply correctly to an 
object, it is both sufficient and necessary that the object in question be identical with 
Aristotle (instead of merely being identical to some individual named "Aristotle"), 
which in turn will be the case when and only when that object satisfies the descriptive 
presuppositions associated with the name "Aristotle" (or, in other words, satisfies the 
conditions both sufficient and necessary for an object to be Aristotle).  However, the 
terms used in an identity statement can be, or can be associated with, different 
descriptions that single out unique individuals, in which case the identity statement, 
                                                 
42.  Although Searle is not altogether careful to spell out all the steps of his reasoning, his 
main argument can, I believe, be summarized as follows. 
 
A speaker follows linguistic rules and uses a proper name to refer successfully to an object when and 
only when the object he intends to refer to satisfies the identity conditions of the object denoted by the 
name he uses. 
The sense of a proper name is what connects the name with the unique object to which speakers use 
the name to refer. 
The condition both sufficient and necessary for the object to which the speaker intends to refer to be 
identical to the object denoted by the proper name is that the former object satisfy the complex of 
descriptions that all fit only one individual and that establish the connection between the name and the 
object denoted by the name. 
When a speaker uses a proper name to refer, he typically presupposes that the requisite connection 
exists between the proper name and the object to which he uses the proper name to refer. 
Hence, when a speaker follows linguistic rules and uses a proper name to refer, he typically 
presupposes that the object to which he intends to refer satisfies the complex of descriptions that 
constitutes the sense of the proper name. 
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even if true, may nevertheless be neither analytic nor trivial.  Indeed, the recognition 
of the truth of an identity statement made with proper names that are associated with 
very different descriptive presuppositions can amount to the acquisition of a 
significant bit of knowledge.  Thus, the sentence "Tully is Cicero" is true, and for 
most people would typically be used to make an analytic statement, assuming, of 
course, that for most people the two names are associated with the same complex of 
descriptive presuppositions.  In addition, the sentence can be uttered as a standard 
way of making what is an analytic statement, provided that the general sense of the 
two names is the same.  However, the sentence "Shakespeare is Bacon," even if it 
should prove to be true, would not be used by most people to make an analytic 
statement, given the fact that most people do not associate the two names with the 
same complex of descriptive presuppositions.  Furthermore, the sentence cannot be 
uttered as a standard way of making what is an analytic statement since the general 
senses of the two names are very different.  Instead, a typical utterance of the 
sentence would only be used (both standardly and for most people) to make a 
synthetic statement, a statement that, if discovered to be true, would represent a 
valuable extension of our knowledge. 
 Unfortunately, Searle's proposed solution to the problem of identity does not 
provide us with an explication of the concept of identity and can be faulted, as a 
theory of identity, for the same basic reasons as can be Frege's proposed solution.  As 
a theory of identity, Searle's solution, as does Frege's, suffers from a major defect.  
According to both accounts, an identity statement is true if and only if its singular 
terms have the same referent, and a true identity statement is to be deemed analytic 
when its singular terms have the same sense.  Furthermore, on Searle's account, the 
sense that attaches to a proper name is its set of descriptive presuppositions that 
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represent the identity conditions of the name's referent.  Thus, we can judge Searle's 
solution, no less than Frege's, to be successful only if we already have at our disposal 
a separate understanding of identity. 
 Searle's solution is questionable for other reasons as well.  According to 
Searle, proper names are typically used to say something about an individual, and 
their characteristic use involves presupposing, but not asserting, that the individual or 
individuals to which a speaker intends to refer satisfy certain descriptions.  However, 
the relevant presuppositions become part of what is asserted in cases where the 
proper name has no referent and the speaker is using the proper name to assert that 
the name has no referent.  Furthermore, Searle has suggested that, at least in some 
cases where a speaker uses a proper name to attribute, quite mistakenly, a property to 
an individual that does not actually possess the property, the proper name can be 
legitimately interpreted to be functioning as a description singling out the individual 
that in reality does possess the property, even if that individual is unknown to the 
speaker.43  So, in some cases the use of a proper name involves descriptive 
presuppositions that are neither severally nor jointly equivalent to the name, while in 
other cases the use of a proper name involves descriptions that do figure in what a 
speaker is actually in effect saying.  In order for Searle's analysis of these two cases 
not to seem ad hoc, Searle needs to clarify what the difference is between the two 
uses of a proper name that would account for the two distinct interpretations.  For 
Searle, such an account would be given within his general theory of speech acts.  
Presumably, one could plausibly say that the former uses amount to a referring use of 
a proper name and the latter uses amount to a nonreferring or descriptive use of a 
proper name.  Unfortunately, Searle never elucidates such a distinction.  I suspect that 
                                                 
43.  See Chapter 6 of Searle’s Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts. 
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such a distinction would need to be explained ultimately on the basis of a more 
general account of how speakers use proper names to indicate what it is that their 
pronouncements are about and what may be the result when the conditions necessary 
for reference to be successful are not met.  Without an explanation of the distinction 
on such a basis, Searle's account appears to represent more of a series of observations 
on the uses of proper names than a general theory on the semantics of statements 
containing proper names. 
 Searle also leaves unanswered important questions about the nature of the 
descriptive presuppositions that he alleges are associated with the use of proper 
names.  Even though the extent of these presuppositions is for Searle always, by the 
very nature of proper names, rather vague, Searle still does not make sufficiently 
clear what he considers to be the conventional descriptive presuppositions associated 
with a proper name.  Do the conventional presuppositions that are involved in the use 
of a particular proper name relate only to what is commonly known among people 
who have expert knowledge about the referent of the name, or to what is commonly 
known among all people who just have a certain familiarity with the referent of the 
name?  Since what is known and considered important about the individuals speakers 
use proper names to refer to often changes over time, should we say that the Searlean 
sense of a proper name changes over time?  The precise relationship between the 
descriptive presuppositions and an understanding of the content of an utterance 
involving the use of a proper name also needs to be clarified.  Do those who have 
very little knowledge of the individual to which they use a proper name to refer 
presuppose no more than what they say literally when they use the name in an 
utterance intended to report all that they know about that individual?  For instance, 
would a person who knew that Aristotle was an ancient Greek philosopher but knew 
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nothing else about Aristotle presuppose exactly what he asserted in uttering the 
sentence “Aristotle was an ancient Greek philosopher”?  If such a person were to 
presuppose what he asserted, then, oddly enough, he would only know about 
Aristotle what is according to Searle an analytic truth.  It is hard to imagine that 
speakers who lack a certain familiarity with the objects to which they use proper 
names to refer presuppose anything about the referents of those names.  It is even 
more difficult to imagine that an understanding of the content of a statement made 
using a proper name, an understanding of such a statement being necessary if any 
knowledge at all concerning the referent of the name is to be obtained or 
communicated to others, should require one to recognize beforehand what is being 
presupposed about that referent.  A theory that has it that the reference, if not also the 
meaning, of a proper name is determined or given by a single description or a cluster 
or family of descriptions is a description theory of names.  Saul Kripke has argued 
against such a theory of reference or meaning, and it is Kripke's views on identity that 
constitute the main topic of the next chapter.44
 
                                                 
44.  In Naming and Necessity, Kripke presents a sustained attack on the description theory of 
names, including a criticism of Searle's position.  Kripke, though, charges Searle with advancing a 
view that, in all fairness to Searle, I believe Searle does not really hold.  In “Proper Names,” Searle 
claims that “... it is a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive disjunction, of 
properties commonly attributed to him: any individual not having at least some of these properties 
could not be Aristotle.”  Kripke takes this remark as indicating that Searle holds that it is 
epistemologically or metaphysically necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to 
him.  However, given the specific example and the wider context of Searle's remark, I highly suspect 
that Searle was using the phrase “necessary fact” only to express his very high degree of confidence in 
the correctness of his account of how proper names become attached to their referents. 
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Chapter 4: Kripke’s Solution 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 I wish to discuss in this chapter and the next chapter two additional strategies 
that philosophers have pursued in order to solve the various difficulties that must be 
surmounted in order to have an adequate analysis of identity.  The first strategy is to 
follow Frege's lead and offer a solution that relies on a distinction between different 
types of necessity.  More specifically, the next account of identity to be examined 
involves drawing a distinction between statements that are necessarily true and those 
that are known to be true a priori and regarding all identity statements as statements, 
about objects, that are necessary but not always known to be true a priori.  The second 
strategy is to treat identity statements as statements that are, at least in part, about 
their terms and involves modifying the traditional notion of a purely referential 
context and its associated principle of substitution in order to account for the 
differences in the informational value of identity statements.  Kripke is one who has 
opted for the first of these just-mentioned strategies, and, as I indicated at the end of 
the previous chapter, his account of identity statements is the primary concern of the 
present chapter.1  Although Kripke most likely never set out specifically to solve the 
problem of identity, as perhaps a means of going on to solve further philosophical 
quandaries, there nevertheless emerge from what Kripke has said about the notion of 
identity a distinct view of identity and manner of solving some of the difficulties to 
which the notion gives rise.  It is this stance that Kripke takes with regard to the 
issues that are relevant to my discussion of identity that I will have in mind when I 
                                                 
1.  Saul Kripke, “Identity and Necessity,” in Identity and Individuation, 135-164.  See also 
Kripke’s Naming and Necessity. 
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use such descriptions as "Kripke's account of the nature of identity statements" or 
"Kripke's solution to the problem of identity." 
 
4.1   Kripke's proposals 
 Kripke regards identity as a relation that always holds between every object 
and itself (i.e., a relation that holds between an object and itself in every possible 
world in which the object occurs).  According to Kripke, when the identity relation is 
discovered to hold between the referents of two terms, what is discovered is a 
relationship between objects that could not be otherwise, even in cases where, in the 
absence of empirical investigation, we could not have ascertained beforehand whether 
this relation obtained.  Kripke maintains that it is entirely plausible to regard any true 
identity statement (or at least what such a statement says about the referents of its 
terms) as being in at least one sense necessary, in spite of the fact that many true 
identity statements are not true just in virtue of the meanings of their words or are not 
known to be true prior to experience.  More specifically, if the notion of de re 
necessity is intelligible (and evidently Kripke thinks it is), we can take true statements 
of identity to express metaphysically necessary truths about the referents of the terms 
in identity statements.2  Kripke regards true identity statements as being what he calls 
"weakly necessary": they are true in all possible worlds in which the referents of their 
terms exist.  What true identity statements always say about the referents of their 
terms is weakly necessary, i.e., it is true of those referents (particular objects) in every 
possible world in which they exist.  Thus, in asserting the sentence "Mark Twain is 
                                                 
2.  De re (“due to the world”) necessity is supposed to be necessity due to the nature of the 
things talked about; this is in contrast to de dicto (“due to the word”) necessity, which is necessity due 
to the manner of talking about things.  If every object has the property of necessarily being identical to 
itself (which is presumably the case if we correctly use the identity predicate only to express a 
metaphysical relation between a thing and itself), then “a = a” is both necessary de dicto (since it is 
tautologous) and necessary de re. 
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Samuel Clemens," one claims that a necessary metaphysical relation holds between 
the referent of "Mark Twain" and the referent of "Samuel Clemens."  Likewise, in 
asserting the sentence "The richest man in Seattle is the richest man in the world," 
one claims that a necessary metaphysical relation holds between the referent of "the 
richest man in Seattle" and the referent of "the richest man in the world." 
 Since some identity statements occur in generalizations that do not contain 
proper names, Kripke sees the view of the identity relation as a relation between 
names or terms as unintelligible.  Furthermore, even if we were to understand the 
identity relation as a relation between terms, we could, Kripke contends, still define 
what would be an artificial relation (a relation Kripke calls "schmidentity") holding 
between every object and itself.3  Kripke notes that the sorts of problems with 
statements of identity that have led some people to take identity to be a relation 
between terms would also arise for statements of schmidentity.  As a consequence, 
Kripke concludes that the existence of these problems does not constitute evidence 
for a metalinguistic account of identity.  Nevertheless, since a typical objectual 
analysis of identity fails the difference in content requirement (i.e., fails to draw a 
distinction between the content of "a = a" and the content of "a = b") and satisfies 
only partially the nonnecessity and nontriviality requirements, Kripke's position 
encounters the difficulty that I mentioned previously in regard to any objectual 
account of identity: it appears to be counterintuitive in that it seems to deny the 
possibility of there being true statements of identity that are only contingent 
statements.  After all, if true identity statements only assert a relation between objects, 
                                                 
3.  See Naming and Necessity, Lecture III.  Presumably, Kripke has in mind defining 
schmidentity in terms of how we currently understand the identity relation.  In the hypothetical case, 
though, Kripke suggests calling that relation something else and reserving the term “identity” for the 
relation that holds between terms.  In the hypothetical case, I take it that the referent of “a” is 
schmidentical to the referent of “b” if and only if “a” is identical to “b.” 
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a relation that always and trivially holds and that must hold between every object and 
itself, then it is hard to see how such statements could be contingently true. 
 Before presenting the details of Kripke's position, I want first to discuss 
Kripke's version of the problem of the contingently true status of identity statements 
and then examine in some depth Kripke's suggestion that an appeal to Bertrand 
Russell's theory of definite descriptions can be employed to solve the puzzle.  When 
definite descriptions occur in identity statements, the situation becomes more 
complex than when identity statements contain only proper names.  Thus, some 
elaboration on the use of definite descriptions will be in order.  Finally, after 
clarifying some distinctions Kripke makes that are important to understanding his 
views on identity, I will then present, discuss, and critique those views. 
 As Kripke points out in Naming and Necessity, the view of identity statements 
as necessary introduces an additional perplexity.  If it is true that, for any x and y, to 
say that x and y are identical is to say that all properties of x are properties of y and 
vice versa (which means that either one of the singular terms occurring in a true 
identity statement can be substituted for one another in all contexts without altering 
truth-value), then it would seem that we would have to accept as valid the following 
inference. 
 
Benjamin Franklin was the first postmaster general. 
Benjamin Franklin was the inventor of bifocals. 
It is necessarily true that Benjamin Franklin was Benjamin Franklin. 
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Therefore, it is necessarily true that the inventor of bifocals was the first postmaster 
general.4
 
This inference seems specious since the conclusion of this argument looks false: it 
appears in no way necessary that the inventor of bifocals should be the first 
postmaster general.  Presumably, the historical facts could have been different than 
they are, and it might not have been the case that the same person both invented 
bifocals and headed the first U.S. post office.  As a consequence, the statement "The 
inventor of bifocals was the first postmaster general" certainly appears to be a 
contingent truth.  However, if we regard identity statements as being necessarily true 
when true, then we seem to be forced to accept both the truth of the conclusion and 
the validity of the inference.  Some may contend that what this shows is that modal 
contexts, just as propositional attitude and explanatory contexts, are evidently not 
transparent.  Nevertheless, even if we have qualms about substituting co-referring 
terms for one another in a modal context, by regarding true identity statements as 
necessary the first two premises of this argument are necessary so that the conclusion 
is not derived from at least one contingent statement.  The modality of necessity in 
the conclusion is thus warranted since the conclusion is derived only from necessary 
statements.5  Hence, the apparent transparency of at least necessity contexts is 
assured if true identity statements are always taken to be necessary. 
 Kripke contends that Russell's treatment of definite descriptions provides a 
solution to the above problem, although the account of identity Kripke ultimately 
proposes does not rely fundamentally on Russell's theory of descriptions.  According 
                                                 
4.  There is another way to reach this conclusion.  Since the first postmaster general is 
necessarily identical to the first postmaster general and the inventor of bifocals is the first postmaster 
general, the inventor of bifocals is necessarily identical to the first postmaster general. 
5.  The inference may not be reasonable, though, if different notions of necessity are involved. 
 75
to Kripke, by analyzing definite descriptions in the Russellian fashion and by paying 
close attention to scope, the apparent conflict between our ordinary understanding of 
necessity and the alleged truth of such a sentence as "Necessarily the inventor of 
bifocals was the first postmaster general" can be resolved.  The trouble with the 
conclusion of the above problematic inference is that the scope of the necessity 
operator appears to be the entire sentence when actually it is not.  The precise scope 
of the necessity operator is revealed when the sentence is rendered into one of the 
forms suggested by Russell.6  The two possible readings of the sentence, one wherein 
the necessity operator has wide scope (or what Kripke calls "de dicto scope") and the 
other wherein the necessity operator has narrow scope (or what Kripke calls "de re 
scope"), are given by the following two sentences. 
 
1.  Necessarily, it is the case that there was both a unique person who invented 
bifocals and a unique person who held the original office of postmaster general and 
the former person is identical to the latter person. 
2.  There was both a unique person who invented bifocals and a unique person who 
held the original office of postmaster general, and necessarily the former person is 
identical to the latter person.7
 
Sentence 1 is false since it is not necessary that there was a unique person who 
invented bifocals and a unique person who held the original office of postmaster 
general.  Sentence 2 is true since both definite descriptions serve to pick out 
                                                 
6.  Bertrand Russell, “On Denoting,” Mind 14 (1905), reprinted in Contemporary Readings in 
Logical Theory, ed. Irving Copi and James Gould. 
7.  The first sentence has the form of “∼◊∼(∃x)(∃y)(((Bx & (z)(Bz → x=z)) & (Py & (z)(Pz → 
y=z))) & x=y),” and the second one has the form of “(∃x)(∃y)(((Bx & (z)(Bz → x=z)) & (Py & (z)(Pz → 
y=z))) & ∼◊∼x=y).” 
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Benjamin Franklin and that individual is necessarily identical to himself.  The definite 
descriptions occurring in sentence 1 are both subordinate to the necessity operator and 
thus have a secondary occurrence in that sentence.  In contrast, the necessity operator 
is subordinate to both definite descriptions occurring in sentence 2 so that these 
descriptions have a primary occurrence in that sentence.  The apparent implausibility 
of the above-mentioned argument vanishes provided that we understand all definite 
descriptions in the Russellian fashion and interpret the definite descriptions occurring 
in the conclusion as having a primary occurrence in that sentence.  The inference is 
indeed problematic, though, when the conclusion is interpreted as the first of the 
above two sentences. 
 The strategy Kripke follows to solve his puzzle about the inventor of bifocals 
and the first postmaster general may suggest to an objectual identity theorist a way to 
account for the contingency of at least some true statements of identity.  Apparently, 
by appealing to Russell's theory of descriptions, an objectual identity theorist could 
plausibly maintain that true identity statements always express metaphysically 
necessary truths without denying that there are statements of identity that are true 
only as a matter of contingent fact.  An advocate of an objectual account of identity 
may defend the view that what a true identity statement says about the object to 
which the terms flanking the identity sign both refer is necessarily true of that object, 
even though the identity statement itself may only be contingently true due to other 
component claims implicit in the statement.8  Some true identity statements will be 
contingent because they contain a definite description, or a name functioning as a 
disguised description, and these descriptions will serve to specify uniquely 
                                                 
8.  One who advances such a view will actually maintain that contingently true “identity statements” 
are not, properly speaking, identity statements but do contain a component that is a genuine statement 
of identity. 
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individuals that are necessarily identical to themselves.  The element of necessity will 
enter into a contingently true identity statement only in the assertion that certain 
individuals are identical, those individuals being singled out by one or more definite 
descriptions in the statement.  This means that the necessity operator implicitly 
associated with an identity statement containing a definite description must always be 
understood as having the smallest possible scope.  Thus, all true statements of identity 
express necessary truths, but some true identity statements say more than that.  Any 
identity statement containing a definite description that is resolvable in the Russellian 
fashion also involves a component claim that is not necessary (i.e., the claim that 
there is a unique individual satisfying the description), and such identity statements 
may differ in content due to differences in the content of the definite descriptions 
occurring in them.  Furthermore, no identity statement that contains a definite 
description, or a disguised definite description, that can be understood in the 
Russellian manner will be trivial in the sense that it will at least assert that there is a 
unique individual that satisfies the description.9
 Unfortunately, the troubles are not over for the objectual identity theorist who, 
like Kripke, wishes to maintain that the identity relation holds necessarily whenever it 
obtains in spite of the fact that many identity statements are contingent.  I contend 
that the appeal to Russell's theory of descriptions, and the notion of scope, in order to 
                                                 
9.  In virtue of his theory of descriptions, it would appear (although I think this is only an 
appearance) that Russell was thus able to solve the difference in content, nonnecessity, and 
nontriviality requirements provided that all identity statements contain only definite descriptions or 
names functioning as definite descriptions.  The difference in content requirement is at best solved in 
an unusual manner.  The statement “a = a” differs in content from the statement “a = b” (provided that 
“a” and “b” are not synonymous definite descriptions) because the uniqueness claim associated with 
“a” is different from the uniqueness claim associated with “b,” but the statement “a = a” is not a 
tautology.  The way in which the nonnecessity requirement is satisfied is also suspect.  In general, an 
identity statement that contains a definite description appears to be contingent not just because a 
description only contingently denotes something but also because the identity of the referents of the 
terms flanking the identity predicate itself seems contingent. 
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explain the contingency of identity statements containing definite descriptions does 
not by itself solve, in its entirety anyway, the problems regarding the alleged 
necessity of true identity statements.  The logical contingency of identity statements 
containing a definite description can be accounted for on Russell's analysis since such 
statements are never interpreted as being logical truths, even in the case of a 
statement in which the same definite description flanks the identity predicate.  
Accordingly, the sentence "Benjamin Franklin was the first postmaster general" will 
yield, when parsed in the standard Russellian fashion, the following existential 
generalization, sentence E. 
 
E. There was a person, and only one person, who was the first postmaster 
general, and Benjamin Franklin was that person. 
 
Sentence E can, in turn, be rendered into symbolic notation as the following formal 
expression, sentence E'. 
 
E'. (∃x)((Px & (y)(Py → x = y)) & x = b) 
 
Since sentence E is not a tautology, as revealed by sentence E', and it is a contingent 
matter of fact that there was a unique person who was both the first postmaster 
general and identical to Benjamin Franklin, the logically contingent and overall 
metaphysically contingent nature of sentence E is secured.  Each implicit necessity 
operator associated with an occurrence of the identity predicate in sentence E' is 
understood to have the smallest possible scope, and for this reason the entire sentence 
E', and hence also the entire sentence E, is not within the scope of an implicit 
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necessity operator.  Consequently, the statement "Benjamin Franklin was the first 
postmaster general" is, according to a Russellian analysis, a contingent statement that 
nevertheless, according to the objectual view of identity under consideration, involves 
the ascription of a metaphysically necessary relation between Benjamin Franklin and 
the first postmaster general. 
 However, something still seems lacking here.  Since it is an accepted fact that 
Benjamin Franklin was in actuality the first postmaster general, the description "the 
first postmaster general" can be used to refer to Benjamin Franklin.  In addition, it 
seems necessary that the first postmaster general, Benjamin Franklin or whoever else 
that person happened to be, headed the first U.S. post office and was unique in so 
doing.  Thus, any value of the variable "x" in sentence E' that is identical to Benjamin 
Franklin is, evidently, guaranteed to have headed the first U.S. post office and to have 
been unique in so doing.  As a result, sentence E, and hence the original identity 
statement, presumably is true in every possible world in which Benjamin Franklin 
exists and is thus weakly necessary.  Therefore, it would appear that the sentence 
"Benjamin Franklin was the first postmaster general" and the seemingly innocuous 
sentence "Necessarily, the first postmaster general was the first postmaster general" 
entail the weak necessity of the original identity statement.  Furthermore, there is 
nothing special about that statement; an argument analogous to the one I just gave can 
be given to establish the weak necessity of any such identity statement.  Kripke's 
problem concerning the necessity of what appear to be contingent statements of 
identity is thus resurrected.  What needs to be introduced is some additional apparatus 
in virtue of which it can be shown that the above inference is faulty.  The appeal to 
Russell's analysis of descriptions, and the notion of scope, is, by itself, inadequate to 
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give a successful account of the contingent nature of identity statements containing 
definite descriptions.10
 One way of remedying the problem (a strategy Kripke would, however, reject) 
would be to introduce into an account of the use of definite descriptions a way of 
making plausible the treatment of the description as, in some cases, a proper name (or 
something like a proper name) and, in other cases, a tacit assertion of uniqueness or a 
disguised universal generalization.  The manner in which the description is 
functioning in an identity statement may sometimes affect the scope of the implicit, or 
explicit, necessity operators in the statement.  The inclusion of such a distinction as 
the one Keith Donnellan makes between the referential and attributive uses of a 
description would be an important element of an account that would warrant the 
requisite distinction in the treatment of definite descriptions.11  For Donnellan, when 
it is said that we can use the description "the first postmaster general" to refer to 
Benjamin Franklin, what is meant is that those who specifically wish to refer to 
Benjamin Franklin can use that description, as well as any other description that 
singles out Benjamin Franklin as its unique referent, as a name of Benjamin Franklin.  
Such a use of the description to refer to Benjamin Franklin would be a referential use 
                                                 
10.  It should be fairly obvious that the suggested approach to identity statements, when 
understood as an account of identity, is also incomplete.  One who takes this approach will interpret 
any identity statement that contains a definite description as a generalization, and that generalization 
will contain the identity predicate within the scope of a quantifier.  This latter occurrence of the 
identity predicate (in what properly speaking is an identity statement) will need to be understood if the 
occurrence of the identity predicate in the unanalyzed identity statement is to be understood.  
Presumably, the generalization will ultimately have (or can be viewed as, in effect, having) as its 
instances sentences containing only proper names, and the identity predicate occurring in those 
instances will be flanked by proper names.  Only if an adequate account can be given of the meaning 
of these identity statements in the instances of the generalization will an adequate account be had of 
the meaning of that component of the generalization containing the identity predicate (i.e., what 
constitutes the identity statement proper).  Hence, the suggested Russellian approach to analyzing 
apparent identity statements needs an account of identity statements proper in order to be complete. 
11.  Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” reprinted in A.P. Martinich, ed., 
The Philosophy of Language, 235-247. 
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of the description.  A definite description is being used in a referential manner when 
its occurrence in a sentence serves only the purpose of enabling the speaker to make 
reference to a particular person or thing the speaker has in mind.  When a statement 
contains a definite description used in this manner, the occurrence of the definite 
description is not essential to the meaning of the statement in the sense that any other 
description that uniquely specifies the same object as the original description could 
have been used instead without a change in the content of the statement.  A speaker 
who uses a definite description referentially uses it merely as a device that allows his 
audience to pick out the particular object about which he intends to say something.  
The use of a definite description in this manner is, roughly speaking, the use of the 
description as a proper name.  According to Donnellan, an attributive use of a definite 
description is something different.  When it is said that the first postmaster general 
was necessarily the unique person who headed the first U.S. post office, what is 
meant is that whoever was the first postmaster general (the referent of the description 
"the first postmaster general") was the head of the first U.S. post office solely in 
virtue of being the first postmaster general.  In other words, it is being claimed that 
anyone who was the head of the first U.S. post office was the one who was the head 
of the first U.S. post office.  (If the attributive use of the description in the sentence 
“The first postmaster general was the head of the first U.S. post office” is understood 
to render the sentence a universal generalization, then the sentence is understood to be 
a logical truth.)  What is not meant is that someone whom the speaker specifically has 
in mind, and is being referred to in the speaker's use of the description "the first 
postmaster general," necessarily was the head of the first U.S. post office.  The use of 
the description as illustrated by sentence E is an attributive use of the description.  A 
definite description is being used in an attributive manner when its occurrence in a 
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sentence serves the purpose of allowing the speaker to say something about whatever, 
or whoever, satisfies the description.  When a definite description is used in this 
manner, its occurrence in a statement is essential to the meaning of the statement in 
the sense that the content of the description is part of the content of the statement.  
The content of the statement will therefore not in general be preserved if such a 
description is replaced by another description that characterizes the same particular 
thing that the original description characterizes.  The attributive use of a definite 
description is successful when a unique object is being referred to (specified or 
picked out) in virtue of that object uniquely satisfying the description, but the speaker 
who uses a definite description attributively does not convey to his audience that he 
has a particular object in mind, an object, that is, that he could refer to in any number 
of different ways. 
 The Russellian strategy Kripke suggests as a way of solving the puzzles that 
arise from substituting co-referring terms into necessity contexts is a plausible 
solution to his particular puzzle provided that the required scope distinctions can be 
justified.  However, in spite of the merits of a Russellian approach that could justify 
the needed scope distinctions, such a proposal would still not go far enough (as I have 
already suggested by some of the above remarks) to dispel the air of paradox 
surrounding the necessary yet contingent status of identity statements containing a 
definite description.  I believe that an adequate solution can only be had in the context 
of a more thorough account of the different meanings that can attach to a definite 
description.12  Russell's theory of descriptions together with the recognition of 
Donnellan's distinction between the referential and attributive uses of a definite 
                                                 
12.  However, I hasten to add that, even though I will subsequently find fault with Kripke’s 
rejection of Donnellan’s referential-attributive distinction, the general strategy that I will ultimately 
suggest as a possible way of developing an adequate solution to the problem of identity does not 
depend on the enriched account of definite descriptions I outline below. 
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description is, I believe, necessary but is still not sufficient to account for all uses of a 
definite description.  Both Russell's and Donnellan's analyses can, nevertheless, help 
to motivate a more inclusive account of the content of statements containing a 
definite description.  The occurrence in a sentence of a definite description can 
actually serve a number of assertory purposes.  In very general terms, when one uses 
a statement containing a definite description to make an assertion, there are, ignoring 
variations in the scope of operators occurring outside the description, five different 
ways of understanding what is being said.  The content of a statement having the 
gross grammatical form, "The F is G," could be revealed, in terms of logical form, by 
rendering the statement as one of the following formal expressions (where "F" and 
"G" are predicates, "n" is a proper name, and "d" is the definite description, "the  F"). 
 
(1) Gd 
(2) (Fn & (y)(Fy → n = y)) 
(3) (∃x)((Fx & (y)(Fy → x = y)) & Gx) 
(4) (x)((Fx & (y)(Fy → x = y)) → Gx) 
(5) (x)(Fx → Gx) 
 
 An example of a sentence containing a definite description is "The President 
of the United States is a Republican."  If the description "The President of the United 
States" is being used in that statement merely to refer to a particular person the 
speaker has in mind, then the description is functioning more or less as a proper name 
and the sentence has the form of (1).  Someone might utter the sentence understood in 
this way if, for example, the speaker was intending to say of George W. Bush that he 
is a Republican.  However, if the description is functioning in the manner envisioned 
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by Russell, then the description is being used to assert both that there is a unique 
person who is President of the United States and that that person, whoever he happens 
to be, is a Republican.  In this case, the sentence has the form of (3).  The sentence 
might have this meaning if, for example, it was to be uttered by a speaker who wished 
to inform an audience about current U.S. presidential politics.  The definite 
description in the sentence could, however, be serving the purpose of allowing the 
speaker to assert that anyone who is President of the United States, and is unique in 
so being President of the United States, is a Republican.   In such a situation, the 
speaker would not be asserting (but might be presupposing) that there is someone 
who satisfies the description "the President of the United States."  If the sentence is 
being used to make such a claim, then the sentence can be interpreted as having the 
form of (4).  A person might intend that his utterance of the sentence be understood in 
such a fashion if, for instance, he believed that, given the current political climate, 
only a Republican could be elected President.  It is possible, though, that a speaker 
may use the description in the statement as a means merely of indicating that the class 
of Presidents of the United States is included in the class of Republicans.  In such a 
situation, the speaker would not be asserting (but might be presupposing) that the 
class of Presidents of the United States is not empty.  In this case, the sentence would 
need to be interpreted as having the form of (5).  A speaker might utter the sentence 
with that meaning if he believed, for instance, that some constitutional law required 
all those who are elected to the office of the presidency to be Republicans.  
Alternatively, a speaker who utters the sentence "The President of the United States is 
George W. Bush" would probably be using the description only to attribute to George 
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W. Bush an outstanding unique feature.  In such a case, the sentence uttered would 
need to be interpreted as having the form of (2).13
 Russell's contextual analysis of the content of definite descriptions could only 
be applied to definite descriptions when they had an attributive role in the sentences 
that contained them.  Russell's preferred rendering of such a sentence as "The 
President of the United States is the person who garners the most votes in the 
electoral college" would be "There is a unique person who is President of the United 
States and a unique person who garners the most votes in the electoral college, and 
the former is identical to the latter."  We would still at least be within the spirit of 
Russell's analysis if we instead interpreted the sentence as "Anyone who is President 
of the United States and is unique in being President is also a person who garners the 
most votes in the electoral college and is unique in so doing."  (The latter rendition 
differs from the former rendition only in being a universal instead of an existential 
generalization.)  Russell's analysis can thus be brought to bear on sentences 
containing definite descriptions that can be interpreted as having the form of either 
the third or the fourth of the above cases.  Russell's analysis is also applicable to 
                                                 
13.  Besides being cognizant of the differences in the use of a definite description as 
represented by the above five forms, one also needs to pay particular attention sometimes not only to 
the scope of an operator occurring outside a definite description but also to the scope of a quantifier 
occurring within a definite description.  Morris (Understanding Identity Statements, p. 96) mentions a 
fallacious inference that turns on an ambiguity in the scope of a quantifier. 
 
“... Ronald Reagan is now one and the same individual as the President of the United States.  The 
President is elected every four years.  And, surprisingly successful as he may be, it is not true of 
Ronald Reagan that he is elected every four years.” 
 
The conclusion that Ronald Reagan is elected every four years is unwarranted because the sentence 
“The President is elected every four years” should not be read as “There is one and only one person 
who is President, and that person is elected every four years” but rather as “Every fourth year, there is 
one and only one person who is elected President that year.”  The quantifier “every” should thus be 
understood as having wide scope, while the description should be understood as having narrow scope. 
(In addition, the predicate “is elected President on a year” needs to be understood differently than the 
predicate “is President and is elected on a year.”) 
 86
sentences containing a definite description that can be interpreted as having the form 
of the second of the above five cases.14  The sentence "The President of the United 
States is George W. Bush" can, after all, be rendered as the sentence "There is a 
unique person who is President of the United States and George W. Bush is that 
person," which in turn is equivalent to the sentence "George W. Bush presides as 
President of the United States and is unique in so doing."15  Identity statements that 
contain definite descriptions that are being used in the fashion in which the 
description is used in sentences having the form of the fifth of the above cases present 
no special problem to an account of identity since, when properly understood, they do 
not actually contain the identity predicate.  The sentence just mentioned about the 
President and the electoral college would be understood as "Anyone who presides as 
President of the United States garners the most votes in the electoral college" if the 
descriptions are being used, as in the fifth case, to refer to two classes of individuals.  
However, Russell's theory of descriptions did not apply to those cases that involve the 
purely referential use of the definite description.  An objectual identity theorist who 
believes in the "contingent and necessary" status of true identity statements will thus 
be forced to provide a nonRussellian account of the content of those identity 
statements that contain definite descriptions used in the manner of sentences having 
the form of the first of the above cases.  The distinction between, on the one hand, the 
use of the definite description as it occurs in sentences having the form of the first of 
the above cases and, on the other hand, the use of the definite description as it occurs 
in sentences having the form of the third or fourth cases is derived from Donnellan's 
                                                 
14.  I have actually already assumed this to be the case in obtaining sentence E and sentence 
E' from the sentence “Benjamin Franklin was the first postmaster general.” 
15.  This is the case since “(∃x)((Fx & (y)(Fy → x = y)) & x = n)” is equivalent to “(Fn & 
(y)(Fy → n = y)).” 
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distinction between the referential and attributive uses of a definite description.  Since 
the referential use of a definite description is very much like (although not quite the 
same as) the use of the description as a proper name, most likely an appropriately 
enriched account of definite descriptions will apply not only to statements having the 
form of the first, third, or fourth of the above cases but also to identity statements 
containing proper names. 
 In light of the more complete analysis of definite descriptions presented 
above, the argument I presented previously for the weak necessity of the sentence 
"Benjamin Franklin was the first postmaster general," and, by extension, for the weak 
necessity of any identity statement, can be shown to be faulty.  I argued above that, 
despite Kripke's resolution of his particular puzzle, the following troublesome 
inference, which resembles Kripke's problematic inference, appears reasonable. 
 
Benjamin Franklin was the first postmaster general. 
Necessarily, the first postmaster general was the first postmaster general. 
Therefore, necessarily Benjamin Franklin was the first postmaster general. 
 
A speaker who uttered the first premise would most likely only be using the 
description to ascribe to Benjamin Franklin a property that distinguished him from 
other people.  Since the sentence "Benjamin Franklin was the first postmaster 
general" is obviously equivalent in meaning to the sentence "The first postmaster 
general was Benjamin Franklin," the first premise should be interpreted as having the 
form of (2) in the above forms.  The second premise is clearly true only on the 
condition that the sentence "The first postmaster general was the first postmaster 
general" is interpreted as a tautology having the form of (4) in the above list of forms.  
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The necessity operator in the conclusion seems quite naturally to have wide scope: 
anyone who asserted the conclusion would be saying, in effect, that the property 
ascribed to Benjamin Franklin by the first premise necessarily pertains to Benjamin 
Franklin.  Thus, the conclusion needs be interpreted as having the same form, except 
for the necessity operator, as the first premise.  The above argument can therefore be 
rendered as the following formal argument. 
 
(Pb & (y)(Py → b = y)) 
∼◊∼(x)(y)(((Px & (z)(Pz → x = z)) & (Py & (z)(Pz → y = z))) → x = y) 
∴  ∼◊∼(Pb & (y)(Py → b = y)) 
 
Rendered in the above symbolic form, the argument is clearly invalid.  The necessity 
in the conclusion is unwarranted since the premises are not both necessary 
propositions.  (If the necessity operator in both sentences designates logical necessity, 
then it is clear why the inference fails, since the substitution of one co-referring term 
for another in a tautology will not always produce a tautology.)   The conclusion is 
false since the first premise is a metaphysical (and logical) contingency inasmuch as 
the particular person (namely, Benjamin Franklin) who in reality satisfies the 
description "the first postmaster general" need not necessarily have been the one who 
was the head of the first U.S. post office, in spite of the fact that whoever was the first 
postmaster general was, of course, the person who was the head of the first U.S. post 
office.16
                                                 
16.  It is best to interpret the necessity in the second premise as logical necessity and the 
necessity in the conclusion as metaphysical necessity.  (So the argument may involve equivocation.)  
Some objectual identity theorists who hold the view of identity as a necessary metaphysical relation 
may want to appraise the original natural language argument by interpreting the explicit necessity 
operator in the conclusion as having small scope.  For these identity theorists who interpret things that 
way, the conclusion is actually true but is no different in content than the first premise, since that 
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 Regardless of what theory of singular terms ultimately proves to make the best 
sense out of identity statements containing a definite description and successfully 
avoids identity paradoxes involving the modalities, any completely articulated 
objectual account of identity must still surmount all those previously mentioned 
difficulties that are associated with an objectual analysis of identity.  Even if such a 
well-formulated account of identity does allow the objectual identity theorist to 
maintain that all true identity statements are in some sense necessary, even when they 
are logically contingent, that account must go on to solve the problem of identity not 
only for identity statements containing a description but also for identity statements 
containing only proper names.  Hence, the objectual identity theorist will still need to 
explain why such statements as "Hesperus is Phosphorus," "Mark Twain is Samuel 
Clemens," and "Cicero is Tully" are not trivial, are in some sense not necessary, and 
are different in content than, respectively, the sentences "Hesperus is Hesperus," 
"Mark Twain is Mark Twain," and "Cicero is Cicero" in spite of the fact that the 
former type of statements seem to be different in nature than the latter type of 
statements and yet an utterance of any of these statements seems more clearly to 
amount to only an assertion that a relation holds between a particular object and itself.  
It is to the issue of how Kripke specifically regards both kinds of identity statements 
that I must now turn. 
 As I mentioned at the beginning of the present chapter, Kripke maintains that 
identity is a metaphysical relation that necessarily holds between every object and 
itself.  Any true identity statement expresses a necessary truth, at least to the extent 
that what the statement says about the referents of its terms (i.e., the particular 
                                                                                                                                           
premise in effect contains an implicit necessary operator in the same position.  Under such an 
interpretation, the argument is valid but circular, and the second premise plays no role in the inference. 
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individual referred to or uniquely described by each of its terms) is true of that 
individual and itself as a matter of metaphysical necessity.   However, because an 
identity statement may contain a definite description or two distinct proper names, a 
true identity statement may not overall be necessary (since it may not express just a 
necessary metaphysical truth) or may not be necessary in another sense of necessity.  
A true identity statement may thus on the whole be contingent and, as a result, not 
known to be true prior to experience, even though what it says about the relationship 
between the referents of its terms is metaphysically necessary.  As I also indicated 
earlier, Kripke's solution to the problem of identity does not depend in any 
fundamental way upon interpreting definite descriptions according to Russell's theory 
of descriptions.  Nevertheless, Kripke does believe that it is in virtue of an individual 
satisfying the Russellian truth conditions (including the uniqueness condition) 
associated with a definite description that the description successfully attaches to the 
individual.17  Moreover, Kripke understands the de re necessity always associated 
with a true statement of identity to be akin to the necessity indicated by an implicit or 
explicit necessity operator, having narrow scope, associated with identity statements 
that are analyzed in the manner suggested by Russell.  (That is why Kripke calls the 
narrow scope of the necessity operator the "de re scope" of the operator.)  In addition, 
Kripke does not accept as a valid semantic distinction Donnellan's distinction 
between the referential and the attributive uses of a definite description.  (The 
rejection of that distinction is an issue that I will discuss later in the present chapter.)  
Kripke thus does not rely upon the apparatus suggested above for analyzing identity 
statements containing a definite description. 
                                                 
17.  There are, though, singular terms that look like definite descriptions but do not attach to 
their referents by describing something uniquely.  Such expressions as “the Statue of Liberty” and “the 
wicked witch of Wescoe Hall,” although perhaps suggestive of their referents, will for Kripke acquire 
their reference in the manner that proper names acquire their reference. 
 91
 Instead, Kripke's solution relies upon seeing proper names and definite 
descriptions as two different types of designators based on how such terms refer in 
counterfactual situations.  Because Kripke understands proper names to be one kind 
of designator and definite descriptions to be another kind of designator, Kripke treats 
identity statements containing only proper names in a different manner than he treats 
identity statements containing at least one definite description.  Kripke contends that, 
with regard to at least one sense of necessity, identity statements of the former kind 
are, when true, necessarily true and, when false, necessarily false and are never 
contingently true or contingently false.  The necessity that always pertains to true 
identity statements containing only proper names is due to the fact that a proper name 
functions as what Kripke calls a "rigid designator."18  A singular term functions as a 
rigid designator if the term does not refer to one thing in one possible world 
(description of a counterfactual state of affairs) and another thing in another possible 
world.  A term rigidly denotes if it denotes the same thing in every possible world in 
which it has a referent.  In contrast, a singular term functions as a nonrigid designator 
when it denotes one thing in one possible world and a different thing in another 
possible world.  A nonrigid designator does not maintain the same reference from one 
possible world to another.  Since definite descriptions, or at least most definite 
descriptions, function as nonrigid designators, identity statements containing a 
definite description are typically not true in every possible world.  That is why Kripke 
contends that most true identity statements containing a definite description are only 
contingently true, even though the identity relation holds between any individual and 
itself in every possible world. 
                                                 
18.  See Lecture I in Naming and Necessity. 
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 Unfortunately, Kripke's notion of rigid designation (as well as its significance) 
and why Kripke regards proper names as denoting rigidly can easily be 
misunderstood and will need to be clarified.  In claiming that proper names denote 
rigidly, Kripke does not mean to claim that speakers in other possible worlds must 
always use the proper names we use in the actual world to refer to the same things we 
refer to in using those names in the actual world.  Kripke would not deny, for 
instance, that people in some other possible world might use the name "Hesperus" to 
refer to something other than the planet Venus, or Phosphorus.  (In other words, 
Kripke acknowledges that our words might have had a different meaning and use 
other than those they actually do have.)  As a consequence, for Kripke, an identity 
statement that expresses a truth when uttered by us in the actual world might not 
express a truth when uttered by a speaker in some other possible world.  "Hesperus is 
Phosphorus" is true (and expresses a necessary metaphysical truth) according to our 
use of the names "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" in the actual world, but in some other 
possible world that identity statement might not be true given the way in which 
speakers in that possible world use those names in that other world.  Rather, in 
claiming that proper names denote rigidly, Kripke means to claim that speakers in the 
actual world use a proper name to denote a particular individual in the actual world 
and continue to use that proper name to denote that same individual when considering 
counterfactual states of affairs in which the term refers and that individual thus exists.  
So, for Kripke, it is our use of a rigid designator to refer in the actual world that 
determines how we use that designator to refer in other possible worlds in which the 
term refers at all.  Identity statements containing only rigid designators that are true 
for us in the actual world are therefore true for us in every possible world.  In 
contrast, our use of a nonrigid designator to refer to a particular individual in the 
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actual world does not, according to Kripke, determine to what we (or, for that matter, 
anyone in some other possible world) might use the description to refer in considering 
a counterfactual state of affairs.  As a result, identity statements containing a nonrigid 
designator that are true for us (i.e., that we use to assert that a necessary metaphysical 
relation holds between an object and itself) in our talk about the actual world may not 
be true for us (i.e., may not be used by us to make the same assertion) in our talk 
about some other possible world. 
 For Kripke, the proper name "Benjamin Franklin" refers to Benjamin Franklin 
in a real-world description and does so in every counterfactual description in which 
the term refers, which will always still be a description in which Benjamin Franklin 
exists.  Kripke regards as mistaken the view that in other possible worlds such a name 
does not refer to what it does in the actual world but instead refers to someone, or 
something, in that possible world who is, or that is, similar in all important respects to 
the referent of the name in the actual world.  Kripke thus rejects David Lewis's 
counterpart theory that construes proper names as referring in other possible worlds to 
the counterparts, in those other worlds, of what they refer to in the actual world.19  
For Kripke, when we make reference to Benjamin Franklin, for instance, in some 
counterfactual statement (such as, "Benjamin Franklin would have made a fine 
President") we are still referring to Benjamin Franklin and not to some person who in 
that counterfactual state of affairs resembles Benjamin Franklin in enough of the 
details to enable the name "Benjamin Franklin" to be attached to him.  If the name 
"Benjamin Franklin" did not denote rigidly, then it would make sense to talk about a 
possible world in which Benjamin Franklin was not Benjamin Franklin.  However, 
                                                 
19.  See David Lewis’s “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic” in the Journal of 
Philosophy. 
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Benjamin Franklin could have been no individual other than Benjamin Franklin, so 
talk about such a possible world is nonsense.  Thus, the name "Benjamin Franklin" 
denotes rigidly, and the same can be said for any proper name. 
 Kripke sees proper names as denoting rigidly due to the manner in which 
proper names acquire their reference.  With regard to proper names, Kripke 
subscribes to a theory of reference that has been called "the causal theory of 
names."20  According to Kripke, an individual is given a proper name as a result of a 
special act involving reference to the individual and the use of the name, and it is in 
virtue of this "christening" that the custom of using the name to refer to the individual 
is inaugurated.  The particular individual that gets named may be indicated to an 
audience through an act of ostension or by the use of a definite description.  In cases 
where a description is used to single out an individual, the individual does not 
actually need to satisfy the description as long as the speaker succeeds in making 
clear to his audience exactly what individual is being given the name.  (In most cases 
where a description is used to specify the individual that gets named, the audience 
nevertheless believes that the individual satisfies the description.)  The name-giver's 
habit of using the name to refer to the individual named is picked up by the audience 
and is subsequently transferred to other people who come to understand what the 
referent of the name is.  Because the custom of using the name to refer to a particular 
individual can then be transferred to subsequent generations, people who are far 
removed from the original users of the name with respect to both time and distance 
can come to use the name, or some corrupted version of it, perhaps in a different 
language, with the same intention to refer as that once had by the original name giver.  
Proper names are causally linked in this manner to their referents, and the causal link 
                                                 
20.  See Gareth Evans’ essay “The Causal Theory of Names.” 
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between a name and its referent is maintained even when the name is used to refer in 
talk of counterfactual situations.  A definite description, by contrast, is used 
successfully to refer only if its referent satisfies the description (or at least people 
believe that its referent satisfies the description).  Since what satisfies or is considered 
to satisfy a description may well vary from one state of affairs or description of a state 
of affairs to another, definite descriptions do not in general keep the same reference 
when changes occur in the actual world or when other possible worlds are considered.  
Thus, definite descriptions denote nonrigidly, while proper names denote rigidly.21
 Given that all the singular terms in a true identity statement are rigid 
designators, Kripke contends that the weak necessity of the statement follows.  
Kripke argues that, if it is true that a is identical to b and "a" and "b" are both rigid 
designators, then, since "a" and "b" refer to the same thing in the actual world and "a" 
refers to the same thing in every possible world in which it has a referent and "b" 
refers to the same thing in every possible world in which it has a referent, "a" and "b" 
must both refer to one and the same thing in every possible world in which one, and 
thus both, of the terms have a referent, which is a world in which a and b exist.22  
Thus, if a is identical to b, then necessarily a is identical to b.  In other words, if "a = 
b" is true, "a = b" is necessarily true.23  Hence, any identity statement containing only 
                                                 
21.  Actually, it is more accurate to say that all proper names are rigid designators while the 
vast majority of definite descriptions are nonrigid designators.  For Kripke, some definite descriptions, 
such as “the sum of two and two,” denote rigidly due to the necessity that Kripke alleges attaches to 
mathematical truths.  In addition, Kripke admits that there are expressions that look like proper names, 
but are not, and are nonrigid designators.  The term “Jack the Ripper,” for instance, appears to be a 
name of a particular individual whose precise identity was never discovered.  However, given the 
circumstances under which the term entered the vernacular, it actually is used as a way of talking about 
the person, whoever he was, who committed most or all of a series of grisly murders in the 
Whitechapel area of London's East End from April to August of 1888.  The term is therefore 
functioning as a disguised definite description and not a proper name. 
22.  “Identity and Necessity,” in Milton Munitz’s Identity and Individuation, 154. 
23.  Kripke would therefore accept some version of the Barcan formula (that is, something 
like the formula “a = b → ∼◊∼a = b”) endorsed by Ruth Barcan Marcus in “Modalities and Intensional 
Languages.” 
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rigid designators that is true in the actual world will be true in every possible world in 
which the referent of its terms exists.  However, if either "a" or "b" is a nonrigid 
designator, then, even if the referents of the two terms are identical in the actual 
world, it is not the case that what one term refers to is the same as what the other term 
refers to in every possible world, since in some possible world the two designators are 
not used to specify the same object in that possible world.  Therefore, if either "a" or 
"b" is a nonrigid designator, then it is not the case that, if "a = b" is true, then "a = b" 
is necessarily true. 
 In order to understand fully Kripke's position in regard to both kinds of 
identity statements (i.e., those containing only proper names and those containing a 
definite description), not only is it important to understand Kripke's account of rigid 
designation, but the crucial distinction Kripke draws between necessity and a priority 
also needs to be recognized.  A statement is necessarily true, for Kripke, iff both it is 
true and its truth-value could not have been otherwise.  A statement that is necessarily 
true is true in all possible worlds (i.e., it remains true under all possible counterfactual 
descriptions).24  A statement is then contingently true iff both it is true and its truth-
value could have been otherwise.  A contingently true, as well as a contingently false, 
statement is true in some possible worlds (i.e., under some counterfactual 
descriptions) and is false in other possible worlds (i.e., under other counterfactual 
descriptions).  In contrast, a statement is an a priori truth, for Kripke, iff both it is true 
and it can be known to be true independent of experience.25  It does not matter that a 
                                                 
24.  In the case of weak necessity, the definition is somewhat different: a statement is weakly 
necessarily true iff both it is true and its truth value could not have been otherwise in any situation in 
which its terms have reference.  In other words, a statement is considered to be weakly necessary iff it 
is true in all possible worlds in which its terms refer. 
25.  There are, of course, various sorts of difficulties that attend the notion of knowing a 
statement to be true independently of experience, but I believe the primary purpose of my exposition of 
Kripke's distinctions will best be served by following Kripke's lead and ignoring these difficulties. 
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statement is in fact never known to be true independent of experience; it will be an a 
priori truth if it can, in principle, be known to be true independent of, or prior to, 
experience.  This means that, for a given statement, if its truth can be recognized 
without consulting one's experience of the world, then that statement is an a priori 
truth.26  In contrast, a statement is an a posteriori truth iff both it is true and 
knowledge of its truth depends on experience.  A statement is thus true a posteriori if 
its truth can only be recognized after, rather than prior to, consulting one's experience 
of the world.  Since, for Kripke, an identity statement's necessity is a matter of the 
way things must be and an identity statement's a priority is a matter of what can be 
known prior to experience, in drawing the distinction between necessity and a priority 
in this manner with regard to identity statements Kripke is in effect making a 
respective distinction between two types of necessity, metaphysical necessity and 
epistemological necessity.27  For Kripke, true identity statements, although weakly 
necessary, may not be known to be true a priori.  Thus, identity statements, when true, 
are always metaphysically necessary (or at least always express claims about the 
referents of their terms that are metaphysically necessary) but are not always 
epistemologically necessary.28  According to Kripke, it is because philosophers have 
not recognized the difference between what must be true from a metaphysical 
standpoint and what must be true from an epistemological standpoint that they have 
been misled into accepting untenable positions regarding identity. 
                                                 
26.  Kripke's notion of a priority appears to be more in line with that of Hume rather than with 
that of Kant.  A priori truths for Kripke, I take it, are not what can be transcendentally derived as the 
preconditions necessary for the very possibility of experience.  Instead, a statement expresses an a 
priori truth for Kripke if the recognition of the truth of the statement does not depend on experience, 
regardless of whether what is expressed employs concepts that can only be derived from experience. 
27.  This is a distinction that I have of course alluded to, but not introduced explicitly, in the 
previous discussion. 
28.  Kripke thus identifies the weak necessity of any true identity statement as weak 
metaphysical necessity and regards it as de re necessity, while he identifies a priority as 
epistemological necessity and regards it as de dicto necessity. 
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 As will soon emerge in my subsequent discussion of Kripke's proposed 
resolution of the problem of identity, the success of Kripke's solution requires that 
necessary truths and a priori truths comprise two separate domains.  Kripke contends 
that neither the class of necessary truths nor the class of a priori truths is wholly 
contained within the other.  Kripke notes that, for instance, there are mathematical 
statements (such as, for all we know, Goldbach's conjecture) that, if true, are 
necessarily true (i.e., true in all possible worlds) but are not known to be true (or 
false) a priori.  If to know a priori that a mathematical proposition is true is to be able 
to prove it in some fixed system, then what Godel showed, in effect, was that there 
will always be mathematical statements that are necessarily true but are not knowable 
a priori to be true.  Certain statements that are used to make assertions about an 
object’s essential properties provide other examples of necessary a posteriori truths.  
In Kripke's lectures, he once asked whether or not the table before him could have 
been made of ice.29  It is possible, Kripke claimed, that the table is really made of ice 
in spite of the fact that tables are not normally made of ice and the table does not 
appear to be made of ice.  It requires an empirical investigation to discover what the 
table is actually made of, but that particular table is necessarily made of that 
particular substance, whatever it happens to be, out of which the table is in fact made.  
For Kripke, since an object cannot be made of a substance other than the one of 
which it is in fact made, the property of being composed of a certain substance 
(material) is one of the essential properties of an object.  According to Kripke, a thing 
will have all its essential features in every possible world in which the thing occurs.30  
                                                 
29.  Lecture III in Naming and Necessity. 
30.  According to Kripke, if we were to suppose that an object could in some other possible 
world be made of a different substance than the one of which it is actually made or could possibly have 
some other essential attribute other than the one it actually has, then we would have to imagine a 
situation in which a rigid designator referring to that object in the actual world would not be referring 
to the same thing in another possible world, a world in which, supposedly, a referent for the designator 
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Kripke therefore regards the statement that a particular object is made of a particular 
substance as expressing, when true, a metaphysically necessary truth.  If the table 
before him is not made of ice but is, in fact, made of wood, then the statement "This 
table is made of wood" is one whose truth, although necessary (from a metaphysical 
standpoint), is not knowable independent of experience.  Thus, if the statement is 
true, it is another example of a necessary truth that is not known a priori. 
 Kripke contends that there are also a priori truths that are not necessary, 
although I must confess that I do not find Kripke's alleged example of such a truth to 
be very convincing.  According to Kripke, if "S" is a proper name (rather than a 
definite description) of the standard meter bar kept in Paris and the reference of the 
word "meter" is fixed by the nonrigid description "the length of the standard meter 
bar," then the sentence "S is one meter long" is knowable a priori but is not necessary.  
The sentence appears to be an a priori truth since the reference of "meter" was defined 
as the unit of linear measure equal to the length of the standard meter bar and thus the 
sentence is evidently known to be true (in any world in which S exists) independent 
of any empirical investigation.  The sentence appears not to be necessary, though, 
since evidently there is no metaphysical reason why the standard meter bar must have 
the particular length it in fact has, a length that is standardly referred to as one meter.  
However, one can judge Kripke as having successfully provided an example of a 
metaphysically contingent a priori truth only if one neglects (or rejects) the distinction 
between an attributive use and a referential use of the description associated with the 
word "meter.”  At the time when the word "meter" was defined, the reference of 
"meter" was fixed by an attributive use of the nonrigid description "the length of the 
                                                                                                                                           
nevertheless still exists.  Since this latter is impossible, an object must have all its essential attributes in 
every possible world in which it exists.  In addition to the substance of which a thing is composed, 
Kripke also regards the origin of a thing to be one of its essential features.  Kripke's essentialism is 
consequently a substance-origin essentialism. 
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standard meter bar."  This means that, provided that a length of one meter was not 
defined in any other way at that time (which, I believe, is safe to say), whatever was 
the length of the standard bar at that time is one meter.  However, the declaration that 
S is one meter long represented at that time a stipulation, rather than an assertion of 
an a priori truth.  Furthermore, when someone today says, "S is one meter long," he is 
not saying something to the effect of "S has a length of one unit of a measure 
equivalent to its length." Rather, he has a particular length in mind when talking 
about a meter (a length he would refer to by a referential use of the description "the 
length of the standard meter bar"), and that length he may believe is, or was at one 
time, the length of the standard meter bar in Paris.  So, when today someone says, "S 
is one meter long," his statement is indeed not necessary, but is also not known to be 
true a priori.  Notwithstanding the failure of the sentence "S is one meter long" to 
express a metaphysically contingent a priori truth, I do agree with Kripke that the 
category of the a priori may well overlap but not be contained within the category of 
the metaphysically necessary.  However, anyone who advances such a thesis or who 
contends otherwise will need to give cogent arguments in support of his position, 
since neither view is obviously true. 
 Now that I have discussed Kripke's distinction between rigid and nonrigid 
designators and his distinction between necessary and a priori truths, and the 
relationship between the latter pair, I can present the account of identity statements 
that is at the heart of Kripke's solution to the problem of identity.  As I indicated 
above, Kripke's position regarding identity statements containing only proper names 
is that such statements are, when true, always weakly necessary but are not always 
known to be true a priori.  Since proper names denote rigidly, such identity statements 
are, when true in the actual world, true in all possible worlds in which there occur the 
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particulars to which their terms are used to refer in the actual world.  As a result, true 
identity statements containing only proper names are always weakly necessary (and 
thus are always metaphysically necessary), but they are not always known a priori to 
be true (and thus are not always epistemologically necessary) because their truth 
cannot always be recognized without consulting experience.  Even though the identity 
relation necessarily obtains whenever it in fact obtains, the recognition of that 
relationship, just like the recognition of an essential attribute, may require an 
empirical investigation.  Hence, we can, on the basis of our empirical knowledge of 
the world, come to accept or reject an identity statement as we would any logically 
contingent proposition and yet acknowledge that the identity statement is, if true, 
necessarily true.  Furthermore, a statement of the form ⎡α = α⎤ will always be 
knowable a priori (and thus be of no informational value), whereas a statement of the 
form ⎡α = β⎤, if true, may only be known to be true a posteriori (and thus be of 
informational value).  In this way, Kripke's account of identity statements containing 
only proper names apparently satisfies the difference in content requirement.  Since 
"a = b" may be a contingent statement in the sense that, even if true, it may not be 
knowable a priori to be true and thus may not be epistemologically necessary (in spite 
of the fact that, when true, such statements express a metaphysically necessary truth), 
the nonnecessity requirement is also apparently satisfied.  If we equate a statement's 
triviality with its a priority and a statement's nontriviality with its a posteriority, then 
Kripke's account appears to satisfy the nontriviality requirement, since the truth of "a 
= b" may well be knowable only a posteriori, while the truth of “a = a” is known a 
priori.  Thus, Kripke's position can be succinctly summarized: Kripke contends that 
identity statements that contain only proper names (which are identity statements 
proper) are being used to claim that a metaphysically necessary relationship holds 
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between an object and itself, a relationship which we may nevertheless, in certain 
particular cases, only be able to recognize as holding after consulting our experience 
of the world. 
 Before ending the present section, I do not want to overlook the issue of why, 
according to Kripke, there is controversy surrounding the status of identity statements 
(containing only proper names) as necessarily true when true.  A discussion of the 
controversy should help further clarify Kripke's views on identity.  The suggestion 
that any identity statement containing purely denotative terms is in some sense 
necessarily true, if true at all, appears to many people to be counterintuitive.  Kripke 
sees two reasons why people have thought that most such identity statements, even 
when true, must be empirically contingent propositions.  One reason, according to 
Kripke, that identity statements have been considered to be contingent is due to the 
fact that some people have opted for the metalinguistic interpretation of the identity 
predicate.  As a result, they have considered such statements as "Hesperus is 
Phosphorus" and "Cicero is Tully" as respectively saying, in effect, "The name 
'Hesperus' and the name 'Phosphorus' are co-referential" and "The name 'Cicero' and 
the name 'Tully' are co-referential."  Since it is obviously the case that "Hesperus" and 
"Phosphorus" on the one hand and "Cicero" and "Tully" on the other hand need not 
necessarily refer to the same thing or to the same person and their co-referentiality 
can only be established by consulting the empirical facts, people have felt compelled 
to regard the corresponding identity statements as being empirically contingent.  
However, the fact that "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" could have referred to different 
heavenly bodies (i.e., the fact that people in some counterfactual description use the 
names to refer to different heavenly bodies) is, for Kripke, quite irrelevant to the truth 
of the identity statement since he regards the statement "Hesperus is Phosphorus" as 
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saying something about Hesperus and Phosphorus and not about the names 
"Hesperus" and "Phosphorus."  An identity statement, even when it contains two 
distinct terms, is always about the reference of its terms and not about the terms 
themselves.  So, the fact that, in some counterfactual descriptions of the world, 
speakers would use a pair of names other than "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" in an 
identity statement to express the fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus (i.e., what is 
expressed by the sentence "Hesperus is Phosphorus" in the actual world) has no 
bearing on the fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus and thus no bearing on the possible 
truth or falsity of the identity statement "Hesperus is Phosphorus" as speakers in the 
actual world understand that statement. 
 The other reason Kripke gives for why it is that people have mistakenly 
thought that identity statements are typically contingent propositions is that many 
identity statements are accepted only on the basis of certain matters of fact and it has 
always seemed possible for these matters of fact to have been other than what they 
are.  Some would thus argue that the statement "Hesperus is Phosphorus" is only 
contingently true since it came to be accepted as true only after the orbit of the planet 
Venus was fully known and it is surely conceivable that Venus could have had some 
other orbit so that it did not occupy both the position of Hesperus in the evening sky 
and the position of Phosphorus in the morning sky.  It is indeed conceivable that a 
bright celestial object seen in the early morning sky could have come to be referred to 
by the name "Phosphorus" and a bright celestial object seen in the early evening sky 
could have come to be referred to by the name "Hesperus" and yet the celestial 
objects referred to by the two names be distinct heavenly bodies.  We can imagine, 
for instance, Venus and Mars having different orbits and different orbital velocities so 
that Venus never made its appearance in the evening sky and Mars took the position 
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in the sky actually occupied by Hesperus and was just as bright as Hesperus.  
However, Kripke argues that such a counterfactual situation would not be a situation 
in which Hesperus is not Phosphorus.  It would be a situation, no doubt, where the 
name "Hesperus," if it were used by people in that situation to refer to a bright object 
seen in the early evening sky in the position actually occupied by Hesperus, would 
not refer to the same thing as referred to by the name "Phosphorus," if that name were 
used by people in that situation to refer to a bright object seen in the early morning 
sky in the position both actually and counterfactually, in this case anyway, occupied 
by Phosphorus.  In such a counterfactual situation (possible world), it would not be 
true to say that both names would be used by people in discourse to refer to Venus, 
since people in that possible world would use "Phosphorus" to refer to Phosphorus 
and use "Hesperus" to refer not to Hesperus but to Mars.  Nevertheless, such a 
situation would not be a situation where the planet we actually refer to in using the 
name "Hesperus" is not the same as the planet we actually refer to in using the name 
"Phosphorus."  Kripke acknowledges that "Hesperus is Phosphorus" was not known a 
priori to be true, but, in discovering the truth of the statement after making careful 
observations of the planets, astronomers had discovered what is a metaphysically 
necessary truth. 
 The case of the identification of Cicero as Tully provides us with yet another 
example of how people have, in a similar fashion, mistakenly come to view identity 
statements containing only proper names as contingent.  We have come to use the 
name "Cicero" to refer to the author of certain Latin texts, and we have come to use 
the name "Tully" to refer to the Roman orator who denounced Cataline.  Furthermore, 
because of our beliefs concerning certain historical facts, we have come to believe 
that one and the same person both authored these Latin texts and denounced Cataline 
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in oratory.  We thus accept "Cicero is Tully" as a true statement of identity.  Since it 
is in fact true, Kripke takes it to be necessarily true.  However, some would contend 
that the historical facts could have been different and it could have been the case that 
the Roman orator who denounced Cataline was not the person who authored the texts 
normally attributed to Cicero.  Those who would make such a contention might then 
go on to argue that the identity statement "Cicero is Tully" is by no means necessary 
since the persons referred to by the two names need not have been the same.  Kripke 
responds to such critics by claiming that those who would advance such a line of 
argumentation have misunderstood both what is being said in asserting that Cicero is 
Tully and how the reference of the names "Cicero" and "Tully" is fixed.  The 
sentence "Cicero is Tully" is not about the names "Cicero" and "Tully" and is not 
about whoever happens to be, in the actual world or in another possible world, the 
one who authored certain Latin texts and whoever happens to be, in the actual world 
or in another possible world, the one who denounced Cataline in oratory.  In using the 
names "Cicero" and "Tully" in the statement "Cicero is Tully," we mean to refer 
rigidly to a particular person whom we have in mind, a person who is necessarily 
identical to himself.  If tomorrow we were to discover that Cicero did indeed write the 
texts that have been attributed to him but he did not denounce Cataline in oratory, we 
would still not reject the identity statement "Cicero is Tully."  Instead, under such 
circumstances, we would only be forced to find some description other than "the 
Roman orator who denounced Cataline" that would fix the reference of the name 
"Tully."  For Kripke, the names "Cicero" and "Tully" are both rigid designators of the 
person whom we have identified in the actual world as, respectively, the author of 
certain Latin texts and the Roman orator who denounced Cataline.  Kripke contends 
that we may sometimes use a nonrigid definite description to fix the reference of a 
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rigid designator.  Thus, the reference of "Cicero" is fixed by the nonrigid description 
"the Roman orator who denounced Cataline" when we use that description to identify 
the individual who bore the name "Cicero."  However, the name "Cicero" should not 
be taken to be synonymous with the description, for Kripke rejects the description 
theory of names.  Accordingly, "Cicero" is not being used to denote whoever would 
have, in some other possible world, denounced Cataline in oratory if Cicero had in 
fact not been the one to have done so.  The name "Cicero" instead refers rigidly to the 
person we refer to in the actual world when we use the description "the Roman orator 
who denounced Cataline."  The reference of "Tully" is fixed in an analogous manner, 
and, since both "Tully" and "Cicero" denote rigidly and "Cicero is Tully" is true in the 
actual world, "Cicero is Tully" is necessarily true because it is true in every possible 
world in which Cicero and Tully exist.  Hence, even though the sentence "Cicero is 
Tully" is not known a priori to be true, what that sentence says about the world is 
nonetheless a metaphysical necessity. 
 
4.2  Problems with Kripke's analysis 
 The account of identity discussed above thus constitutes Kripke's solution to 
the problem of identity.  An identity statement that contains a definite description 
typically expresses what is a metaphysical contingency.  Nevertheless, what a true 
identity statement says about the referents of its terms is a metaphysical necessity 
(which is more clearly seen when a true identity statement contains only proper 
names) in spite of the fact that such a statement is often not epistemologically 
necessary.  Has Kripke solved the problem of identity?  I will argue below that 
Kripke's account of the nature of identity cannot provide us with an understanding of 
the logical content of identity statements because it does not include an account of the 
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notion of an essential property, the notion of a purely referential context, and the 
notion of a rigid designator that are free of the notion of identity.  However, before 
presenting my primary objections to Kripke's account of identity, I need to make 
some preliminary critical remarks regarding Kripke's analysis. 
 Appearances to the contrary, Kripke has not actually provided us with an 
understanding of the identity relation as a metaphysical relation that necessarily holds 
between every object and itself.  For Kripke, what any true identity statement says 
about the particular objects that are the referents of its terms is metaphysically 
necessary, even if the identity statement as a whole is not true in every possible world 
in which its terms refer and is thus not metaphysically necessary.  Kripke accounts for 
the metaphysical necessity of true identity statements containing only rigid 
designators by the fact that such designators refer to the same thing in every possible 
world in which they refer at all, which means that such identity statements are true in 
every possible world in which the referents of their component rigid designators exist.  
Kripke accounts for the epistemological contingency of some true identity statements 
containing only rigid designators by their logical contingency or by the fact that they 
are not known a priori to be true.  However, the weak necessity of such identity 
statements would seem to indicate that the identity predicate, like a rigid designator, 
does not change its interpretation (or semantic role) across possible worlds.  The rigid 
interpretation of the identity predicate suggests that it is a logical predicate, a 
suggestion that is reinforced by the epistemological necessity of the identity statement 
"a = a" (where "a" is a rigid designator).  As a consequence, I am not sure what it 
means to say that identity is a metaphysical relation. 
 In addition, although an examination and critique of Kripke's causal theory of 
names would go beyond the scope of the present discussion, I should point out here 
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that much of the success of Kripke's account of identity depends upon the success of 
his theory of proper names. Without a clear exposition of how it is that rigid 
designators can have their reference fixed by the use of a nonrigid designator, the 
metaphysical necessity of identity statements containing only rigid designators can be 
called into question.  According to Kripke, the reference of rigid designators is 
sometimes fixed by the use of a nonrigid definite description.  The reference of the 
name "Tully," as was previously mentioned, may be fixed by the use of the 
description "the Roman orator who denounced Cataline," as presumably occurs when 
someone asserts the identity statement "Tully is the Roman orator who denounced 
Cataline" in response to a query about the reference of the name "Tully."  Kripke 
needs to clarify the exact manner in which a nonrigid designator fixes, or sets, the 
reference of a rigid designator, for this will help to explain why any true identity 
statement containing only rigid designators should be regarded as true in all possible 
worlds.  Definite descriptions are often used to fix the reference of a proper name, 
and such a use of a definite description is successful only when what is singled out is 
a particular individual to which the speaker wishes to refer and to designate with a 
name.  According to Kripke, once the reference is set, the proper name, as a rigid 
designator, continues in all circumstances and under all counterfactual conditions to 
refer to that particular individual, even if, because of changes in the world or changes 
in our knowledge of the world, the nonrigid description no longer functions to pick 
out that individual.  Kripke's theory of proper names must account for how it is 
possible for such a determinate reference to be set.  Evidently, the intention to refer to 
a particular individual in the original act of asserting the appropriate identity 
statement serves somehow to fix irrevocably the reference of the proper name.  
However, since, for Kripke, a statement's metaphysical necessity requires its truth in 
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all possible worlds, without an adequate understanding of how such identity 
statements do in fact fix reference it is doubtful one would be compelled by Kripke's 
analysis of identity to accept the metaphysical necessity of identity statements 
containing only rigid designators.  (That there is this dependency seems odd and 
suggests that there is something not quite right about Kripke's conception of 
metaphysical necessity; after all, why should the metaphysical necessity of a relation 
or of a statement of that relation depend upon the manner in which singular referring 
terms acquire their reference?)  Furthermore, if one is not compelled by Kripke's 
analysis to accept the metaphysical necessity of these identity statements, then one 
should also not be compelled to accept the component de re necessity Kripke 
contends is present in any identity statement.  After all, if simple identity statements 
containing only proper names or other rigid designators are not metaphysically 
necessary, then it is hard to see why the identity relation should be regarded as a 
necessary metaphysical relation holding between any individual and itself.  In 
addition, I should also add that in order for Kripke's causal theory to be a true 
alternative to a description theory, such as that offered by Searle, Kripke must 
indicate how the reference of a proper name may be fixed by a description without 
either the proper name becoming synonymous with the description or the use of the 
proper name involving the presupposition that the thing referred to satisfies the 
description. 
 Since my previous analysis of the appeal to Russell's theory of descriptions in 
the attempt to solve the problem of the contingent nature of identity statements 
containing definite descriptions relied on taking seriously the sort of distinction 
Donnellan made by his referential-attributive distinction, I need to discuss Kripke's 
rejection of that distinction.  In his "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference," 
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Kripke argues for a unitary approach to interpreting the content of definite 
descriptions.  Kripke rejects the idea of there being a semantic ambiguity in definite 
descriptions, and Donnellan's distinction requires, Kripke contends, the presence of 
such an ambiguity in statements containing a definite description.  The sort of 
phenomena that Donnellan cites as evidence of the need to mark the distinction 
between the referential and the attributive uses can be accounted for, according to 
Kripke, in a manner that does not amount to ascribing an ambiguity to definite 
descriptions.  Kripke notes that what words mean when uttered in a certain context 
may differ from what a speaker means in uttering those words.  What the words mean 
is fixed by linguistic conventions, intentions on the part of the speaker, and certain 
other contextual elements, while what the speaker means is fixed by what his words 
mean in the context of his utterance and certain special intentions together with more 
general conventions governing conversational exchanges.  There is thus a distinction 
to be made between what Kripke calls the "semantic reference" of a term and what 
Kripke calls the "speaker's reference" of a term.  With regard to definite descriptions, 
the former is the particular person or thing the description refers to in virtue of that 
person or thing possessing the features detailed in the description.  In contrast, the 
speaker's reference of a definite description is the particular person or thing to which 
the speaker intends to refer in using the description.  In cases that Donnellan 
describes as attributive uses of a definite description, the speaker intends to say 
something about whatever or whoever is the semantic reference of the description.  In 
such cases, the speaker's reference is the same as the semantic reference.  Speakers 
may, however, have in mind a particular person or thing about which they intend to 
make their assertion and because of their beliefs about the intended referent use a 
definite description to single out and refer to that individual.  In these latter cases, 
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which Donnellan describes as referential uses of a definite description, the speaker's 
reference may, but not necessarily will, differ from the semantic reference, even 
though the speaker believes that they are one and the same.  Kripke calls the first kind 
of case, wherein the speaker's reference is just the semantic reference the "simple 
case" of reference.  The latter kind of case, wherein the speaker's reference may not 
be the semantic reference of his words but the speaker believes that his "general 
linguistic intentions" (those intentions that fix the meaning of his words in the context 
of their use) also determine his "specific intention" (his intention to refer, by the use 
of his words, to a certain individual), Kripke calls the "complex case" of reference.   
Thus, in a simple case of reference in which a speaker says, "The tallest mountain in 
the world is in Tibet," the sentence the speaker utters and what the speaker says in 
uttering the sentence will both be true when and only when there is a unique 
mountain that is taller than all others and is found in Tibet.  In contrast, in a complex 
case of reference involving a speaker saying of a particular party goer drinking from a 
champagne glass, "The person over there drinking champagne is happy tonight," the 
sentence the speaker utters is false if and only if there is no unique person over there 
who is drinking champagne and is happy tonight, but what the speaker says about the 
intended referent of the definite description is true if that particular person (the 
speaker's referent) is indeed happy tonight, regardless of what is in his champagne 
glass (or what is in the champagne glass of someone else who just so happens to fit 
the description).  Since, under Kripke's proposed analysis of the two different senses 
of the definite description associated with the two different uses of descriptions, no 
difference in literal meaning is ascribed to the definite descriptions involved, Kripke 
concludes that there is only one analysis of the content of definite descriptions.  If 
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there is no syntactic or semantic ambiguity present in definite descriptions, then, 
according to Kripke, they can have only one analysis. 
 Kripke contends that one can also distinguish between simple and complex 
cases of reference in connection with the use of a proper name, rather than a 
description, and therefore Donnellan is mistaken in characterizing the referential use 
of a definite description as the use of the description as a proper name.  For instance, 
someone may misidentify a person seen in the distance as Jones (when in fact it is 
Smith) and say, "There is Jones," and then go on to say of that person seen in the 
distance, "And Jones is raking leaves again."  In the situation imagined, the speaker's 
utterance of the first sentence, in which is revealed his misidentification of the person 
seen in the distance, involves a simple case of reference since the speaker, in using 
the name "Jones," intends to refer to the name's semantic referent.  The speaker's 
utterance of the second sentence, on the other hand, involves a complex case of 
reference since the speaker intends to say something about the individual seen in the 
distance and, because of his mistaken belief that the individual seen is Jones, uses the 
name "Jones" to refer to that individual.  What the speaker means and succeeds in 
saying in uttering the second sentence, apart from what his words literally mean in 
uttering that sentence, is true provided that the speaker's referent (the specific person 
to whom the speaker intends to refer and the speaker believes is named by the name, 
or believes fits the description) is indeed raking leaves. 
 Since Donnellan's distinction between the sense of a definite description used 
referentially and the sense of a definite description used attributively is not required 
in order to understand what occurs in simple and complex cases of reference, and that 
distinction does not pertain to cases of mistaken identity involving the use of a proper 
name instead of a description, Kripke concludes that considerations of simplicity and 
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completeness count against Donnellan's analysis.  Kripke sees Donnellan's appeal to 
an alleged referential-attributive distinction as an unnecessary extravagance.  Kripke 
maintains that the considerations Donnellan entertains as an argument against Russell 
are inconclusive and do not in themselves show that Russell was wrong about definite 
descriptions.  The phenomena that Donnellan cites to show that some English 
sentences presumably have nonRussellian truth conditions would still arise even if the 
statements containing definite descriptions made by English speakers were 
considered always to be analyzable in the manner proposed by Russell.  Thus, the fact 
that the phenomena do arise among speakers of English is no proof that Russell's 
analysis is not correct for English.  According to Kripke, no clear misunderstanding 
of English sentences would result from always interpreting the content of any English 
sentence containing a definite description in the Russellian fashion.  Despite what 
Donnellan suggests, it is far from obvious that the truth conditions of actual English 
sentences containing a definite description do indeed differ in the manner implicit in 
the recognition of the attributive and referential senses of a description.  Complex 
cases of reference, wherein the semantic referent is different from the speaker's 
referent, always involve the speaker making a statement that is false if interpreted 
literally but is nevertheless being used to say something that may be true of the 
intended referent.  How this is possible is explained in terms of Kripke's account of 
how speaker's reference and semantic reference are determined, and this is 
accomplished without recognizing a special kind of ambiguity associated with the 
different uses of a definite description.  Furthermore, since the use of a proper name 
to refer to someone who has been misidentified would not normally prompt us to say 
that proper names can be used ambiguously in the manner Donnellan suggests for 
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descriptions, Kripke argues that we should not attribute that ambiguity to definite 
descriptions. 
 The Kripkean analysis of the hypothetical situation involving the 
misidentification of Smith as Jones appears, though, to be in no way necessary.  
Since, according to the story, Smith, not Jones, is seen in the distance and Smith, not 
Jones, is raking leaves, what the speaker succeeds in saying by uttering each one of 
the above sentences seems to me to be false.  It is only by virtue of a liberal 
application of a principle of charity that the speaker in such a situation could be 
interpreted as having said something true.  The tendency to suppose that something 
true has been said in the case imagined stems from thinking of the use of the name 
"Jones" as succeeding, despite the misidentification, in referring to the person who 
actually satisfies the definite description "the person seen in the distance."  However, 
if, as Kripke does in fact maintain, a proper name is not equivalent to one or more 
descriptions, then the name "Jones" does not need, in any sense, to acquire Smith as 
its referent just because Smith is actually the person seen in the distance.  As long as 
speakers are not employing language merely as a code, the referent of a proper name 
could always be considered to be what Kripke would identify as its semantic referent.  
Indeed, I suspect that such a view of proper names may ultimately be required if one 
accepts the view of proper names as rigid designators.  If what speakers refer to in 
using a particular proper name in normal conversation must be seen as remaining 
constant when talking about the actual world or any possible world, then a case of 
mistaken identity would not seem to result in a shift of reference. 
 In virtue of the distinction between what speakers say literally and what they 
succeed in telling an audience in uttering certain words, Kripke maintains that it may 
be the case that what a speaker says literally in uttering a particular statement (i.e., 
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what his words mean) is false but what the speaker says in uttering that statement in 
the context in which it is uttered (i.e., what he means by uttering those words) is true.  
Thus, as in a case Kripke considers, if a person sees a man and a woman together and 
says of the man, "Her husband is kind to her," and the two people are not actually 
married to each other but the man is indeed kind to the woman, then the sentence the 
speaker uttered is literally false even though what the speaker has succeeded in saying 
about the man is true.  However, just what is it that (1) the speaker has accomplished 
to say about the man and (2) is true?  If truth is a property of statements or assertions, 
then what satisfies the two conditions must be a sentence or must be expressible by a 
sentence.  The sentence spoken, though, cannot be, or cannot express, what is said 
truly about the man since that sentence (according to Kripke) is false.  Nevertheless, 
the sufficient and necessary conditions for the speaker having said something true are, 
by hypothesis, satisfied since the speaker believes that the semantic referent of "her 
husband" is indeed the person to whom he intended to refer and that individual is kind 
to the woman.  Consequently, it is very clear what sentence (i.e., what words) the 
speaker uttered, but it is not clear what true statement the speaker made.31  The most 
                                                 
31.  Searle, in Chapter 6 of his Expression and Meaning (137-161), offers an alternative 
analysis that handles much better the problem of specifying what exactly is the statement that gets 
made in what is called a referential use of a description. Searle also rejects Donnellan's referential-
attributive distinction and presents a view that is, by his own admission, similar to that of Kripke.  
According to Searle, the speech act of referring to an individual can be accomplished in most cases by 
a speaker using any number of definite descriptions to pick out the individual in terms of features it 
alone is alleged to possess.  The unique feature (or aspect of the individual) the speaker mentions when 
using a description whose satisfaction is not a part of the truth conditions of the statement made is what 
Searle calls the “secondary aspect.”  If a speaker knows what he or she is talking about in the sense 
that there actually is some individual the speaker has in mind and about which he wishes to say 
something, then, according to Searle, there must be some aspect of the individual that is unique to that 
individual and can be appealed to in using a description.  The aspect that is actually unique to the 
individual and can be mentioned in the use of a definite description to refer to the individual is what 
Searle calls the “primary aspect.”  For Searle, a definite description used to mention a primary aspect 
of an individual is such that (1) the individual the speaker intends to refer to actually satisfies the 
description and the speaker is aware of this, (2) the description's satisfaction is a component of the 
truth conditions of the statement actually asserted, and (3) the content of the description is part of the 
content of the statement made, but not necessarily a part of the meaning of the sentence uttered.  Searle 
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plausible way to resolve the difficulty in terms of Kripke's speaker's reference-
semantic reference distinction would be to view the sentence "Her husband is kind to 
her" as false if the referent of "her husband" is taken to be its semantic referent and as 
true if the referent of "her husband" is taken to be the speaker's referent.  However, to 
adopt this view would amount to seeing the sentence as, in effect, ambiguous and to 
reintroducing, albeit in different terminology, Donnellan's referential-attributive 
distinction. 
 More importantly, despite what Kripke suggests to the contrary, there is 
evidence (in addition to what I have already provided) for the need to recognize the 
sort of distinction that Donnellan makes.  Noting Donnellan type distinctions in the 
content of definite descriptions can reveal the implausibility of certain inferences.  
The faulty nature of the traditional theistic rejoinder to the classical dilemma 
proposed to show that neither God nor any other being could be omnipotent can be 
made apparent if consideration is given to the content of a key descriptive phrase.  
Those who pose the dilemma argue that, since God either can or cannot create a 
situation in the universe in which He cannot act and either hypothesis entails that God 
                                                                                                                                           
claims that each of Donnellan's alleged examples of a referential use of a description involves a case 
where the satisfaction of the description has to do with a secondary aspect, whereas each of 
Donnellan's alleged examples of an attributive use of a description involves a case where the 
satisfaction of the description has to do with only the primary aspect.  Thus, for Searle, the statement 
that actually gets made in a so-called referential use of a description is always expressible by a 
sentence containing a description that characterizes the individual referred to in terms of the primary 
aspect alone.  The trouble with Searle's analysis is that it is hard to see how the satisfaction of a 
definite description describing an individual in terms of the primary aspect could actually enter into the 
truth conditions of a statement in a case where the sentence uttered does not contain that description.  
Since the primary aspect may vary across different counterfactual situations and the definite 
description the speaker would need to employ to refer to the individual in terms of the primary aspect 
so as to make the same claim about the same individual may therefore vary in different counterfactual 
situations, the satisfaction of such a description is not what really counts when determining the content 
of the statement made.  What is important is just reference to the individual, which suggests that the 
definite description functions like a proper name. 
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is not omnipotent, God must not be omnipotent.  The sort of reasoning involved in 
reaching the first horn of the dilemma can be explicated as follows. 
 
1.  Either God can create a situation in the universe in which He cannot act or God 
cannot create a situation in the universe in which He cannot act. 
2.  Suppose God can create a situation in the universe in which He cannot act. 
3.  Thus, there is some possible situation in the universe that God can create and in 
which He cannot act. 
4.  So, suppose that the situation in the universe in which God cannot act is a possible 
situation in the universe that God can create and in which He cannot act. 
5.  Thus, the situation in the universe in which God cannot act is a possible situation 
in the universe in which God cannot act. 
6.  Thus, God cannot act in every possible situation in the universe. 
7.  Thus, God is not omnipotent. 
 
Perhaps the most common theistic response to the problem (“the paradox of 
omnipotence”) is to admit that God can conceivably create the situation in which He 
cannot act but argue that God's acting in such a situation is not logically possible and 
thus God's inability to act in such a situation is no infringement on His omnipotence.  
A theist who took such a position would thus reject the above line of reasoning as 
fallacious.  (The criticism would focus on the inference from line 6 to line 7.)  The 
theist would argue that the sentence "God acts in the situation in the universe in 
which God cannot act" is self-contradictory and thus any description of God acting in 
such a situation is a description of a "logically impossible action" and is therefore 
really a description of no possible action at all.  As a consequence, God can be 
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thought to have the ability to create the problematic situation, and be unable to act in 
that situation, without compromising His omnipotence.  This refutation, though, relies 
on treating the description "the situation in the universe in which God cannot act" as 
an attributive description, for the above-mentioned sentence is self-contradictory only 
if the content of the description is part of the content of the sentence and fixes its truth 
conditions.  However, the description enters line 4 in the above derivations that give 
rise to the first horn of the dilemma as a designator for a particular thing the existence 
of which is guaranteed by the truth of the existential generalization at line 3.  The 
description must therefore be interpreted as a referential description, but, if it is so 
understood, the contradiction the theistic critic has in mind cannot be derived.  In the 
supposition at line 4, one legitimately could, after all, have instead used the 
designator "the Ω situation" in stating the particular instance of the generalization, but 
the sentence "God acts in the Ω situation" is not self-contradictory. 
 What is of even more concern than the above case, given the main topic under 
discussion, is the case of problematic inferences involving identity statements.  The 
following example was motivated by a similar example provided by John Paulos.32
 
The temperature outside at 12:17 a.m. is the ambient temperature of 65oF. 
The temperature outside at 12:17 a.m. is never recorded by the weather bureau. 
Therefore, the ambient temperature of 65oF is never recorded by the weather bureau. 
 
What is wrong with the above argument can be accounted for in terms of the 
referential-attributive distinction.  (The inference does not appear to involve an 
                                                 
32.  On page 25 of his amusing little book, I Think, Therefore I Laugh: The Flip Side of 
Philosophy. 
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opaque context or to turn on an ambiguity in the scope of a generalization.)  The 
description "the ambient temperature outside at 12:17 a.m." in the first premise 
should be interpreted referentially as a device for referring to a particular temperature 
at a particular time.  The same description in the second premise should be interpreted 
attributively so that the premise is understood to state that the weather bureau never 
records the ambient temperature outside at 12:17 a.m., whatever that temperature is.  
The conclusion that the weather bureau never records the ambient temperature 
outside at 12:17 a.m. (i.e., the ambient temperature of 65oF) does not then follow.  
The weather bureau, after all, may well not have a vested interest in recording 
whatever is the ambient temperature at precisely 12:17 a.m. but may well have no 
qualms about recording the specific ambient temperature of 65oF whenever it occurs 
at a recording time. 
 As I previously indicated, the above remarks were intended to constitute a 
preliminary criticism of Kripke's position.  The difficulties of understanding how 
identity can be a necessary metaphysical relation, how nonrigid designators can fix 
the reference of rigid designators, and how best to analyze definite descriptions are all 
very important but are ancillary to other more pressing problems.  I will now turn my 
attention to my main argument against Kripke's proposals as an analysis of identity.  
In the long run, I do not find Kripke's account of the nature of identity statements 
very helpful in unraveling the content of such statements and resolving the problem 
of identity.  This is the case because, as I shall argue, Kripke's analysis cannot 
ultimately be employed in a full explication of the epistemological and metaphysical 
necessity (and thus the content of) identity claims since his analysis presupposes a 
prior understanding of the nature of identity.  I will defend the latter claim by citing 
three reasons why Kripke can be charged with providing an analysis of identity that is 
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not independent of a prior notion of identity.  First of all, Kripke cannot rely upon his 
account of essential predication in order to explain the metaphysical necessity of true 
identity statements since the ability to recognize an essential property requires one 
already to have a notion of what it means for terms to be co-referential.  Secondly, in 
order to extend Kripke's analysis to account for the logical features of identity 
statements, a notion of a purely referential context free of a notion of identity is 
required, but such a notion is not provided by Kripke's analysis.  Thirdly, the notion 
of rigid designation cannot be exploited as a means of accounting for the 
epistemological and metaphysical necessity of identity statements because the notion 
of a rigid designator carries with it the notion of identity. 
 If an object's self-identity is considered to be one of its necessary properties 
and the necessary properties are the essential properties, then it may be thought that 
an appeal to Kripke's essentialism could be made in an explication of an identity 
statement's metaphysical necessity.  According to Kripke, a thing's essential 
properties are just those properties whose attribution is necessary in order for a 
certain name to refer in any possible world (counterfactual situation) to the same 
thing that it does in the actual world.  Kripke maintains that in some counterfactual 
descriptions of the world a proper name may not succeed in referring to anything 
because it cannot refer to what it refers to in the actual world due to certain features 
of the counterfactual description.  A counterfactual situation prevents a name from 
having the same referring role that it has in the actual world whenever the 
counterfactual description specifically precludes the referent of the name in that 
possible world from possessing some property its referent in the actual world 
necessarily possesses (i.e., possesses in every possible world). 
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 For example, consider the sentence "If Nixon had been born Chinese in the 
sixteenth century, he would not have become a corrupt politician."  The referring role 
played by the name "Nixon" in this sentence is very much in doubt since it does not 
seem possible for the name to refer to the same individual man both in the actual 
world and in the counterfactual situation.  Unless, perhaps, there is a clear notion of a 
soul that constitutes a person's identity regardless of the person's physical attributes 
and his or her time and place of birth, nobody who was born (in the actual world or 
any possible world) of Chinese parents in sixteenth century China could be identified 
as the same man who has in actuality been referred to in using the name "Nixon."  
Thus, the attribute of not having been born Chinese in the sixteen century was 
evidently an essential attribute of Nixon.33  However, consider the sentence "Had 
Nixon not resigned he would have been removed from office."  Presumably, there is 
no problem posed by the use of the name "Nixon" in this sentence since it is possible 
to imagine one and the same man as having resigned in the actual world and not 
having resigned in some other conceivable world.  The attribute of having resigned 
thus appears not to have been an essential attribute of Nixon. 
 The trouble with appealing to the notion of essential attribution in accounting 
for the metaphysical necessity of identity statements should be obvious.  In order to 
identify a property as a thing's essential property, one needs to know whether a rigid 
designator referring to that thing could be used to refer to what is the same thing but 
lacks the property in some counterfactual situation.  Thus, a notion of co-
                                                 
33.  Admittedly though, Kripke presumably does not consider one's nationality or time of 
birth to be a person's essential properties.  Nevertheless, he does consider a thing's particular origin to 
be an essential feature of the thing, and a person's origin seems to me to be more commonly 
understood in terms of an origin within a particular genealogy.  (Kripke has given consideration to a 
person's origin in terms of a particular sperm and egg, but most people, including most reproductive 
physiologists, are completely unfamiliar with the particular sperm and egg that unite and give rise to a 
particular person.)  I take it that anyone who was born ethnically Chinese in the sixteenth century could 
not have had the lineage that Nixon in fact had. 
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referentiality, which in turns requires a prior notion of identity, is antecedently 
required in order to talk about the essential attributes of the referent of a term in any 
statement of identity.  The notion of essential predication therefore cannot be usefully 
employed in a Kripkean analysis of the nature of identity statements. 
 As has already been mentioned, any totally successful analysis of identity will 
account for the validity of the basic patterns of inference that get expressed in a 
formal language as the inference rules of identity elimination and identity 
introduction.  If identity is a relation that only holds between every object and itself 
(and necessarily holds when it in fact holds), then it would seem plausible to say that, 
if a is identical to b, then anything true of a is also true of b, since a and b are the 
same thing.  (Unfortunately, though, this latter does not seem to be an altogether 
helpful way of putting the matter since saying that a and b are identical appears 
exactly equivalent to saying that a and b are the same thing.)  If this is a plausible, 
and significant, thing to say, then the validity of the basic patterns of inference 
associated with identity statements is evidently secured.  It would appear then that 
Kripke's objectual analysis of identity might reasonably be extended to give an 
account of the logical nature of identity statements.  However, it is not always correct 
to say that, when a is the same as b, whatever is true of a is also true of b.  As was 
discussed earlier, when what we say of a involves an intensional context, we may be 
saying something about a that we could not properly say of b.  The inferences judged 
to be legitimate according to the analysis of identity must be limited to those that 
involve only purely referential (i.e., referentially transparent) contexts.  Those 
contexts that are purely referential are extensional contexts.  If an analysis of identity 
can only provide an account of a purely referential context that is based 
fundamentally on a previous explication of the validity and invalidity of inferences 
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involving the substitution of co-referring terms, then the limitations that must be 
placed on a principle of intersubstitutivity cannot be accounted for and justified on 
the analysis (for in such a case the analysis would be circular).  If the analysis of 
identity cannot make plausible a principle of intersubstitutivity in an appropriate 
manner, the analysis will not give an account of the validity of the basic inferences 
associated with identity statements.  A purely referential context, as has been 
mentioned before, is traditionally recognized as one in which the substitution of co-
referring terms always preserves truth-value.  A principle of intersubstitutivity, of 
course, governs the substitution of co-referring terms and is not to be understood 
apart from a notion of identity.  (After all, the notion of co-referring terms carries 
with it the notion of identity.)  It is thus difficult to give an account of a purely 
referential context without making essential reference to a principle of 
intersubstitutivity and a prior notion of identity.  Anyone who considers it feasible to 
extend Kripke's analysis to give an account of the basic inferences associated with 
identity statements must believe that his analysis can provide, or can be provided 
with, an account of a purely referential context that is free of a notion of identity and 
is not based fundamentally on a prior understanding of the validity and invalidity of 
inferences involving the substitution of co-referring terms.  As a consequence, those 
who take for granted the former consideration presuppose the latter belief; however, 
since Kripke does not provide such an account of a purely referential context, those 
who wish to extend Kripke's analysis must evidently rely upon the traditional account 
of a purely referential context.  Therefore, those who claim that a Kripkean analysis 
of identity can account for the validity of the basic patterns of inference associated 
with identity statements are assuming as a given what a successful analysis of identity 
is designed ultimately to provide. 
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 As I have explained above, Kripke relies upon his account of rigid and 
nonrigid designation in order to make credible his position concerning the 
epistemological and metaphysical necessity of identity statements.  However, the 
notion of a rigid designator is the notion of a term that refers to the same thing in 
every possible world in which its referent (in the actual world) exists.  The notion of a 
rigid designator carries with it, as a part of its meaning, a notion of identity.  Thus, if 
one does not understand the idea of a and b being the same thing, one cannot 
reasonably expect the idea of rigid designation to be, in the final analysis, very 
enlightening.  If such is the case, then Kripke cannot legitimately account for the 
necessity of identity statements by appealing to the distinction between rigid and 
nonrigid designation.  Therefore, when Kripke accounts for the epistemological and 
metaphysical necessity of identity statements, as part of his analysis of the nature of 
identity claims, he actually presupposes a previous understanding of the very notion 
he attempts to elucidate. 
 In the final analysis, Kripke does not succeed in elucidating the concept of 
identity, and thus the logical content of identity statements.  Instead, Kripke provides 
us with only an explanation of how it is possible for identity statements to be in some 
sense contingent (i.e., not necessary) even though the relation of identity holds 
necessarily whenever it holds.  Kripke must be understood as taking identity to be a 
primitive relationship that necessarily holds between every object and itself in spite of 
the fact that we do not always employ a trivial and logically necessary statement to 
assert that relationship. 
 In the next chapter, I will focus on an attempt to solve the problem of identity 
by, among other things, developing a metalinguistic account of identity.  Such 
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accounts of identity are appealing in certain respects, but they encounter their own 
sorts of difficulties that do not arise in connection with objectual analyses of identity. 
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Chapter 5: A Metalinguistic Solution 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 Both Frege's and Kripke's approaches to clarifying the nature of identity 
statements are not completely successful at resolving the problem of identity because 
they do not succeed in overcoming the difficulties that typically attend objectual 
analyses of identity.  Furthermore, both accounts require for their completion a prior 
notion of identity that it should be the purpose of their analyses to provide.  Of the 
two strategies previously mentioned at the beginning of the last chapter, I will now 
give some consideration to the second strategy that has been pursued in order to 
resolve the various difficulties associated with the objectual and the metalinguistic 
analyses of identity.  In the present chapter, I shall examine a couple of metalinguistic 
accounts of identity statements that employ notions from the theory of speech acts.  I 
will begin in the first section below with a discussion of an account of identity 
statements offered by Michael Lockwood.  I will then critique that account in the 
subsequent section, and then in the final section I will examine and critique a possible 
modification of Lockwood's account.  In the process of evaluating these views, I will 
uncover additional problems that I believe inevitably beset any metalinguistic account 
of identity. 
 
5.1 Lockwood's account of identity 
 The approach pursued by Michael Lockwood, a modified version of which 
was subsequently endorsed by Thomas Morris, involves accounting for the 
differences in informational value of different identity statements by redefining the 
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notion of a purely referential context and its associated principle of substitution.1  For 
Lockwood, the problem of there being contingent statements of identity is easily 
solved.  All substantival expressions (definite descriptions and proper names) do not, 
in general, have the same reference in every possible counterfactual situation. 
(Lockwood evidently does not subscribe to the idea of rigid designation.)  Thus, it is 
possible for two substantival expressions contingently to denote the same thing and 
for the identity statement containing those two expressions to be contingently true.  
The real problem, according to Lockwood, is generated when we allow co-referring 
terms to be freely substituted for one another in all contexts that are traditionally 
recognized as being purely referential.  According to the standard account of a purely 
referential context, the singular terms occurring in such a context serve only the 
purpose of singling out a unique individual and enabling, in a declarative utterance, a 
speaker to say something about that individual.  Consequently, co-referring terms are 
considered to function in an equivalent fashion in a purely referential context to 
enable a speaker to refer to the particular individual about which the speaker wishes 
to talk.  Because singular terms occurring in a purely referential context are being 
used only as devices to refer and co-referring terms serve the same purpose in such a 
context, it is customarily thought that any two co-referential terms can be substituted 
for one another in purely referential contexts.  Such substitutions, when made in the 
context of declarative sentences, should yield declarative sentences that are 
standardly used to make the same assertion.  Since "Gaurisankar" and "Everest" refer 
(supposedly) to the same mountain, it ought to be legitimate to substitute the name 
"Everest" for the name "Gaurisankar" in the sentence "Gaurisankar is Everest."  
                                                 
1.  See Lockwood’s essay “Identity and Reference,” reprinted on pages 199-211 in Identity 
and Individuation.  For the account provided by Morris, see his “functional account” of identity in 
Chapter 4 of Understanding Identity Statements. 
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However, the result of such a substitution, the sentence "Everest is Everest," 
expresses a trivial truth and lacks the force and informational value of the statement 
ordinarily expressed by the original sentence.  The temptation at this point, says 
Lockwood, is not to challenge the notion of a purely referential context and the 
principle of substitution but instead to reject the idea that proper names and 
descriptions used referentially serve only the purpose of referring and play no 
attributive role.  The problem, after all, does not arise in the case of descriptions used 
attributively since the substitution principle never warrants their being substituted one 
for the other.2  Nevertheless, Lockwood considers it more reasonable to maintain that 
proper names and some definite descriptions do serve merely to refer and to place the 
blame for the problem on the standard account of a purely referential context and the 
substitution principle, both of which he attempts to modify in order to solve the 
problem.  Lockwood does not find fault with the very idea of a purely referential 
context but rejects the more traditional interpretation of how the preservation of truth-
value under substitutions of co-referring terms delimits or defines exactly what are 
the contexts that are purely referential. 
 Lockwood considers the difficulties to be resolved once we understand just 
how it is that a speaker's utterances of declarative sentences used to make not only 
assertions of identity but also other assertions about one or more individuals can be 
                                                 
2.  Indeed, the rendering of the distinction between the referential and the attributive uses of a 
definite description provides a simple solution to Lockwood’s problem, at least for many such 
substitutions involving a definite description.  If the description “the tallest mountain seen from Tibet” 
is used attributively in an utterance of the sentence “The tallest mountain seen from Tibet is Everest,” 
then clearly the substitution of the name “Everest” for the description will yield a sentence (namely, 
“Everest is Everest”) that is not synonymous to the original.  Thus, it is easy to see in this case why the 
sentence that results from substitution does not have the same informational content as the original 
sentence.  Lockwood's problem would therefore be totally resolved (but most, if not all, substitutions 
of co-referring terms would be viewed as illegitimate) if it were reasonable to hold that all uses of 
names amount to uses of disguised definite descriptions understood attributively and no descriptions 
are ever used purely referentially. 
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informative or not with respect to a given audience.  When a speaker intends to 
inform an audience by uttering a declarative sentence in order to make an assertion in 
a standard conversational setting, the speaker assumes that the audience understands 
the literal meaning of his words and any other meaning attached to those words due to 
the context of their utterance.  Also associated with the referential use of any 
substantival expression (i.e., the use of an expression only to refer to something and 
not to attribute to something) in a declarative utterance is what Lockwood calls an 
"assumption of knowledge" and an "assumption of ignorance" regarding the 
extralinguistic information the audience has at its disposal.  The speaker assumes that 
his audience is familiar enough with the object he is referring to and the features of 
that object so that the audience can identify exactly what the speaker is referring to in 
the use of the substantival expression.  The speaker also assumes that his audience is 
either unaware of, or can be usefully reminded of, whatever, as the primary substance 
of his assertion, he is ascribing to (predicating of) the individual or individuals to 
which he is referring.  The former assumptions comprise the assumption of 
knowledge; the latter assumptions, the assumption of ignorance. 
 In the referential (nonattributive) use of a definite description in the utterance 
of a sentence, the particular assumption of knowledge involves the speaker's 
assumption that the audience knows enough about the attributes of a thing and its 
relations to other things to be able to recognize it as being singled out by the 
description.  The particular assumption of ignorance in this case involves the 
speaker's assumption that the attribute or relation ascribed to the object or objects 
referred to in the statement is not a part of what is known by the audience that would 
enable its members to recognize the particular individual the speaker intends to refer 
to in using the description. 
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 In regard to the referential use of a name (i.e., the use of a name as a logically 
proper name and not as a disguised description) in the utterance of a sentence, the 
matter of what constitutes specifically the assumption of knowledge and the 
assumption of ignorance is a bit more complicated.  In order for an audience to be 
informed by the assertion made by a speaker in uttering a sentence containing a name, 
the name used must mean something to the members of the audience.  Lockwood's 
sense of a name "meaning something" to an audience is the sense in which the name 
gives access to a body of knowledge, possessed by each member of the audience, 
concerning the referent of the name.3  The notion of a name giving access to a body 
of knowledge concerning its referent is, I believe, the idea of the name's occurrence in 
each sentence of a complex of sentences that manifests, at least in part, a person's 
knowledge regarding the referent of the name.  The body of knowledge, about an 
individual, to which a name gives access is what Lockwood calls the "mental file" 
associated with the name.  The particular assumption of knowledge involved in the 
referential use of a name in a declarative sentence is that the person to whom the 
utterance of the sentence is directed has a mental file to which the name can give 
access and the information in this file about the individual referred to is compatible 
with the use of the name in that context.  The particular assumption of ignorance 
involved in this case is that the information contained in the mental file to which the 
name will give access, on the part of the person to whom the utterance of the sentence 
is directed, does not contain the information that the assertion on the whole is 
intended to impart.4
                                                 
3.  If I understand Lockwood correctly, what he means by a name “meaning something” to 
someone can also be stated more informally as what a person would mean in asking another person a 
question like “Does the name ‘Michael Lockwood’ mean anything to you?” 
4.  The information the assertion of the sentence is on the whole intended to convey is, if I 
follow Lockwood correctly, the information about the subject of the sentence that is provided by the 
content of the grammatical predicate of the sentence, the subject of the sentence in this case being not 
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 In the specific case of a speaker's utterance of a statement of identity that is 
intended to inform an audience, the speaker assumes, when the identity statement 
contains only names and those names do not function as disguised descriptions, that 
each member of the audience has more than one mental file (on the individual 
referred to) to which the names will give access.  The speaker also assumes in 
uttering an informative identity statement containing only names used purely 
referentially that, for each name occurring in the identity statement, the mental file to 
which the name gives access does not contain the information that the individual 
referred to in the use of the name is also referred to in the use of the other name in the 
identity statement.  When a speaker, for instance, utters the sentence "Gaurisankar is 
Everest" with the intention of informing an audience, the speaker assumes that the 
names "Gaurisankar" and "Everest" each give access to a mental file on the referent 
of the name.  Furthermore, the speaker assumes that the information within the 
mental file to which the name "Gaurisankar" gives access does not include the idea 
that the individual on which that mental file exists is also the individual on which 
exists the mental file to which the name "Everest" gives access.  Similarly, the 
speaker assumes that the information within the mental file to which the name 
"Everest" gives access does not include the idea that the individual on which that 
mental file exists is also the individual on which exists the mental file to which the 
name "Gaurisankar" gives access.  Thus, the assumptions of knowledge and of 
ignorance involved in a speaker's utterance of an intentionally informative identity 
statement in which the identity predicate is flanked only by proper names are that the 
names in the identity statement give separate access to mental files and that these 
                                                                                                                                           
the grammatical subject of the sentence but rather the referent of the substantival expression occurring 
in the grammatical subject position in the sentence. 
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mental files are, for the audience, distinct mental files.  The speaker's purpose in 
uttering an informative identity statement, Lockwood declares, is to encourage the 
audience to merge these distinct mental files into one. 
 Since different uses of names and descriptions in differing contexts involve 
different assumptions of knowledge and of ignorance and these assumptions on the 
part of the speaker are key to understanding the informational value that an utterance 
has for an audience, it is clear for Lockwood why the separate roles of the 
substantives occurring in an identity statement are not fully recognized when all that 
is known is their intended reference.  Therefore, we should not expect, according to 
Lockwood, the substitution of co-referring terms one for the other in a sentence 
always to yield alternative formulations of the same statement.  For this reason, 
Lockwood proposes the adoption of an appropriately modified version of the 
principle of substitutivity.  For Lockwood, the purely referential use of terms must 
comply with a condition placed upon the interchangeability of co-referring terms that 
is somewhat stricter than mere sameness of reference.  According to the new version 
of the principle, the substitution of one term for another co-referring term in a 
sentence is legitimate only when the substitution preserves the informational content 
of the sentence, and the substitution of co-referring terms in a sentence will yield 
another sentence that expresses the same statement as expressed by the original 
provided that two conditions are met. 
 The first condition that must be met is that the assumptions of knowledge and 
of ignorance associated with the utterance of a sentence into which such a substitution 
has been made must not conflict.  For Lockwood, the assumption of knowledge 
conflicts with the assumption of ignorance whenever the identification of the 
particular referred to in the speaker's use of a term in a sentence requires the audience 
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already to possess the information the utterance of the sentence is overall intended to 
convey.  The sentence "Everest is Everest" cannot be standardly employed as a means 
of informing an audience since its assertion would typically involve a conflict 
between the assumption of knowledge and the assumption of ignorance.  In uttering 
the sentence, the speaker would ordinarily assume (as part of the assumption of 
knowledge) that each member of the audience has a mental file to which the name 
"Everest" gives access and would also, paradoxically, assume (as part of the 
assumption of ignorance) that the mental file to which the name "Everest" gives 
access does not contain the information that the particular on which there is this file is 
the particular on which there is a file to which the name "Everest" gives access.  
However, the information assumed to be lacking is essentially the information that 
the name "Everest" gives access to a certain mental file, which is something that 
needs to be recognized by the members of the audience in order for them to identify 
the particular referred to in the speaker's utterance of the name "Everest."  The fact 
that the combined assumptions normally associated with an assertion of “Everest is 
Everest” do not make sense indicates for Lockwood that its assertion is not generally 
equivalent in content to the assertion of “Gaurisankar is Everest.”  Hence, the 
substitution of "Everest" for "Gaurisanker" in the sentence “Gaurisanker is Everest” 
may not preserve informational content and thus may represent an illegitimate 
substitution. 
 The second condition that must be met if co-referring terms are to be used 
interchangeably in a legitimate manner is that the speaker who uses the terms must be 
able to assume that his listeners or readers do not have distinct mental files to which 
each term gives its own separate access.  The sentence “Gaurisankar is the tallest 
mountain seen from Nepal” and the sentence “Everest is the tallest mountain seen 
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from Nepal” cannot be used to make the same assertion whenever the persons to 
whom the utterance of either sentence would be directed possessed a mental file to 
which the name "Gaurisankar" gave access that was distinct from the mental file to 
which the name "Everest" gave access.  Only when it is reasonable for the speaker to 
assume that the members of his audience have only one mental file to which co-
referring terms each give access can those terms be used interchangeably to pick out 
the same mental file and thus to say what amounts to the same thing about one and 
the same individual. 
 With a revision of the substitution principle comes a change in the 
understanding of a purely referential context.  For Lockwood, the purely referential 
use of a term is the use of a term under conditions that generally involve more than 
the mere fact that the speaker could possibly have instead used an alternative co-
referring term in an utterance having the same truth-value.  A purely referential 
context, for Lockwood, is a context in which a term is being used purely referentially.  
A term is being used purely referentially, for Lockwood, if and only if the use of the 
term serves only the purpose of enabling the speaker to indicate to his audience a 
particular mental file on the referent of the term and, when the speaker can assume 
that his audience has distinct mental files to which the term and other terms having 
the same reference give separate access, the substitution of the term for one of its co-
referring terms in the context of a sentence does not produce a sentence with the same 
informational content as the original.  Thus, according to Lockwood, we would 
normally expect substitutions of co-referring terms in a purely referential context not 
to preserve informational content, and possibly also truth-value, under certain 
circumstances and to preserve informational content, and hence also truth-value, 
under other circumstances.  Substitutions that preserve informational content always 
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preserve truth-value, but substitutions that preserve truth-value do not always 
preserve informational content.  For Lockwood, then, a purely referential context 
does not, oddly enough, guarantee the preservation of informational content when co-
referring terms are substituted one for the other.  Consequently, for Lockwood, more 
contexts are purely referential than are traditionally recognized. 
 So, in the final analysis, how exactly, and to what extent, has Lockwood 
solved the problem of identity?  The nonnecessity requirement is easily satisfied: an 
identity statement of the form ⎡α = β⎤ is not necessary since it is logically contingent, 
and, since it expresses a fact about language use, is presumably a statement that 
expresses a contingent matter of fact.  The contingent nature of statements of identity 
of the form ⎡α = β⎤ should also bestow upon them their nontriviality so that the 
nontriviality requirement is also apparently satisfied.  Lockwood considers an identity 
statement of the form ⎡α = β⎤ to have the same content as an identity statement of the 
form ⎡α = α⎤ when the assumptions of knowledge and of ignorance associated with 
the use of the terms α and β conflict.  However, when these assumptions do not 
conflict in the case of statements of the form ⎡α = β⎤, identity statements with a 
content different from the content of identity statements of the form ⎡α = α⎤ result.  
The difference in content requirement is thus apparently satisfied. 
 
5.2 Objections to Lockwood's account 
 Nevertheless, there are several puzzling aspects to Lockwood's account of 
identity, and it is susceptible to a host of possible objections.  It is questionable 
whether, in the final analysis, Lockwood actually provides an account of the content 
of identity statements, as opposed to merely proposing an explanation of how it is 
possible for there to be failures of the traditional principle of substitutivity in contexts 
 136
that are nevertheless purely referential.  The essentials of Lockwood's basic position 
on identity can be succinctly summarized as follows.  The purpose served by 
assertions of identity is to get an audience to regard as a single body of knowledge 
what was previously regarded as separate bodies of knowledge.  The statement "a = 
a" is always uninformative since its assertion always fails to satisfy what is required 
for statements in general to be informative.  The statement "a = b" can sometimes be 
used by a speaker to inform an audience, and this occurs only when (1) the audience 
has some idea of what "a" and "b" refer to but does not know that "a" and "b" are co-
referring and (2) a recognition of what "a" refers to does not depend on a recognition 
of what "b" refers to and vice versa.  (When this latter condition obtains for a 
particular assertion of identity, there is no conflict between the assumptions of 
knowledge and of ignorance involved.)  Furthermore, a speaker can legitimately use 
co-referring terms "a" and "b" interchangeably in making a particular assertion 
provided that his audience is aware that the terms are co-referring and has some 
knowledge of the referents of the terms but does not already acknowledge the content 
of the assertion and does not need to acknowledge that content prior to recognizing 
what the terms are being used to refer to in the speaker's utterance.  Thus, Lockwood 
attempts to provide an account of identity that centers upon solving the difference in 
content requirement.  The assertion of "a = a" is never informative, while the 
assertion of "a = b" can be informative when certain conditions are met.  The 
conditions that must be met are conditions under which it is not legitimate to 
substitute "a" for "b" (or vice versa) in an identity statement or any other statement.  
A specification of a workable principle of substitutivity, or of a purely referential 
context (or minimally of a context that is not purely referential), is therefore crucial to 
Lockwood's account of identity. 
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 The main trouble with Lockwood's analysis is that the manner in which he 
resolves the differences in content among identity statements ultimately does not shed 
very much light on the issue of what exactly is being claimed, if anything, when a 
speaker makes a true assertion of identity.  What Lockwood primarily provides us 
with is, in effect, a simple account of when the substitution of one co-referring term 
for another in a statement should result in a statement with the same informational 
content.  Lockwood appeals to some rather commonsense considerations in 
developing a revised account of a purely referential context, but, unfortunately, too 
much of what he says is left at the level of an analogy and not explained in more 
straightforward language.  What precisely is a "mental file"?  What does it mean for a 
term to give access to a mental file?  What does it mean for a file to contain 
information on an individual?  What does it mean to merge mental files into one?  
These questions never get fully answered, and yet they are important since they seem 
to concern matters of knowledge, reference, and linguistic aboutness and meaning.  
(Presumably, Lockwood could answer these questions by appealing to notions of such 
things as mental contents, linguistic predispositions, and capacities to recognize 
concepts, but, unfortunately, Lockwood never does so.)  Moreover, Lockwood 
advances a modified principle of substitutivity according to which substitutions of co-
referring terms allegedly preserve sameness of informational content, but Lockwood 
offers no account of informational content and thus no well-founded support for his 
proposed revisions to the principle of substitutivity.  The modifications he makes to 
that principle are evidently motivated by a desire to circumvent certain classical 
problems of substitutivity.  However, without an analysis of informational content, 
his emendations seem ad hoc, the only reason for adopting them being their 
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usefulness in avoiding some of the difficulties in interpreting some of the apparent 
failures of the principle of substitutivity. 
 In addition, it is clear that substitutions made in accordance with Lockwood's 
revised principle of substitutivity (i.e., substitutions in situations where the two 
conditions required, according to the principle, for the substitution to be legitimate are 
met) do not always succeed in preserving truth-value, and it is arguably the case that 
some such substitutions do not succeed in preserving informational content even if 
they do succeed in not altering truth-value.  That the former is the case can easily be 
seen by considering a simple example.  Suppose, borrowing from an example 
provided in Chapter 3, Joe believes that Mark Twain wrote The Adventures of Tom 
Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn.  However, suppose it is not true to say, because of 
Joe's lack of knowledge about Mark Twain's real name, that Joe believes Samuel 
Clemens wrote The Adventures of Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn.  Suppose now 
that a speaker, who is someone distinct from Joe, wishes to inform an audience about 
Joe's belief concerning the author of The Adventures of Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry 
Finn, and suppose each member of the audience knows who Mark Twain was and 
knows that Mark Twain was Samuel Clemens and is ignorant of Joe's beliefs about 
the matter.  According to Lockwood's principle of substitutivity, the speaker could 
utter either one of the following two sentences as a means of informing the audience 
about Joe's beliefs. 
 
 Joe believes that Mark Twain wrote The Adventures of Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry 
Finn. 
Joe believes that Samuel Clemens wrote The Adventures of Tom Sawyer and 
Huckleberry Finn. 
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 The latter sentence results from the former by substituting the term "Samuel 
Clemens" for the term "Mark Twain."  The substitution that generates the latter 
sentence is in conformity with Lockwood's revised principle since in the case 
imagined the utterance of the latter sentence does not involve a conflict between the 
assumptions of knowledge and of ignorance (since the name "Samuel Clemens" 
means something to the audience and the audience is ignorant of Joe's beliefs) and the 
audience does not have distinct mental files to which the names "Mark Twain" and 
"Samuel Clemens" each give separate access (since the audience knows that "Mark 
Twain" and "Samuel Clemens" are co-referring terms).  According to the suppositions 
that have been made, however, the former sentence is true while the latter sentence is 
false.  Truth-value, and thus informational content, has therefore not been preserved 
under substitution in this case. 
 Lockwood might respond to this situation by pointing out that in the case 
imagined only the former sentence could be used to report accurately the content of 
Joe's belief, so the latter sentence could not be used to inform the audience about Joe's 
belief, the revelation of the content of that belief supposedly being the speaker's 
purpose for uttering either sentence.  The problem, he might claim, is not with the 
revised substitution principle but with the supposed facts of the matter.  However, this 
would mean that further emendation of the substitution principle is necessary.  In 
order to be legitimate, not only would a substitution of one co-referring term for 
another in a sentence need to involve no conflict between the assumptions of 
knowledge and of ignorance when the utterance of the sentence is directed at an 
audience who recognizes that the terms are co-referring, but the substitution would 
also need to preserve the truth or falsity of the original sentence.  An appeal to a new, 
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appropriately emended, substitution principle could then only, at best, account for the 
conditions under which some substitutions of co-referring terms (i.e., those 
substitutions that preserve truth-value) produce different sentences the utterance of 
which is, for a certain sort of audience, equally informative.  (Notice that the relevant 
notion of sameness of informational content is too weak to be a general notion of 
synonymy since it presupposes an understanding of, rather than accounts for, the 
conditions under which different sentences will exhibit a sameness of truth-value.)  
Alternatively, Lockwood might respond to my alleged counterexample by claiming 
that sentences about propositional attitudes, as well as those involving indirect 
discourse, should always be given a transparent reading.  Since both the former and 
the latter sentences are true given a transparent reading, such a move would eliminate 
the difficulty.  Nevertheless, given this response to the problem (as is also the case 
with the former response), it hard to see the value of Lockwood's principle of 
substitutivity, inasmuch as it is of no help in resolving the most serious problems of 
interpretation that arise in connection with the standard notion of intersubstitutivity.  
Rather than aiding our understanding of why the substitution of co-referring terms 
fails to preserve truth-value in certain troublesome cases involving grammatically 
complex sentences, an appeal to Lockwood's principle of substitutivity can evidently 
aid our understanding of why substitutivity fails when substitutions of co-referring 
terms produce only trivial statements of identity or statements containing terms with 
which an audience is unfamiliar.  To be truly useful, Lockwood's principle needs to 
be further refined so as not to legitimize substitutions of co-referring terms in 
connection with the utterances of sentences that involve conflicts between the 
assumptions of knowledge and of ignorance having to do not only with what the 
speaker and his audience know and do not know but also with what other people 
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(such as people whose beliefs are reported on) know and do not know.  Only by 
making such refinements will the application of the principle not be questionable in 
the case I have imagined and in a myriad of other possible cases displaying various 
degrees of additional complexity.  Unfortunately, the necessary refinements of the 
principle may get quite complicated, and I see no easy way to state a general principle 
of substitutivity along the lines of Lockwood's principle that is both plausible and 
significant. 
 I have characterized Lockwood's position on identity as a metalinguistic view 
of identity, even though Lockwood never explicitly declares that identity is a relation 
that holds between the terms in an identity statement and not a relation between the 
referents of those terms.  In fact, since Lockwood makes it clear that he does not wish 
to challenge the traditional idea of the referential use of proper names and 
descriptions as serving only the purpose of singling out their referents, it would 
appear that he views the referential use of terms in identity statements as enabling 
speakers to refer to the terms’ objects of reference instead of to the terms themselves.  
Nevertheless, if what he proposes is to be taken as a serious account of identity, then 
his views on identity should be seen as providing for a metalinguistic account of 
identity.  Since it is doubtful that Lockwood subscribes to the peculiar view that 
assertions of identity are primarily about mental files rather than the terms that give 
access to mental files or the individuals on whom there are these files, the items that 
are claimed to be related in making assertions of identity are for Lockwood either the 
terms or the individuals.  What Lockwood states explicitly about the content of 
identity statements strongly suggests that he interprets the terms to be the subjects of 
identity statements.  For Lockwood, the identity statement "a = b" means (or the 
content of the identity statement "a = b" is) that the terms "a" and "b" can and should 
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give access to the same mental file.  The identity statement "a = a" means essentially 
that the term "a" gives access to a mental file, which is something that a speaker who 
utters such a statement presupposes his audience already recognizes.  The terms in a 
true identity statement therefore stand in a certain relation, the relation of giving 
access to a single mental file on a single individual.  For Lockwood, then, the primary 
content of identity statements is evidently about their terms, not about the referents of 
their terms.  Speakers who assert identity statements are only indirectly concerned 
with mental files and the particulars on which there are these files.  Lockwood's 
account of identity is thus a metalinguistic account of identity. 
 Admittedly, though, Lockwood does seem occasionally to depart from a 
metalinguistic analysis, which suggests that Lockwood's view of identity is not 
entirely consistent.  For instance, when explaining why an assertion of the sentence 
"Everest is Everest" involves a conflict between the assumptions of knowledge and of 
ignorance, Lockwood states that the speaker who utters the sentence would be 
assuming, among other things, that the mental file to which the name "Everest" gives 
access does not contain the information that the particular on which there is this file is 
the particular on which there is a file to which the name "Everest" gives access.  
However, this assumption is, according to Lockwood's notion of conflict between the 
assumption of knowledge and the assumption of ignorance, the information the 
utterance of the sentence "Everest is Everest" is overall intended to convey.  Thus, 
Lockwood is apparently committed to the view that the information provided by (i.e., 
the content of?) the assertion of "Everest is Everest" is about the particulars to which 
the terms flanking the identity predicate give access.  This view is an unfortunate 
result of Lockwood's particular attempt at accounting for how the two different kinds 
of identity claims can differ in informative value and is at odds with Lockwood's 
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fundamental position regarding the content of assertions of identity, which is, despite 
this anomaly, a metalinguistic account of identity. 
 Being a metalinguistic analysis of identity, Lockwood's account of identity is 
thus susceptible to all the difficulties that customarily attend such a view.  It is 
difficult, for instance, to see how the assertion of an allegedly informative identity 
statement can really be used to inform an audience about the world, since all it 
conveys is the idea that certain terms are to be regarded in a certain manner (i.e., as 
terms that give access to the same mental file).  Furthermore, Lockwood's stated 
position on identity concerns only identity statements that contain terms that are being 
used purely referentially.  Lockwood does not deny that an identity statement may 
contain terms that are being used attributively.  (The problem of identity that concerns 
Lockwood arises, though, only in the case of an assertion of identity that involves the 
referential use of terms.)  However, it is not clear, given Lockwood's conception of 
identity, what information is imparted to an audience by the utterance of an identity 
statement that contains a term that is being used attributively.  Given Lockwood's 
notion of identity, the assertions of identity statements containing terms used 
attributively are in many cases somehow about both terms and the referents of terms.  
(The values of variables in the component assertions of uniqueness will be objects, 
but the values of the variables that appear in the contained ascriptions of identity will 
be both objects and terms.)  Lockwood's metalinguistic account of identity thus seems 
to necessitate that the variables of quantification involved in identity statements 
somehow be understood in two different ways in order for the account to be applied 
more generally to cases involving either the referential or the attributive use of terms 
in an assertion of identity. 
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 In addition, the attributive use of terms in assertions of identity does not 
appear in most cases to involve simply encouraging an audience to merge mental 
files.  Indeed, unless there is some legitimate sense in which people can be thought to 
construct at will new mental files on the basis of previously existing mental files, 
speakers who use complex singular terms usually cannot assume that members of an 
audience have mental files to which the terms give access.  For most people, it is 
doubtful, for instance, that complicated mathematical terms containing numerous 
functor expressions give immediate access to mental files on the numbers to which 
the terms refer.  Furthermore, assertions of identity corresponding to mathematical 
equations containing such complicated terms clearly do not serve the purpose of 
getting an audience to merge mental files.  Rather, such assertions of identity most 
likely serve the practical purpose of informing an audience about the results of certain 
calculations.  Similarly, the attributive use of more mundane complex terms in an 
assertion of identity seems in the typical case to serve the purpose of conveying 
information about the reference of the terms instead of promoting the merger of 
mental files.  For example, the grocery shopper who tells the clerk in the checkout 
lane, "The most expensive item on my grocery list is the item I want to buy the least," 
may be attempting to convey explicitly or implicitly several different bits of 
information but is certainly not trying to get the store clerk to merge mental files.  
(Unless the situation is unusual, the store clerk does not even have mental files on the 
most expensive item on the list and on the item the shopper wants to buy the least.)  
Thus, even if Lockwood's analysis had succeeded in solving the problem of identity 
in the case of a referential use of singular terms in an identity statement, his analysis 
still could not be extended to solve the problem of identity in the case of an attributive 
use of singular terms in an identity statement. 
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 I should also point out that there are some rather obvious problems of 
circularity with Lockwood's account of identity.  First of all, the purposes served by 
assertions of identity are, for Lockwood, to be accounted for in terms of encouraging 
an audience to merge mental files into one, or the same, file, but, if we do not 
understand sameness as a relation between terms, then we are not in a position to 
understand sameness as a relation between mental files.  Lockwood's account of 
identity, like Frege and Kripke's, requires a prior understanding of identity in the 
metalanguage.  Secondly, separate mental files can be, or should be, merged because 
the subjects on which those files exist are the same, and thus Lockwood's 
metalinguistic analysis of identity relies upon a prior notion of identity as a relation 
between objects.  Presumably, if a speaker's identity claims are not always trivial, 
there should be a reason why the members of an audience can follow the speaker’s 
recommendation to merge mental files.  That general reason must reside in the 
speaker's belief in the identity of the subjects of those files.  However, if the identity 
of the subjects is considered to be just the mergeability of their associated mental 
files, then a circular truism ("Mental files can be merged because they can be 
merged") is the result.  Thus, Lockwood needs to hold that mental files can be merged 
because their subjects are the same and that subjects are not the same merely because 
their mental files can be merged.  Hence, the idea of why mental files are the same, 
and consequently Lockwood's proposed analysis of identity, depends upon a prior 
notion of identity, a notion of identity as a relation between objects. 
 
5.3 A modified metalinguistic account 
 Perhaps, though, an identity theorist could offer the following alternative 
account of identity that is explicitly metalinguistic and is well within at least the spirit 
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of Lockwood's analysis of identity.5  The singular terms used in any assertion of 
identity are being used to refer only to the terms themselves, and thus there is no 
distinction between the referential use of a singular term and the attributive use of a 
singular term at least when it comes to assertions of identity.  Furthermore, when a 
speaker uses an identity statement in making an assertion, the only thing the speaker 
says literally is that the terms that flank the identity predicate can be or should be 
used interchangeably.  An ascription of identity has no other inherent content other 
than that associated with a declaration of the interchangeability of its terms.  Whether 
the interchangeability of terms is considered to be due to a stipulation or to the nature 
of the world is revealed by certain contextual elements and by the features of the 
utterance of the identity statement that determine its illocutionary force.  How then 
can statements of identity be used to inform an audience?  Although the utterance of 
an identity statement is rarely informative all by itself, an assertion of identity is often 
made within a context where claims about the intersubstitutivity and co-referentiality 
of terms have important ramifications that can be recognized by both the speaker and 
his audience.  It is this background that provides identity statements with an indirect 
informational content and enables them to have an added significance that they 
normally do not possess.  For instance, in telling his students that two terms can be 
substituted one for the other, an algebra instructor may in effect be informing his 
students of something significant due to the fact that, given what he has already told 
them about the subject, they are then able to recognize how to make a substitution of 
                                                 
5.  This alternative account seems to come close to Morris's “functional account” of identity 
presented in his Understanding Identity Statements.  However, if I understand the latter account 
correctly, Morris's position is even more radical.  Morris seems to think that the utterance of an identity 
statement is not really an assertion of any kind of fact at all.  For Morris, as far as content or meaning 
is concerned, identity statements should be understood only in terms of the function or purpose they 
serve in getting an audience to merge bodies of knowledge.  Wittgenstein also seems to have endorsed 
a similar more radical view of identity at certain places in the Tractatus (e.g., 4.241, 4.242, 5.5303, 6.2, 
6.21, 6.23, 6.2322, and 6.24). 
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terms that will enable an equation to be reduced algebraically.  In a similar vein, 
because it is generally recognized that certain astronomical conditions must be 
fulfilled in order for us to be able to use two designations for a heavenly body 
interchangeably, the statement "The morning is the evening star" can be used to 
inform an audience indirectly about the satisfaction of those astronomical conditions.  
Identity statements are always trivial in the sense that what is conveyed to an 
audience immediately by any utterance of one concerns only the interchangeability of 
terms, but identity statements can have a significant indirect, or connotative, content 
due to the context of their utterance.  In addition, whereas a single term is always in 
effect used interchangeably with itself, two distinct terms are not necessarily used 
interchangeably.  Thus, the statement "a = a" always appears trivial and linguistically 
necessary, but the statement "a = b" can appear both nontrivial and nonnecesssary.  
Where "a" and "b" are distinct singular terms, what is said literally and what is 
conversationally implied by an utterance of "a = b" is typically different than what is 
conveyed literally and what is suggested (if anything) by an utterance of "a = a". 
 This alternative analysis represents what is perhaps one of the most 
satisfactory metalinguistic accounts of identity possible.  It avoids the problem of 
giving a clearly circular characterization of identity that ruins the attempt to define 
identity in terms of co-referentiality (i.e., sameness of reference).  It seems to account 
nicely for the nonnecessity and nontriviality of identity statements, while at the same 
time preserving at least the indirect significance of such statements.  In spite of this, 
however appealing this view of identity may be, I believe it suffers from two very 
major defects and should in the end be rejected.  First of all, just as is true with 
Lockwood's metalinguistic account of identity, there is the problem of interpreting 
generalizations containing the identity predicate.  What flanks the identity predicate 
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in a sentence may not be singular terms but may in effect be variables, as in the 
generalizations "Something is identical to itself" and "Things both identical to a thing 
are identical to each other."  (The former sentence is sometimes used, perhaps 
inappropriately, to assert that a domain of discourse is not empty, and the latter 
sentence may be used as a way of expressing the notion of the transitivity of identity.)  
Of course, identity statements containing terms that are being used attributively also 
amount to generalizations in which variables in effect flank the identity predicate.  If 
identity is taken to be a relation that, properly speaking, only holds between terms, 
then there is a difficulty in interpreting what statements containing the identity 
predicate without singular terms, or with singular terms used only attributively, are 
about.  The sorts of generalizations mentioned above appear to be about what amount 
to the values of their variables of quantification.  Indeed, in the case of identity 
statements the utterance of which involves the attributive use of singular terms, the 
singular terms themselves drop out when these statements are put into their proper 
quantificational form.  However, these sorts of generalizations cannot be exclusively 
about the referents of singular terms if identity is a relation holding only between 
terms.  These kinds of generalizations would in some fashion be about language and 
about things in the world at the same time, a highly implausible situation.  So, unless 
a good case can be made for there being two different kinds of quantifiers, one whose 
variables range over objects and another whose variables range over singular terms, 
both metalinguistic accounts discussed above, and generally all metalinguistic 
accounts of identity, face the difficulty of relying upon an inconsistent notion of 
quantification.6
                                                 
6.  A proposal to introduce two such kinds of quantifiers into an analysis of identity 
statements has been entertained by James B. Freeman in “Quantification, Identity, and Opacity in 
Relevant Logic” (in Directions in Relevant Logic). 
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 The other major defect in the proposed analysis of identity has to do with the 
relationship between the primary or literal content of an identity statement and what 
is taken to be part of the secondary or implied content of an identity statement.  
According to the account of identity proposed above, the literal or denotative 
meaning of an assertion of identity consists of only an assertion of the 
intersubstitutivity of terms, while a claim about the co-referentiality of terms is only a 
part of the suggested or connotative meaning of an assertion of identity.  Thus, in 
asserting "a = b," a speaker says literally only that the terms "a" and "b" can be used 
interchangeably in suitable contexts without altering the truth or falsity of what is 
asserted.  Nonetheless, since we would not normally claim that two singular terms 
can be used interchangeably unless there was something that they both referred to, 
given certain considerations concerning the nature of reference and the nature of 
singular terms, the assertion of the interchangeability of "a" and "b" seems to suggest, 
or to conversationally imply, that there is some x such that "a" refers to x and "b" 
refers to x.  This latter fact in turn seems to suggest, given certain higher level 
metalinguistic assumptions, that the terms "the referent of 'a'" and the referent of 'b'" 
can also be used interchangeably.  If these latter two terms can be used 
interchangeably, then, according to the metalinguistic notion of identity, the referent 
of "a" is the same as the referent of "b," which means that "a" and "b" are co-
referring terms.   In this fashion, the co-referentiality of "a" and "b" may be seen as a 
part of the connotative meaning of asserting that a is equal to b.  However, the 
metalinguistic assumptions about singular terms and reference must be about both 
objects and language in order for what is stated about language to imply something 
about objects.  These assumptions must be about the uniqueness of the reference of 
singular terms and the "aboutness" of statements or assertions and the 
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interchangeability of their terms.  The notion of unique reference involved will 
contain notions of identity, at least one of which cannot be a notion of identity as a 
relation between terms.  In order for singular terms to be connected with their 
referents, at least one component notion of identity must be a notion of identity as a 
relation between objects.  In order for a speaker to imply the co-referentiality of terms 
by asserting the intersubstitutivity of terms, the speaker must therefore rely upon 
assumptions some of which involve treating identity as a relation between objects.  
The identity theorist who advocates the proposed analysis has thus failed to realize 
that, if "a = b" is true, then "a" and "b" can be substituted one for the other because 
they are co-referring terms.  If singular terms are intersubstitutable in appropriate 
contexts, then they are so intersubstitutable because they are co-referential; they are 
not co-referential merely because they are intersubstitutable. 
 Therefore, from the examination of Lockwood's account of identity and the 
alternative analysis, there emerge two other sorts of problems with which the 
metalinguistic identity theorist must deal.  There is a problem of interpreting the 
quantification involved in identity statements: the metalinguistic analysis appears to 
force an inconsistent interpretation of quantification.  There is also the problem of the 
reliance upon a prior notion of identity as a relation between singular terms and 
objects: a metalinguistic account of identity seems to depend for its completion upon 
an objectual account of identity.  Furthermore, the appeal to speech act theory does 
not alleviate these problems but instead may actually make them more apparent. 
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Chapter 6: Toward a Solution to the Problem 
 
6.0 Some conclusions regarding attempts to solve the problem 
 The difficulties that attend the typical sort of objectual analysis of identity 
emerge from the consideration of Frege’s and Kripke’s accounts of identity.  
Associated quite naturally with the view of identity as a relation between objects is 
the understanding of identity as a metaphysically necessary relation that always holds 
between anything and itself.  With regard to at least metaphysical necessity, the 
objectual identity theorist thus comes to reject the idea that there are contingently true 
(i.e., true but not necessary) statements of identity.  All identity statements are at least 
in one sense necessarily true when true.  The identity theorist who advances an 
objectual account then provides for the sense in which some identity statements are 
not necessary and not trivial by a special theory of the expressions or terms that flank 
the identity predicate in an identity statement.  One consequence of the special theory 
of expressions may be that not all statements that appear on the surface to be 
statements of identity are actually, properly speaking, identity statements.  The fact 
that some statements that appear to be identity statements are informative is then 
interpreted to be a result of the fact that not all such statements are in some sense both 
necessary and trivial.  Unfortunately, the sense in which some apparent identity 
statements turn out to be neither necessary nor trivial does not seem to capture in its 
entirety our ordinary idea of contingently true identity statements.  Some statements 
of identity seem to be contingently true because the identification of the referents of 
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the expressions flanking the identity predicate as the same object is itself a contingent 
matter of fact quite apart from the nature of the expressions used to refer to the 
objects.  Another trouble for the objectual identity theorist is that his particular 
strategy for solving the problem of identity does not enable him to provide a 
noncircular account of identity that is thereby free of a prior notion of identity.  The 
identity predicate remains in an important sense primitive and unanalyzed on an 
objectual analysis of identity. 
A metalinguistic account of identity, such as the one Lockwood offers, is 
plagued by another set of difficulties.  If identity is a relation among the terms in an 
identity statement, the terms in an identity statement are being mentioned instead of 
being used, and what, in asserting a statement of identity, a speaker is claiming is 
essentially that the terms are being used or should be used interchangeably.  As a 
consequence, if identity is a relation among terms, identity statements are statements 
primarily about language use and only have an indirect connection to the things in the 
world about which we wish to speak.  The untoward consequences of adopting a 
metalinguistic approach to identity thus seem more obvious than they are for an 
objectual approach, for the metalinguistic interpretation of identity statements appears 
immediately counterintuitive.  There is also the problem of making sense of the 
quantification involved when the identity predicate occurs in generalizations, 
particularly in generalizations where it is clear that a statement of identity constitutes 
only a part of the generalization.  In addition, the identity theorist who defends a 
metalinguistic analysis will ultimately have to rely on an objectual understanding of 
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identity statements in order to account for how it is possible for identity claims to be 
significant claims that are at least indirectly about things in the world.  An objectual 
understanding of identity statements will also be required if such an identity theorist 
wishes to characterize a purely referential context, in which substitutions of co-
referring terms are always legitimate, so that his specification of the truth conditions 
for identity statements on the metalinguistic reading is meaningful in that it avoids 
vicious problems of circularity.  Thus, one who offers a metalinguistic account of 
identity is actually presupposing that all the difficulties that attend an objectual 
account of identity have been resolved.  As a result, there seems to be little reason for 
pursuing the metalinguistic strategy for developing an account of sentence meaning 
aimed strictly at identity statements. 
In the remaining sections to follow, I want to give some consideration to the 
idea of identity as a logical relation and to the idea of identity as indiscernibility.  
Several distinct points will emerge from my brief discussion, and I will conclude by 
weaving these different lines of thought together in order to suggest a strategy that 
may in the end be fruitful in solving the problem of identity. 
 
6.1 Identity and truth as logical notions 
Identity is often treated as an irreducible logical relation that holds between 
any object and itself.  What sense, though, can be made of the notion of a strictly 
logical relation that holds true of objects?  Since the logical relations are normally 
thought of as the inferential relations that obtain among sentences, this is certainly not 
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the exact sense we should attach to the identity predicate.  In formal systems of logic, 
the sign for identity is treated as a binary predicate except that it has a standard 
interpretation, and thus in this sense has a fixed meaning, and for this reason it is 
deemed a logical predicate.  However, any formal language sentence of the form ⎡α = 
β⎤, where α and β are distinct singular terms, is a contingency, just as it is the case 
with any nonlogical binary predicate, and the differences in truth-value among 
different identity statements of this form are due solely to differences in the 
denotations (assignments or interpretations) of the singular terms. 
In formal systems, we do have precise rules governing the relations among 
identity statements and certain nonidentity statements in proofs.  In spite of the 
differences in the interpretation of the nature of the identity relation provided by the 
objectual and metalinguistic accounts of identity, the inference rules of identity 
introduction and identity elimination are standard.  Furthermore, there is an important 
sense in which to understand the meaning of a logical particle is just to understand the 
inferences that can be made from sentences containing that particle, and I think this is 
also true in the case of identity (which is understandable given that, as I have 
indicated, the logical problem of identity will not be solved unless and until there is 
provided an understanding of identity that warrants its associated inference 
principles).  Thus, to understand the meaning of the identity predicate, one needs to 
take into consideration its associated inference rules, especially the rule that gets 
expressed in formal systems as the rule of identity elimination, since the truth 
conditions for identity claims can be stated (and are probably more accurately stated) 
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in terms of this rule.  However, these rules are specified in terms of syntax only, and 
identity is not a relation merely among words.  It is also not merely a relation among 
objects, for the construing of it as such a relation has led to the perplexities previously 
mentioned.  Nonetheless, we can specify the truth conditions of an identity statement 
in terms of both syntax and semantics by saying that a statement of the form ⎡α = β⎤ 
is true whenever we can replace the name α with the name β (and vice versa) in the 
transparent context of any sentence and preserve the truth-value of the sentence.  
Obviously, though, such a specification is plausible only if we can provide an 
appropriate notion of a transparent context that can be understood independently of 
the permitted substitutions.   
There is an interesting parallel between the identity predicate and the truth 
predicate.  Both the predicate “is identical to” and “is true” have logical and 
semantical properties.  Just as an identity statement has certain logical consequences, 
so does a statement that ascribes truth to another statement.  From the statement ⎡p is 
true⎤, p can be inferred, and, from the statement p, the statement ⎡p is true⎤ can be 
inferred.  Questions analogous to the questions of meaning, reference, and 
informational value, which are asked about identity statements, can also be asked 
about statements that ascribe truth.  What precisely is a speaker indicating when he 
asserts that something is true?  What is truth a property of (i.e., what kinds of things 
have the property of being true)?  How, given just the semantical features of the truth 
predicate, is it possible for statements that ascribe truth to be significant and 
informative?  The distinction between matters pertaining to the logical content of a 
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statement and matters pertaining to the extralogical conditions under which a 
statement is judged to be true can also be maintained with regard to statements that 
ascribe truth.  Thus, there are the issues concerning the meaning or content of 
statements that ascribe truth on the one hand and issues concerning the conditions 
under which an ascription of truth is itself accepted as true (or the content of a 
statement that ascribes truth, whatever that content happens to be, is accepted or 
believed) on the other hand.  The similarities between the questions and issues 
surrounding the identity predicate and those surrounding the truth predicate at least 
suggest that there is some connection between the predicate “is identical to” and the 
predicate “is true.” 
 
6.2 Identity as indiscernibility 
Identity is sometimes characterized in terms of indiscernibility, as is allegedly 
suggested by Leibniz.  Some take the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals and 
the principle of the identity of the indiscernibles to in effect give the logical meaning 
of identity statements.  According to the former principle (the relatively 
uncontroversial one of the two), things that are identical are indiscernible (have all 
their properties in common).  According to the latter principle (the more controversial 
one), things that are indiscernible (have all their properties in common) are identical.  
The combination of both of these principles is sometimes called “Leibniz’s Law.”  
However, Leibniz never clearly advances either one of these principles as a logical 
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principle.1  Perhaps the clearest statement of the logical nature of identity Leibniz 
made occurs in his discussion of his proposed “universal calculus.”  In that 
discussion, Leibniz had the following to say about identity.  
 
Def. 1.   Two terms are the same (eadem) if one can be substituted for the other 
without altering the truth of any statement (salva veritate).  If we have A and B, and 
A enters into some true proposition, and the substitution of B for A wherever it 
appears, results in a new proposition which is likewise true, and if this can be done 
for every such proposition, then A and B are said to be the same; and conversely, if A 
and B are the same, they can be substituted for one another as I have said.  Terms 
which are the same are also called coincident (coincidentia); A and A are, of course, 
said to be the same, but if A and B are the same, they are called coincident.2
 
The above definition of the identity relation unfortunately describes identity as a 
relation among terms, but the definiens is interesting, though, since it seems to 
represent, in essence, the specification of the truth conditions for identity statements I 
mentioned above in the previous section.  However, since the definition does not 
characterize identity, as a relation between objects, in terms of indiscernibility, those 
who see the definition as advancing the view of identity as strict indiscernibility 
(according to the two above-mentioned indiscernibility principles) must be appealing 
to additional matters (including, perhaps, matters Leibniz never entertained). 
 Some, evidently prompted by a consideration of the two indiscernibility 
principles (or something akin to those principles), have suggested that the identity 
relation be defined as a relation that holds between object a and object b when and 
                                                 
1.  See, for instance, Ishiguro’s discussion of these matters in his Leibniz’s Philosophy of 
Logic and Language and Simons’ entry in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (s.v. “Identity of 
Indiscernibles). 
2.  Translated as section XIX by C.I. Lewis, A Survey of Symbolic Logic, 373. 
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only when all properties of a are properties of b and vice versa.  In a formal system, 
this definition gets expressed in standard second-order logic as the following formal 
statement. 
 
(x)(y)(x = y ≡ (X)(Xx ≡ Xy) 
 
This approach does seem to be promising for several reasons.  The questions of 
reference and meaning seem to be answered in a straightforward manner: the terms in 
an identity statement refer to objects, and those objects stand in the identity relation 
just in case they have all their properties in common.  Since an identity statement 
amounts to a logically contingent statement, the assertion of such statements can in 
principle inform us about the world and for that reason can be significant.  Also, a 
complete grasp of the definition does not appear, on the surface anyway, to rely on a 
prior understanding of identity.  However, depending upon how the quantification 
over properties is interpreted, individual properties may need to be clearly 
identifiable, which would require at best a notion of the sameness of properties and at 
worst a prior notion of the sameness of objects.  Furthermore, the domain over which 
the second-order variables range, or the class of the substituends of those variables, 
must be specified in such a way as to avoid modal and other sorts of paradoxes, 
without incurring problems of circularity, and thus be successful in specifying the 
contexts in which substitutions of co-referring terms are plausible. 
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 Perhaps, though, the strategy of defining the identity relation in terms of some 
sense of indiscernibility can be employed in some other way so as to yield a feasible 
account of identity.  I will now end my discussion with a proposal for such an 
amended account.  Rather than taking identity to be a relation that holds when things 
have all their properties in common, one could conceivably construe identity as a 
relation holding between a and b just in case everything true of a is also true of b and 
vice versa.  In order to make this precise, however, one will interpret identity 
statements to be statements rendered in the metalanguage and will construe the 
metalanguage as containing both expressions used to refer to sentences in the object 
language and terms occurring in the object language used to refer to objects.  
Metalinguistic expressions used to refer to object language sentences will be 
constructible from sentences in the object language together with an apparatus in the 
metalanguage that functions like quotation.  The metalanguage will also contain the 
predicates of the object language together with a special predicate, having logical 
properties, that does not occur in the object language and that designates the relation 
of a sentence being true of an object.  The predicate that designates this relation 
between sentences and objects will be characterized semantically in such a fashion 
that the substitution of one term for another in object language sentences will 
preserve truth-value among such sentences provided that the relevant metalanguage 
sentence representing the appropriate identity statement is true.  In addition, we will 
take the quantification over sentences in the object language to be substitutional 
quantification and characterize syntactically the values of the variables occurring only 
 160
in the metalanguage as object language sentences that represent just those contexts in 
which the substitution of co-referring terms is always legitimate.  The development of 
such a metalanguage will obviously require a metalanguage to be thought of in an 
entirely different manner than is customary.  Nevertheless, the approach I have just 
outlined seems to be worth pursuing since it may well result in an account of identity 
that has all the benefits of the above-mentioned account, while at the same time 
circumventing its pitfalls.  If my suggested approach to the strategy of defining 
identity in terms of indiscernibility is ultimately successful, it should have the added 
bonus of providing an account of identity that takes identity to be a logical notion free 
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